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RUSSIA, THE WEST, AND WORLD ORDER

By ROBERT C. TUCKER

I

THERE is a feeling abroad today that Western civilization is on trial before history. One of the clearest signs of it is the increasing frequency with which we hear the word "challenge" in connection with the policies and progress of Soviet Russia and the Communist world at large. The challenge of the sputniks, of Soviet science and education, of Soviet economic development—these phrases, and variations on them, have recently grown all too familiar in America and Europe. We realize, of course, that the situation is not wholly a dark one for the West, that our Communist adversaries have serious internal problems of their own to contend with, that they too face some challenges. Still, nowadays few in the West find grounds for complacency in that fact.

In the following pages, attention will be directed to a generally neglected aspect of this large problem—the thinking on both sides about what is happening in the world in the twentieth century. The topic of this article is the Soviet challenge to the West in the field of theory. The term "theory" is used here in a quite specific sense. It refers not to theoretical ideas in general, and not to science, but concretely to comprehensive conceptions of the *historical process* of our time, conceptions of the direction or directions in which events are tending on a world scale. The thesis to be defended is that Soviet Russia does present a most serious challenge to the West in this particular sphere, albeit a challenge of which people in the West are not generally aware. One of the reasons why it is so serious is that "theory" in the particular meaning just specified is intimately related to policy-making, and the latter, in turn, influences or may influence the actual world trend of development.

Notoriously, we in the West tend to minimize the need for theory (and theorists) in the policy-making function, whereas the Soviet policy-makers attach considerable importance to it. In this respect they continue a tradition which goes very far back into the past, and most notably to Lenin's important work of 1902, *What Is To Be Done?*, in which he contended that "Without a revolutionary theory

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there can be no revolutionary movement." Lenin here went far beyond his master, Marx, whose position was just the reverse of this; for Marx the correct formulation would be that without a revolutionary movement there can be no revolutionary theory.[1] The Russian Communist mind has changed considerably since Lenin's time, but theory in the above-mentioned sense of the word still shapes its thinking to an important degree. It is a measure of the persistence of this theoretical bias that Nikita Khrushchev, who is exceedingly theory-oriented compared with leading statesmen in most Western countries, has been criticized by certain elements within the Soviet Communist Party for being insufficiently so. He has rejected their charge of "practicalism."

The contrast between this outlook in policy-making and the characteristic Western one scarcely requires documenting. A pragmatic or instrumentalist approach to world problems typifies the Western policy-maker. Not theoretical conceptions enabling him to relate policy to the general trends of events, but know-*how* in the face of concrete problem-situations is what he typically emphasizes. He wants to "solve" the immediate, given concrete problem that is causing "trouble," and be done with it. Accordingly, diplomatic *experience*—always of great importance, of course—is exalted as the supreme qualification for leadership in foreign policy. For experience is the royal road to know-how. It teaches the statesman how to negotiate with the Russians, how to co-ordinate policy with the allies, how to respond to emergencies, and so on.

In facing foreign-policy problems it is not the Western habit to attempt first of all to form a valid general picture of the world-setting of events in which the problems have arisen. The tendency is rather to isolate the given problem-situation from the larger movement of history and ask: What can and should we *do* about it? And, characteristically, even when one of the West's important thinkers, Professor George Kennan, seeks to *rethink* our foreign policy, as in his recent Reith lectures in England, he begins not by asking what is broadly happening in the twentieth-century world, but by pointing straight to the German situation as the crucial knot in the tangle of East-West relations and suggesting a new, practical approach to it.

So strong is the instrumentalist bias in our foreign-policy thinking that we cannot easily perceive the existence of a Soviet challenge to the West in the area of theory. We can readily see that the Russians

[1] See, for example, Marx's statement that "The existence of revolutionary ideas in a particular period presupposes the existence of a revolutionary class" (K. Marx and F. Engels, *The German Ideology*, New York, 1939, p. 40).

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challenge us in science, education, military power, economic growth, missiles—everything, in fact, about which we can straightway *do* something without becoming involved in the work of theorizing. On the other hand, some of our Asian friends take a very different view. A Ceylonese scholar visiting in the United States suggests that a technological bias is unfortunate in Western relations with contemporary Asia. The Western democracies, he writes, appear to be hamstrung vis-à-vis Asia, and will have to learn that "support of freedom alone as an essential for the life of Asia is not enough." And, referring to the Soviet bloc, he goes on to say: "The strength of the Marxist group stems from the fact that they provide theory or ideology which is relevant to the clamant needs of the peoples. *Tools alone are not enough.* This is what aid under the Columbo plan reveals."[2] I believe that we would do well to reflect seriously on this criticism of the Western approach to the problems of Asia, and note that the deficiency to which it calls attention is a deficiency of "theory."

However, our image of a pragmatic, technique-minded West versus a theory-conscious Soviet Russia requires some modification. For the foreign policy of the Western coalition has a certain grand design which is not devoid of doctrinal foundation. Curiously, though, this underlying philosophy of the Western position derives from a single source—a rather brief essay by George Kennan, entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" and published in *Foreign Affairs* in 1947. Here Kennan explored the motivation of the Soviet expansionism which, as he correctly foresaw, would confront the West for years or decades ahead with a profoundly serious challenge. And he formulated the concept of "containment" of Soviet expansionism which still serves as the theoretical base of the entire structure of Western policy in the present world situation. Ironically, it was Kennanism in this form which rose to do battle with Kennan when, in his recent lectures, he embarked upon the search for a new perspective.

The philosophy of containment played a great and positive role during the years immediately following World War II. But, beginning in 1953, the year of Stalin's death and the Soviet explosion of a thermonuclear device, the development of events has revealed signs of its inadequacy. And looking back now upon the essay in which this philosophy was stated, I think that its essential deficiency can be stated as follows: the reasoning relates only to *Russia.* This is not said in criticism of Kennan, who had every right to confine himself to his announced subject—the sources of Soviet conduct. It is a criticism of the essay

[2] *New York Times,* November 7, 1958 (italics added).

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only in its acquired historical role as the theoretical underpinning of Western policy in the contemporary world.

The essay examined the powerful expansionist drive which was manifest in the actions of the Stalin regime in the war's aftermath, but it did so in abstraction from the over-all world setting. It did not construct a broad frame of reference, did not visualize the Russian developments in relation to the general pattern of events of our time in the world at large. The global situation and tendencies in the twentieth century lay outside its scope. In short, the horizon of thinking was a Russian horizon and not a world horizon. And this basic limitation entered into the structure of Western policy as it took firm shape in the late 1940's.

Here, I suggest, we touch upon a fundamental flaw in the Western position and a source of the troubles which the West is increasingly experiencing. Here too is one of the explanations for the uneasiness which many thoughtful people in the West feel nowadays about the established ways of thinking and acting in foreign affairs. Our response to the global situation is an inadequate one. Lacking a world horizon in its thinking, the Western coalition lacks an affirmative policy for the world. To state it otherwise: the West, instead of dealing with Russia in terms of a world policy, persists in the attempt to deal with the world in terms of a Russian policy, this being in essence the policy of containing Russia all over the world. The underlying orientation is faulty.

Here is the context in which the Soviet challenge to the West in the field of theory takes shape. For Soviet thinking and policy do not suffer from the deficiency just pointed out. Of Soviet Russia it cannot be said that, instead of dealing with America in terms of a world policy, it deals with the world in terms of an American policy. Whatever its own peculiar deficiencies may be—and these will be mentioned below—the Soviet philosophy of foreign policy has a world horizon. That is, Soviet foreign policy and, more generally, the policy of the Communist bloc are predicated upon a certain theory of contemporary history, a broad conception of what is transpiring in the twentieth century. What is this conception, and what light if any does it shed upon the *realities* of world history in our time?

II

The answer to the first part of this question is a great deal more complicated and obscure than one might offhand suppose. The theory

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of history to which the Soviet leaders officially give their allegiance is Karl Marx's, as elaborated in the *Communist Manifesto*. According to Marx, all modern capitalist societies are arenas of civil war between the classes of property-owning exploiters and exploited working masses; and the civil wars are approaching violent denouements in social revolutions which collectively will mark the transition to the universal Communist society wherein man realizes his human nature and history comes to rest.

While this is the doctrine of history to which the Soviet leaders pledge their allegiance, it is by no means the full story of what they think. In fact, it has long since receded into the background of the Russian Communist mind and become a kind of formal first premise for a *working* theory of history which reflects events of *our* time and is not to be found in the annals of nineteenth-century Marxism. The working theory not only goes beyond anything that Marx ever thought or wrote. It is in some important respects inconsistent with his view of history. Whereas Marx, for example, visualized the world revolution as a simultaneous act of the rebellious proletarian classes of the most advanced capitalist countries of *Europe* (specifically England, France, and Germany), the Soviet working theory sees it as a long-drawn-out historical process beginning in Russia and having its center of gravity in the *East*.

This working theory of contemporary history has come to be known as the theory of the "general crisis of capitalism." It evolved gradually during the 1920's as the Russian Communists sought to work out a scheme of ideas which would, as it were, "save" Marxism but at the same time reflect what had actually happened in Russia and anticipate what was yet to happen elsewhere in the future. The one constant in their thinking—still operative today—was the postulate that the October Revolution was not a mere national event, not simply a momentous incident in the history of Russia, but the beginning of a larger process, a general movement in world affairs. Without this postulate, of course, the Russian Communists could not have maintained the affiliation with Marxism, which rests on the notion of "world history."

What underwent change as the Soviet working theory evolved was the concrete image of the larger process of which the Russian Revolution was taken to be a part. In the immediate post-revolutionary period, Lenin and others clung to the idea that October was the somewhat fortuitous first step of a world revolutionary process whose epicenter lay in Western Europe. They looked particularly to revolution in advanced Germany as the salvation of backward Red Russia. But

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when revolution failed to materialize in Europe and Soviet power consolidated itself in Russia, a vast reorientation of thinking began in Moscow. The larger world process initiated by the Russian Revolution came to be seen and felt as a process with its epicenter in the awakening Asian hinterlands of Europe. The postulated division of the world between capitalist and Communist camps took concrete shape in Russian Communist thinking as a division between what Lenin, in one of his last writings, called "the counter-revolutionary imperialist West" and the "revolutionary and nationalist East."[3]

The World War, said Lenin, had dislodged the Eastern countries, including India and China, from their groove and drawn them into "a process of development that cannot but lead to a crisis in the whole of world capitalism" (here we have the origin of the phrase "general crisis of capitalism"). And he went on to add: "In the last analysis, the upshot of the struggle will be determined by the fact that Russia, India, China, etc., account for the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe. And it is precisely this majority that, during the past few years, has been drawn into the struggle for emancipation with extraordinary rapidity, so that in this respect there cannot be the slightest shadow of doubt what the final outcome of the world struggle will be."[4]

What was reflected in Lenin's statement, which has since become one of the most often-quoted in Communist literature, was the growth of what might be called an "Eastern orientation" in the Russian Communist mind. Briefly, the epicenter of world revolutionary development was transferred from the industrialized West, where Marx's own Marxism had placed it, to the backward, agrarian and colonial, but increasingly rebellious East. The world revolutionary process came to be conceived of not as an all-European proletarian revolution on Marx's model, but as a long-drawn-out revolt of the colonial East against European hegemony on the model of the revolution in semi-Asiatic peasant Russia. Now all this was quite un-Marxian. But it was and is related to certain real and profoundly important world developments of the twentieth century.

The Leninist phrase "general crisis of capitalism" is an inaccurate description of these developments because it places prime emphasis not upon the political aspect, where it belongs, but upon the economic. It is quite true that the world-wide economy of exchange which was brought into being in the nineteenth century has suffered great disruption

[3] *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1947, Vol. II, p. 854.
[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 853, 854.

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in the twentieth, and that the First World War and the Russian Revolution inaugurated this process. But the supremely significant historical fact marked by these events was the breakdown of an international political order characterized by the world hegemony of Europe.

True, the international order of the nineteenth century never institutionalized itself as a world-wide political system; it was not an organized system of international order. It was, however, such a system in embryo. The core was the European political system created by the Vienna settlement in 1815, a system whose mechanism of balance of power maintained what has been called the "hundred years' peace"—i.e., it kept wars of world-wide scope from occurring for a century. What gave this intra-European political order a world-wide significance was the fact that Europe in the nineteenth century, together with the United States, brought most of the rest of the world within its political and economic orbit of control or influence.

The basic fact of contemporary history to which the new "Eastern orientation" in the Russian Communist mind and the new post-Marxian working theory corresponded was the collapse of the Europe-centered international order in and after the First World War. As this working theory saw from the beginning, the defection of Bolshevist Russia from the European system signalized most dramatically and consequentially the collapse of the old order. And instead of treating this initial great defection as a fluke or reparable accident, the theory construed it to be the momentous beginning of a long process of further decline and eventual total fall of the Europe-centered order in the world. It projected the departure of Russia from the European system in 1917 as an augury of the shape of things to come.

Russia had been a great European power from the time of Peter two centuries earlier, and in the nineteenth century became one of the five European powers on which the balance-of-power system rested. As one historian writes of the imperial Russian government, "If there was any constant element in her policy, it was her devotion to the idea of a European system, to be maintained, developed, and defended against every threat."[5] Seen, then, in the perspective of history, the outstanding significance of the October upheaval is that Russia as a consequence retired into the isolation from Europe of the state of Muscovy before Peter's time, reverting to the historic Muscovite anti-European posture. Some perceived this at a very early stage. For example, a group of Russian *émigrés* who called themselves "Eurasians" published a volume in Sofia in 1921 called *Outlet to the East*, which described revolu-

[5] Wladimir Weidle, *Russia: Absent and Present*, New York, 1952, p. 44.

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tionary Russia as "a former European province" now in revolt against Europe.[6] Lenin, as a Marxist with a high regard for certain aspects of European civilization, could not have agreed that this accurately summed up the essential historical meaning of Russia's October Revolution. But a dim cognizance of it was surely reflected in his words of 1923 quoted above, and entered into Moscow's working theory of the world situation as elaborated in subsequent years.

This Moscow of the Third International reverted in its outlook to the earlier Moscow which had proclaimed itself the Third Rome. It saw itself as the embodiment of the ascendant principle as against a decadent Western world, and the new Russia as the *nucleus* around which other "former European provinces" in revolt against Europe would cluster as the world movement proceeded further. Stalin, himself a man of the East, found this ideology very congenial. He had significantly entitled one of his articles of the revolutionary period "Light Comes from the East." As early as April 1917 he had propounded the idea that "Russia may be the country which points the way to socialism." And the concept of Russia as the nucleus of the world revolutionary process was given its classic formulation by him in an interview with a delegation of American workers in 1927. "In the further progress of development of the international revolution," he said, "two centers will be formed: the socialist center, attracting to itself all the countries gravitating towards socialism, and the capitalist center, attracting to itself all the countries gravitating towards capitalism. The fight between these two centers for the conquest of world economy will decide the fate of capitalism and communism throughout the whole world, for the final defeat of world capitalism means the victory of socialism in the arena of world economy."[7] As his later writings showed, the two opposing hegemonic "centers" around which the world was destined to be polarized were Russia and America. Stalin's statement of 1927 was constantly quoted in Soviet writings after World War II to show that he had foreseen the "cold war." As will be explained presently, however, it was quoted in an edited form.

In the original form, just cited, economics was called the decisive arena of world conflict. The fight between the two world "centers" would be primarily a fight for "conquest of world economy." Now, in the background of this idea lay another important element of the working theory that was originated by Nikolai Bukharin. In his book *Economics of the Transition Period*, published in Moscow in 1920,

[6] E. H. Carr, *Socialism in One Country, 1924-1926*, New York, 1958, p. 60.
[7] Lenin, *op.cit.*, p. 44.

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Bukharin had pictured the growth of the world revolution as a gradual historical process in which industrialized "socialist" countries would draw other former colonies into their orbit by force of *economic attraction*. The process would work itself out as follows: "Former colonies and backward agrarian countries, where there is no proletarian dictatorship, nevertheless enter into economic relations with the industrial socialist republics. Little by little they are drawn into the socialist system, approximately in the same way that peasant agriculture is drawn into it in individual socialist countries. Thus does the world dictatorship of the proletariat grow little by little. As it grows, the resistance of the bourgeoisie weakens, and toward the end the remaining bourgeois complexes will in all probability surrender with all their organizations intact."[8] It was this Bukharinist image of future world development which underlay Stalin's reference in 1927 to the "victory of socialism in the arena of world economy."

However, the concept of Soviet expansion through "conquest of world economy" was destined to be laid aside for many years—in fact, until the 1950's, when Khrushchev resuscitated it. It faded out of Stalinist thinking in the period before and after World War II. An interesting historical reflection of this is the fact that when Stalin re-edited his earlier writings after the war, for inclusion in his *Collected Works*, he deleted the phrases "conquest of world economy" and "in the arena of world economy" from his 1927 statement on the future emergence of two antagonistic world centers. Doubtless what moved him to do so was the inconsistency between this bloodless picture of a world-wide revolutionary development that was economically determined, and his own gradually evolved image of the cold war as a politico-military duel between the USSR and the United States for world empire.

Already in the early 1930's his mind had gravitated to the idea that the advancement of the world revolutionary process would take place by the very same means as that by which it was initiated: a world war. In 1934 he stated that a new war "will certainly unleash a revolution and will place in question the very existence of capitalism in a number of countries, as happened during the first imperialist war." "Let not Messrs. the bourgeoisie blame us," he went on, "if on the morrow of such a war certain governments close to their hearts, now ruling safely 'by the grace of God,' turn up missing."[9] The war came, and

[8] *Ekonomika perekhodnogo perioda (Economics of the transition period)*, Moscow, 1920, p. 153.

[9] *Voprosy Leninizma (Problems of Leninism)*, Moscow, 1947, pp. 431, 432-33.

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he undertook in the aftermath to compel history, against the will of the Eastern European peoples, to fulfill his earlier prediction. He took the path of imperialist expansion which led to the creation of the system of satellite states. As a consequence of this, and of the Communist revolution in China, the great Sino-Soviet empire came into being more or less as it exists today—a conglomeration of states covering a quarter of the earth's territory, possessing a total population of over 950,000,000, and accounting at the present time for perhaps about a third of the world's industrial production.

III

While the Communist empire was being built in the postwar years, the official Soviet theory of the world situation was being reformulated in Moscow in the light of the new developments and under Stalin's personal guidance. There was much doctrinal discussion of the "general crisis of capitalism" and its further development during and after World War II. Finally, Stalin made an authoritative pronouncement on it in his series of papers published in 1952 under the title *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR.*

The general crisis, he wrote there, had entered upon a second stage. The first stage had started during World War I, especially as a result of the secession of Soviet Russia from the world capitalist system, which split the world in two. The second stage had developed during World War II, especially after the secession of China and the other "people's democracies" from what remained of the world capitalist system. These were successive stages in the development of a single, pervasive, over-all crisis of the former world capitalist system. The crisis was to be seen as a historical process which embraced both economy and politics on a global scale. The second stage witnessed a deep aggravation of the crisis. No longer was Soviet Russia pitted all alone against the world from which it had defected in 1917. The picture now was rather one of two *worlds* in opposition—reflected, for example, in the emergence of a "parallel world market" in the Soviet East. Stalin, in short, saw the present situation as a realization of his prophecy of 1927 about the future polarization of the globe around two antagonistic world "centers." However, as his earlier deletion of the reference to *economic* competition indicated, he visualized the continuing contest between them for global hegemony in the military-political terms of the cold war against the West, as he had been waging it since 1947.

It was suggested earlier that the Soviet working theory of the world

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situation corresponded broadly to certain real developments of this century connected with the breakdown of the old Europe-centered international order. Regarded from this point of view, Stalin's postwar reformulation of the doctrine of the general crisis erred on the side of conservatism. It recognized that the crisis of international order entered a new and aggravated stage during and after World War II. But it failed to take adequate measure of the deepening of the crisis, the extent to which the old international order has further crumbled in our time. Stalin saw this development solely or primarily in terms of the rise of the Sino-Soviet empire in opposition to the erstwhile dominant West. But that is only one major component of the process of dissolution of the old order.

The other major component is the departure of the Afro-Asian-Arab nations from colonial dependency and the tutelage of the West. It is the breakdown of the structure of Western dominion in the non-European parts of the world, the disappearance of most of what remained in the interwar period of the great European colonial empires. The former colonial powers have granted independence to non-European nations with an aggregate population of well over 700,000,000. And the fact that many of these are now called "uncommitted nations" shows that independence has tended to mean departure from the Western order of things. Viewed as a whole, this process marks a radical shift in world affairs. In an important sense it could be said that the nineteenth century finally came to an end in the aftermath of World War II. The downfall of the old international order is now nearly complete. The Europe which once controlled the world has become a truncated peninsula of Asia holding a few outposts here and there, and even in its African hinterland the dissolution of the old order is swiftly proceeding.

This trend of development was seen and understood by students of international affairs in Moscow. The economist Eugene Varga, for example, foresaw the postwar line of development in Asia and cautiously called attention to it in a book written at the war's end. Stalin, however, resisted and overruled this appraisal. He compelled the professional theorists to deny the facts and contradict what they knew to be true. He refused to recognize the revolutionary implications of such developments as the granting of independence to India, Burma, the Philippines, and other former dependencies of the West. He insisted that no meaningful change had taken place, that the independence of these newly independent nations was merely a cunning "fiction" by which the colonialists and their native agents—such as Nehru—

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were trying to conceal the continuing reality of colonial dependence upon the West.

For him there was simply no such thing as a neutral or "uncommitted" country, no space between the two antagonistic worlds. Any territory necessarily remained an Anglo-American preserve until such time as it changed worlds and became a part of the Soviet empire. This was the logic underlying the Stalinist theory of cold war. It also underlay the Stalinist practice of cold war, with its emphasis on territorial conquest which found supreme expression in the Korean War. Stalin, right up until the end in March 1953, appears to have overruled any idea of a Korean armistice. His death was the crucial factor behind the cessation of hostilities in Korea as well as the broader reorientation of Soviet foreign policy which took place in the following period.

The reorientation made possible by Stalin's death, and by the release of Soviet policy from the autocrat's personal psychology, has theoretical as well as practical aspects. Among the former, first place goes to the recognition of the realities of postwar political development outside the Communist sphere which Stalin had forced the theorists to deny. This change, however, has taken place within the framework of a basic continuity of doctrine. The conception of contemporary world history as reflecting a "general crisis of capitalism" remains fully in force under Khrushchev. The division of the world between what is now called the "world system of socialist states"—that is, the Soviet bloc—and all other countries is taken to be the central fact of the general crisis and the international situation. The general crisis is still seen as a developmental process on a world scale, and Soviet doctrine holds to Stalin's tenet that during and after World War II it entered a second and greatly aggravated stage.

But the official assessment of the crisis in its present stage no longer errs on the side of conservatism. Stalin's refusal to recognize the postwar collapse of Western hegemony over vast tracts of the non-Western world is now a thing of the past. Indeed, "breakdown of the colonial system of imperialism" is taken by Soviet theorists not only as largely a *fait accompli* of history but also as a principal expression of the *deepening* of the general crisis in the present second stage. They affirm that countries with an aggregate population of about 1,300,000,000 have, since the war, ceased to be colonies or dependencies of the West, whereas before the war the population of colonies and dependencies was 1,500,000,000.

A Soviet monograph of 1958 divides the former colonies and depend-

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encies into three big groups: (1) the Asian Communist states of China, North Korea, and North Vietnam, where the breakdown of colonialism is said—quite falsely, in view of the present relationship to Soviet Russia—to appear in its "most mature form"; (2) countries such as India, Egypt, Indonesia, and Burma, which have won political independence under the leadership of a "national bourgeoisie" and remain capitalist in economic structure although they have set out to attain economic independence by industrialization and have made some inroads on foreign property holdings (as in the incident of Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company); and (3) countries such as the Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya, which have likewise won political independence but have yet to consolidate their national sovereignty and embark on national economic development. The monograph also refers to a fourth group of countries, those still in the position of colonies and dependencies, but points out that forces are in motion which will eventually bring them, too, from colonial status to independence; the Algerian situation is cited as an illustration of this movement.[10]

Thus in one important respect a drastic change has taken place since Stalin's death in the Soviet doctrine of the world situation. The departure of non-Communist as well as Communist countries from the Europe-centered international order of the nineteenth century has been recognized as a fact. Further, it has been evaluated as a positive and progressive development in history, a movement which deepens the "general crisis" and so is in the Soviet interest to support. The above-mentioned monograph, for example, reasons as follows: the tendency in the newly independent countries is toward "a new form of state capitalism" whose main feature is that it promotes the development of the national economy. Not only does such development in turn strengthen the newly won political independence from the West. It also creates big native enterprises which can compete with foreign (i.e., Western) concerns, even in world markets. It strengthens the local economy against Western economic penetration and influence. It constricts Western markets, as, for example, in India, where the development of a textile industry has reduced the market for British textiles and so has helped keep the British textile industry in its state of chronic crisis. It intensifies internal class conflict in the Western countries by forcing manufacturers to cut labor costs in the effort to

[10] *Materialy vsesoyuznogo soveshchaniya zaveduyushchikh kafedrami obshchestvennykh nauk (Materials of the All-Union Conference of Heads of Chairs of Social Science)*, Moscow, 1958, pp. 184-85.

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meet increased foreign competition. And it increases tensions between the Western powers themselves.[11]

The monograph goes on to say that the decline and fall of the old colonial order are of "special" importance in that they make possible a *rapprochement* between the Soviet bloc and a whole series of countries which used to constitute the "reserve of imperialism." The majority of these countries pursue an independent policy, are friendly to the "socialist" states, refuse to participate in anti-Soviet blocs and alliances, and enter into what is called a "peace zone." This phrase was introduced into official Soviet doctrine by Khrushchev in his public report to the 20th Party Congress in 1956. He declared that there was taking shape an immense "peace zone" in the world, including "socialist" and "non-socialist" states and embracing territories in which live nearly one and one-half billion people, a majority of the world's population. In this same report Khrushchev said that the period of world history foretold by Lenin, when the peoples of the East would become a primary determining factor in the destinies of the world, has now come to pass.

M. S. Dragilev, the writer of the 1958 monograph already cited, uses the phrase "anti-imperialist bloc" as an alternative to "peace zone." He writes that the postwar formation of the "world system of socialist states," combined with the breakdown of the colonial system, has brought the bloc into being. The "anti-imperialist bloc" includes (1) the "socialist" countries—i.e., the Soviet bloc: (2) former colonial countries which have won their independence; and (3) the colonies. This is a heterogeneous collection, he points out, but is cemented by the presence of a common enemy—"imperialism."[12] By "imperialism" he obviously means the Western powers, headed by the United States. The choice of the phrase "anti-imperialist bloc" in place of the more toothless "peace zone" is most interesting and significant as an indication of Soviet thinking. It shows clearly that the alliance of the Soviet bloc with the non-Communist or not-yet-Communist "former provinces of Europe" in Asia, the Near East, Africa, etc., is envisaged as a distinctly anti-Western grouping of the great majority of nations and peoples. Not a genuine neutralism, but specifically an anti-Western and pro-Soviet neutralism, is thus projected as the proper stance for a non-Communist nation in the "peace zone" or "anti-imperialist bloc." In short, the underlying theoretical postulate of the Soviet thinkers is that what was formerly a huge "reserve of imperialism"—the Eastern hinterlands of Europe—shall become in time a reserve of sovietism,

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 188-90. [12] *Ibid.*, pp. 190-91.

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that a partnership shall take shape between the Soviet bloc and the remainder of the non-Western world *against* the West, that the great Afro-Asian-Arab zone will become increasingly oriented toward the Soviet bloc as it is emptied of what remains of Western influence. Nor, in this thinking, does the anti-Western bloc exclude certain states which geographically belong to the "West," such as the Latin American countries.

Here is the theoretical background of Khrushchev's doctrine of long-range economic competition between the Soviet bloc and the West. This doctrine has evolved in the post-Stalinist period along with the practical Soviet program of aid-and-trade, under which large sums have been granted to non-Communist countries in the form of credits for arms and economic development. The political rationale of the new policy is directly related to the broad theoretical conceptions just outlined. The concrete economic assistance is regarded as having a political purpose of prime importance: to help along the ongoing process of self-detachment of non-Communist countries in the "anti-imperialist bloc" from economic dependence upon the West and Western political influence. Beyond this, however, Soviet writers now frankly acknowledge that the policy has the further positive goal of attracting these countries into more and more intimate relations with the Soviet bloc and encouraging them to adopt Soviet patterns of economic organization and society. Dragilev, for example, states: "As the former colonies win political independence, they enter an ever closer *rapprochement* with the socialist countries, which extend to them all-round economic and political assistance on a basis of equality to strengthen their independence. Already at this time there is much interest being shown within India, Egypt and Indonesia in the methods of economic construction employed in the socialist countries."[13]

As noted earlier, Bukharin in 1920 envisaged economics as the decisive field of battle between the world revolutionary forces embodied in Soviet Russia and the bourgeois powers of the West. Industrialized Soviet republics, he prophesied, would exert an increasing power of attraction upon former colonies and backward agrarian countries, drawing them "little by little" into the Soviet orbit of political influence. Stalin initially endorsed this economic emphasis in Communist theory, but subsequently abandoned it in his obsession with the cold war as a politico-military duel between the two superpowers. Viewed against this background, the doctrinal innovations of the Khrushchev period appear as largely a revival of some older Russian Communist

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 192.

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ways of thought. The fundamental identity of Khrushchev's conception, as formulated by Dragilev in the passage just cited, with that which Bukharin sketched thirty years ago is easily discernible. The language is now more cautious, but it is clearly the old idea which is being expressed. The basic political conception which underlies Khrushchev's doctrine of long-range economic competition between the Soviet bloc and the West is a novelty only in relation to later Stalinism—the Stalinism which deleted "conquest of world economy" from Stalin's own earlier writings. But it has a doctrinal ancestry which goes back to the Lenin period. The great difference is a practical one: Soviet Russia today has the economic potential to act on an idea which, at the time that Bukharin first formulated it, could be little more than a prophecy.

IV

Together with many of his other policies, Khrushchev's effort to revive the theory and develop the practice of Soviet economic competition with the West in the underdeveloped countries has not gone unresisted. Certain highly conservative elements within the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party have apparently opposed the policy of extending credits for economic development to non-Communist countries such as India, Egypt, and Indonesia. Specifically, some members of the now ousted conservative opposition, who vainly attempted to unseat Khrushchev in mid-1957, appear to have fought Khrushchev on the issue of "foreign aid" as well as on numerous other external and internal questions.[14]

The controversy has not, of course, been publicly aired. Yet Soviet published materials of mid-1958 do contain some interesting indications of the manner in which the policy debate was apparently conducted. Dragilev, for example, formulates—for purposes of refutation—the anti-Khrushchev position on Soviet economic assistance to non-Communist countries. Does not the process of self-detachment of former colonial countries from colonialism signify, he inquires, an enlargement of the capitalist sphere of the world? And do not the "socialist" countries therefore encourage the expansion of *capitalism* by supporting this process with economic aid? If this, as seems quite probable, is a reflection of the actual line of argument used by the anti-Khrushchev opposition, the burden of the argument would be that Soviet economic assistance to newly independent but non-Communist countries is cal-

[14] See particularly Maxim Saburov's speech of recantation at the recent 21st Soviet Party Congress, in which he stated that the "anti-Party group" opposed Soviet "assistance to underdeveloped countries."

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culated to strengthen their position as non-Communist, so why extend such assistance? The steel mill we are building at Bhilai, one can hear the opposition saying, is costing us a lot, and at the same time will help to consolidate India's independent economic position as a non-Communist country; it will inhibit rather than promote the future Communist revolution in India. There are indications that this conservative Soviet position has found ready sympathy within the leadership of Communist China, whose political aspirations and insatiable demands on Soviet capital resources might be more adequately satisfied if no Soviet economic aid were going to non-Communist countries (above all, India).

To this line of argument the Khrushchev school of thought replies that Soviet economic assistance will not *in the long run* promote "capitalist" prospects in non-Communist Asia or elsewhere. Writing in *Pravda* in July 1958, Academician Arzumanyan contended that the newly independent countries cannot solve their problems of industrialization by developing "along ordinary capitalist lines." He then added, rather imperiously and without supporting arguments: "The peoples of these countries will become more and more convinced that not capitalism, but socialism, is their immediate future."[15] Dragilev reasons similarly in reply to the opposition, but places main emphasis upon a further point. The question of the development of capitalism in former colonial countries, he writes, has to be approached from the standpoint of the "relationship of world forces." Present developments in these countries are undermining the positions of the "monopolies" (i.e., the West), and "Everything which injures the monopolies alters the relationship of forces in favor of socialism" (i.e., whatever hurts the West helps us).[16]

In the background of this reasoning lies the Soviet working theory of history as outlined earlier. The argument is that Soviet economic assistance to non-Communist, former colonial countries must be viewed primarily in terms of its *political* effect. While it may temporarily strengthen the economic position of the recipient as a non-Communist country, it likewise reinforces the new political status of non-attachment to the West. And whatever accelerates the movement of the newly independent countries *away* from the Western political order and Western influence thereby alters the balance of world power in favor of the Soviet Union and indirectly promotes the eventual expansion of communism within the new "anti-imperialist bloc." In short, the

[15] *Pravda*, July 9, 1958. [16] *Op.cit.*, p. 192.

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economic foreign assistance program is advocated by the Khrushchev school in Soviet policy as an instrument for accelerating a deep ongoing historical process of secession of "former European provinces" from the old order. Beyond this, the Khrushchev school confidently predicts that the beneficiary of this whole process will be the Soviet-led "world system of socialist states." The newly independent countries are frankly visualized as gravitating into the Soviet orbit little by little. It was no doubt with this prospect in view that Soviet doctrine was amended by Khrushchev in 1956 to provide for a "peaceful" mode of "transition to socialism." In his report to the 20th Party Congress, he particularly singled out countries where capitalism is weak and relatively undeveloped as the most likely places for the "peaceful" mode of transition. Soviet theorists since then have emphasized, by the way, that "peaceful" does not imply absence of coercion. All that is meant, they indicate, is that communism may come to power without civil war, widespread armed violence, or military intervention by the Soviet bloc. From this point of view, recent developments in Iraq may have been a test case of the possibility of Communist revolution by the "peaceful" path.

The 21st Soviet Party Congress in early 1959 dramatized the consolidation of Khrushchev's leadership and policy line in both internal and external affairs. It sealed his victory over the opposition on a whole range of important issues, including the issue of Soviet policy toward the newly independent non-Communist countries. In his report to the Congress he firmly restated this policy as an integral part of the Party's general line in international affairs: "Countries which have won their national liberation need and will continue to need support from the socialist countries, from all progressive people. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries are consolidating friendly relations with countries which have liberated themselves from the colonial yoke, are extending and *will continue to extend* assistance to them."[17] The chief difference between Khrushchev's statements at the previous Party Congress and this one with reference to the policy toward "liberated" non-Communist countries is that in 1959 he placed greater stress upon the struggle for Communist political hegemony in these countries, and failed to repeat the emphasis of 1956 on the possibility of a "peaceful path" to this end. Now he does not conceal the expectation that countries emancipated from Western tutelage and under nationalist regimes (such as Nasser's in Egypt) are becoming or will become scenes of a "struggle of labor with capital"—i.e., a struggle of native Communist

[17] *Pravda*, January 28, 1959 (italics added).

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parties to win power and bring their countries all the way into the Soviet orbit.

V

This article has traced the evolution in Soviet thought of a working theory of contemporary world history not contained in original Marxism. What claim the theory has to validity derives from its departure from Marx's false prophecy of an all-European proletarian revolution—a departure carried out in order to relate what happened in agrarian Russia in October 1917 to an actual world trend of development. The postulate of the theory all along has been that the October Revolution was more than a national Russian occurrence, that it betokened a movement of things, a tide in human affairs, not localized in Russia. The revolution came to be seen—or felt—as Russia's mighty act of secession from the Europe-centered world order of the nineteenth century, and as a beginning and major part of a general movement of secession of nations from that order, a movement having its epicenter in the awakening colonial East.

In the doctrine of the "general crisis of capitalism," as evolved in the 1920's and amended in the 1940's and 1950's, the disintegration of the old world-embracing order is viewed as proceeding in two great stages connected with the two World Wars of the twentieth century. The doctrine, moreover, sees the seceding nations as forming an embryonic and expanding *new* world order, with Soviet Russia, or perhaps the Sino-Soviet axis, as the hub of power and fountainhead of world-wide political and ideological influence, corresponding to Europe in the nineteenth century. Since Stalin's death, the concept of seceding nations has been greatly broadened to include not only nations which already form a part of the Soviet bloc, but also former dependencies of the West which, while as yet "uncommitted" and non-Communist in political regime, nevertheless cohere with the Communist countries in a huge "peace zone" or "anti-imperialist bloc" whose essential defining characteristic is anti-Westernism. Soviet theorists predict the further widening of the "anti-imperialist bloc" via the secession of remaining colonial areas from dependence upon the West. And within this wider non-Western or anti-Western grouping in the world, they foresee the gradual but consecutive spread of regimes of the Communist type, with Soviet economic foreign policy as one of the chief instrumentalities of this process. Ultimately, of course, they envision the new Russia-centered international order as world-wide in scope.

This, in brief, is the Soviet working theory of contemporary history.

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Having suggested at the outset that it poses a serious challenge to the West, and to the United States particularly as the principal Western power, I should like, in conclusion, to reformulate this thesis in more concrete terms. What, precisely, is the Soviet challenge to us in the field of theory? The answer, it seems to me, is that the Soviet working doctrine of history recognizes a root fact of world development in the twentieth century, or reflects such recognition, whereas Western policy thinking has not hitherto clearly recognized this fact *as* a root fact and Western grand policy itself suffers as a consequence. As this article has sought to bring out, the fact in question is the progressive disintegration and breakdown of the world-wide Europe-centered order of the nineteenth century.

Western thinking does increasingly reflect an uneasy awareness that the rise and spread of Russian communism are not the whole story of what is happening in the world in the present century, and that a policy predicated on the one idea of "containment" of communism scarcely suffices as the Western response to the world situation. The efforts to fix upon these larger contours of the problem have not, however, been very successful. Present Western thinking is typified by phrases such as "revolution of rising expectations" or "rising tide of nationalism in the world" or even "anti-colonial revolution." Phrases of this kind do have the merit of suggesting that something very consequential is happening abroad which is not exactly Soviet-inspired even though Moscow tries to encourage it and to capitalize upon it, and that Western policy consequently errs insofar as it focuses *exclusive* concern on the containment of the Soviet Union and communism. But they fail to go to the root of the matter—to the fact that an erstwhile world scheme of things is today in a very advanced stage of decomposition. And while they suggest that the West badly requires a *world* policy as distinguished from a policy of containing Soviet Russia all over the world, they do not yield ideas as to what an effective or at least relevant Western response to the present situation might be.

If we take the disintegration of international order as the fundamental fact and trend of the twentieth century—a trend not yet really checked or altered by the two great experiments in world organization undertaken during this century—the challenge to Western thinking becomes a challenge to frame a new world policy in the light of what has happened. If, further, we take international order as something supremely desirable, especially in the nuclear age and dawning space age, then it may appear that the rebuilding of order into the affairs

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of nations should become the master concept in the world policy of the Western coalition.

Of course, the concept of reconstitution of international order as the goal and guiding principle for Western policy requires further definition. According to one possible interpretation, it might mean the restoration of the world of 1914. But this is scarcely a tenable interpretation. On any realistic view, it has to be recognized that the nineteenth century is beyond resurrection, that the era of Western world hegemony is over. The processes which have produced this result run too deep and have gone too far to be subject to reversal now. The contemporary West can hope that certain values of its civilization, centering in its liberal political ideas, will take root and flourish in former dependencies that have now become or are on their way to becoming independent nations. It can work by certain methods to achieve this, not least by the force of example, by a conscious effort to show how successful the open society can be in solving its serious problems and how exciting and satisfying to live in. It can strive to cultivate close and productive relations with these nations in commerce and culture and many other fields. But it is out of the question to resubordinate them to Western political influence or control.

Practically speaking, then, the issue is whether or not the Western mind and spirit are capable of one more supreme historic impulse of political initiative, whether the West can proceed, first in its thinking and then in the action that flows from thought, beyond the nationalist principle to a concept of international order not predicated upon the hegemony of any one great power or group of powers, or upon the universalization of any one form of internal social-economic system. To make international order in this historically new sense the conscious goal of national policy would evidently mean placing greater and greater emphasis upon the existing machinery of world community, particularly the United Nations and its associated agencies, such as the World Court. But the positive content of such a new internationalism would by no means be confined to that. International order and international organization are related but distinguishable concepts. Given the existence of several dozen national sovereignties in the present world, international order essentially means the establishment of certain operative norms of orderly behavior of national states in their relations both with each other and with their own peoples. It is open to the Western countries, and above all to the United States, to take the initiative in many ways toward the growth of international order so con-

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ceived. The force of American and Western example is potentially a very great force indeed.

To take one concrete example, there appears to be a growing consensus among well-informed Americans that a far greater effort is needed in the area of aid for economic development than America is presently putting forth. The difficulty with the proposals that have been offered so far for a greatly increased effort is that they are not coupled with a large political idea capable of generating the requisite willingness to sacrifice on the part of the American public and its elected representatives. The Marshall Plan experience stands as a reminder of what it means to associate economic assistance with a positive and unselfish political idea. How might the United States make an expanded economic assistance program the instrument of a policy dedicated to the growth of international political order? One way of doing this might be to predicate the program upon the new principle that aid for economic development of underdeveloped lands should *not* be used as a means of competing for political influence over the recipients, and in this connection to internationalize the administration of the aid program. This in turn would strengthen the insistence of the donors upon the willingness of the recipient nations to use the assistance in the manner best calculated to attain positive results, to submit to the requisite supervision, and so forth. Beyond this, the "depoliticalized" economic assistance might well be offered on condition that the recipients live up to certain norms of behavior in their relations with other states, as dictated by the requirements of international order in their part of the world.

In short, under this approach the West would not be working to line up the uncommitted countries on *its* side, but rather to line up *itself* as well as them on the side of a higher goal and principle—the growth of international order in the relations among states. Recognizing that the freedom of the uncommitted countries includes the freedom to remain uncommitted as between East and West if they so desire, it would ask them to commit themselves only to those norms of behavior in international relations to which it is committing itself in deeds as well as words. The practical adoption of such a philosophy of Western foreign policy would, moreover, put the present policies of Soviet Russia to the test in a politically most potent manner. Refusal by the Soviet Union to co-operate in measures to promote the growth of international order would expose the discrepancy between the professed "selfless" aims of Soviet foreign policy and its actual motivation. It would clarify for those who may need such clarification, and continually remind the

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whole world, that the grand design of Soviet foreign policy is not, as its exponents claim, a world-wide commonwealth of nations on a new, higher plane of order, but rather the transformation of the twentieth century into a greater replica of the nineteenth—with Russia as the new hegemonic center of the international system.

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BETWEEN STRESEMANN AND HITLER

The Foreign Policy of the Brüning Government

By WOLFGANG J. HELBICH

MOST historians of the Weimar Republic, fully occupied with the domestic affairs of the Brüning government in its crucial place between democracy and dictatorship, show little interest in Germany's foreign policy of the early 1930's. If they do devote some attention to it, their evaluation tends to be highly negative, regardless of their political or national sympathies. Observers who can be classified as liberals, socialists, Nazis, and nationalists—at odds among themselves on virtually every other question—all voice strong criticism of the Brüning diplomacy.[1]

This seeming paradox is indicative of the fact that Germany's foreign policy during the Brüning period was neither a continuation of Stresemann's conciliatory policy nor the first step of Hitler's *Lebensraum* campaign. But the neglect and the negative judgment also reveal what appears to the writer to be a misunderstanding of the aims and methods of Brüning's foreign policy, and an underestimation of its achievements and significance. It is suggested here that the predominant views, according to which Brüning either showed weakness and indecision or committed a long series of blunders by a policy of "activity," need thorough revision. It is the contention of this article that Brüning's foreign policy—disastrous as its domestic implications may have been—was by no means weak and undecided, or an inconsistent indulgence in "activity" for activity's sake; that it was, in many respects, skillful and ingenious; that, under the existing circumstances, it yielded ample results; and that Heinrich Brüning deserves a place among those German statesmen of the twentieth century who understood how to gain political advantages for their country from a position of weakness.

I

A few months after Brüning's fall, a Frenchman, comparing him with Adolf Hitler, wrote that it was their nature and their destiny—rather than their political aims—that put them in such violent opposi-

[1] E.g., Erich Eyck, *Geschichte der Weimarer Republik*, II, Zurich and Stuttgart, 1956, p. 374; Arthur Rosenberg, *A History of the German Republic*, London, 1936, pp. 302, 309f.; K. S. Baron von Galera, *Deutschlands Schicksalsweg, 1919-1939*, Berlin, 1940, p. 93.

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tion to each other.[2] And a year earlier, in 1931, an Italian statesman observed that "Germans of all parties, and not merely the large numbers who already adhere to National Socialism, dream of following once more the path of Germany's rise in Europe—not only of regaining the positions lost at Versailles, but of conquering others which will quickly lead to German hegemony."[3]

There is certainly some exaggeration in both these statements; but these observers saw more clearly than most other Europeans of that period that there was little disagreement inside Germany on the ultimate aims of German foreign policy. The bitter internal conflicts concerned the best method of achieving these aims; there were precious few which were contested as such. All parties—including the Democrats and the Socialists—wanted a complete revision of the Versailles Treaty; and none, with the exception of the Communists (who were, for their own reasons, also eager revisionists[4]), could emphasize their national consciousness too strongly. The Social Democrats might announce themselves to be against seeking the immediate restitution of the German colonies or of Eupen-Malmédy,[5] or hold that a government demanding "protection of minorities, revision of the eastern borders, restitution of the colonies, revocation of war guilt, revision of the Young Treaty, and an *Anschluss* with Austria," all at one time, would end up achieving nothing[6]—but they solemnly declared that all these aims of German foreign policy were also theirs.

The right and the extreme right in the early 1930's, at least according to their public statements and contributions to *Reichstag* debates, did not want any more than the left; the adherents to the Stresemann tradition were not willing to give up any more, in the long run, than the Hugenbergs and Hitlers. They differed only in their estimation of the time needed for a thorough revision of Versailles, in their conception of the most effective and least dangerous method of achieving it, and in their desire for a true amelioration of the European international climate. Whereas the followers of Weimar's outstanding foreign minister felt that the best way—for the interests of Germany and for peace in Europe—lay in winning the confidence of Germany's former enemies, and particularly France, the extreme nationalists, with little con-

[2] André Germain, *Hitler ou Moscou?*, Paris, 1933, p. 67.

[3] Raffaele Guariglia, *Ricordi, 1922-1946*, Naples, 1950, p. 131.

[4] In party language, reparations were equivalent to exploitation of German workers by Allied capitalists; cf. the official party publication, Theodor Neubauer, *Deutsche Aussenpolitik heute und morgen*, Berlin, 1932.

[5] The Socialist representative Breitscheid in a *Reichstag* debate in March 1931, *Verhandlungen des Reichstags: Stenographische Berichte*, Vol. 445, Berlin, 1931, p. 1653.

[6] The Social Democrat Stampfer in February 1931, *ibid.*, Vol. 444, p. 888.

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cern for the rest of Europe, favored an uncompromising policy of demands and threats.

When Brüning took office, he was committed to neither group; but undoubtedly he was in agreement with the great majority of his compatriots as to the ultimate objectives of German foreign policy. Good Catholic though he was, nothing leads one to believe that Brüning was searching for the policy which was morally the most respectable; his aim was one that was realistic and would yield the best results for Germany. But since foreign policy cannot be made in a vacuum, his choice was not entirely free at any point. The practice of the "art of the possible" requires a correct evaluation of all the factors with any bearing on the possibilities of success. And the full realization of prevailing conditions, of what is possible and what is not, is just as important for the historian in judging a foreign policy as it is for the statesman in shaping it.

At home, the depression had already started when Brüning formed his government. As the economic situation deteriorated and the unemployment figures rose, more and more people turned to the two extremist parties, which fought one another bloodily in the streets but were unanimous in their hatred of the Chancellor. The state of mind of much of the country is adequately illustrated by the circumstances of Brüning's trip to the important Chequers Conference: when he boarded the ship in Hamburg, Communist choruses of "*Nieder mit dem Hungerdiktator!*" were his farewell, whereas the Nazis welcomed him home with "*Deutschland erwache! Nieder mit Brüning!*"[7]

In the *Reichstag*, the declarations of these two parties were the same in substance and hardly more civil in tone. In addition, the criticism of the more moderate left and right rarely subsided, Brüning's foreign policy being either too uncompromising or not "national" enough for them.[8] He was caught between two fires; refusing to take the way shown by Thälmann and Hitler, and not choosing to follow in Stresemann's footsteps, he could not hope for any significant parliamentary support for his foreign policy. Only if it were rewarded with success could he expect approval and a strengthening of his domestic position.

To this picture of opposition and disunity, even Brüning's own cabinet afforded no exception. Although he had reduced its members to a position which has been compared to that of Bismarck's Secretaries

[7] Paul Schmidt, *Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, 1923-1945*, Bonn, 1949, pp. 202f., 215.

[8] E.g., *Verhandlungen des Reichstags*, Vol. 427, pp. 4736f., 4771f.

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of State,[9] basic differences of opinion among them could only prove harmful to the diplomacy of the *Reich*. Between Stresemann's successor Julius Curtius, who had been the chief promoter of the Young Treaty in the *Reichstag*, and the three ministers who had strongly advocated the notorious anti-Young Plan referendum, Brüning occupied a middle position. While apparently he was closer emotionally to his colleagues of the *Frontkämpfer* generation and was often tempted to follow their advice, reason—and his foreign minister—again and again prevailed upon him not to leave the straight course of a policy which he himself had recognized to be the most promising.[10]

Thus the domestic basis for Brüning's foreign policy was certainly not a sound one. Abroad, things looked hardly any brighter when the Chancellor took office. France had just granted what she considered major concessions—renunciation of part of her reparations and, above all, evacuation of the Rhineland five years before it was due—and felt entitled to German gratitude. The lack of any appreciation of French generosity in Germany, and particularly the new German demands forwarded at the very moment when France had given up her last real hold on her former enemy, could not fail to arouse grave suspicion in France. Furthermore, the growing political radicalism in Germany—chiefly in the direction of the vindictive right—induced in the French a mood which was far from conciliatory; and the spectacular results of the September 1930 *Reichstag* elections were received with especial apprehension and bitterness in France.

Much the same was true of Poland. The *Reich* government had as little influence on a *Stahlhelm* meeting at Breslau as it had on one at Koblenz; and when Cabinet Member Treviranus made his highly emotional, sharply threatening speech about "the unhealed wounds in the eastern region, that withered lung of the *Reich*,"[11] Brüning could make him retract so far as to say that "*Kampf*" did not really mean "war,"[12] but he could not undo the harm already done east of the border. Polish public opinion burst out in bitterness, and a fund drive for the construction of a submarine as an "answer to Treviranus" was initiated.[13]

[9] Lutz Graf von Schwerin-Krosigk, *Es geschah in Deutschland*, Tübingen and Stuttgart, 1951, p. 134.

[10] Curtius cites three instances in which he was able to make Brüning give his policy a more conciliatory turn (Julius Curtius, *Sechs Jahre Minister der deutschen Republik*, Heidelberg, 1948, pp. 162f., 165f., 171f.).

[11] Excerpts from the speech printed in Ulrich Thuerauf, ed., *Schulthess' Europäischer Geschichtskalender, 1930*, Munich, 1931, pp. 188f.

[12] Treviranus' qualifications of August 16, *ibid.*, p. 191.

[13] Richard Breyer, *Das Deutsche Reich und Polen, 1932-1937*, Würzburg, 1955, p. 29.

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German public opinion—as expressed in speeches, in the press, and at the polls—so alarmed France and the Little Entente that further alienation from the *Reich* seemed inevitable, whatever the German government's attitude and official policy might be. Brüning's precarious domestic situation thus set definite limits to his foreign policy; he had no control over the irresponsible threats of the extreme right and the impressive shows of force of these parties, which were anxiously followed abroad.

Elsewhere, the picture was not quite as dark. Soviet Russia did not seem particularly worried about nationalist gains in Germany, showed herself eager to renew the Berlin Treaty of 1926, and felt considerable sympathy for, and a common interest in, Germany's struggle for the revision of the Versailles Treaty. This was even truer of Italy, which swung more decidedly into the revisionist camp;[14] although she entertained fears regarding a possible *Anschluss*, she was badly in need of support in her strained relations with France. Mussolini was very apprehensive about a Franco-German reconciliation, and Guariglia was particularly annoyed by Curtius' statement that Germany wanted to associate with Italy "only at Geneva" at the disarmament conference.[15]

On the Anglo-Saxon countries, the swing to the right in German public opinion and political life exerted an influence quite different from that which it had on Germany's eastern and western neighbors. The British—especially the Labor Party, which was then in power—had felt sympathy for German revisionism all along, and came to the conclusion that it was necessary to support a moderate German government in order to prevent the dangerous consequences of its fall. Similarly, across the Atlantic, President Hoover felt that "the United States had a broad interest in supporting the efforts of liberal-minded men in Germany, Austria, and Eastern Europe to sustain their representative governments against the political forces besetting them," because they alone gave some foundation to the hope for lasting peace in Europe.[16]

Well aware of this situation at home and abroad, Brüning came to believe that neither the way of Stresemann nor that of Hitler was the most effective and quickest one toward the revision of Versailles. It goes without saying that, in the early 1930's, pursuit of the foreign policy demanded by the Nazis and the Nationalists would have been

[14] Cf. Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1930*, London, 1931, pp. 10, 125.

[15] Guariglia, *Ricordi*, pp. 139f.

[16] *The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover*, III: *The Great Depression, 1929-1941*, New York, 1952, pp. 64f.

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nothing short of disastrous for Germany. But the prospects for a genuine Stresemann policy seem to have been almost equally as bad if even moderately quick results were desired. It had required the genius of Stresemann, countless difficult negotiations, and seven long years to create a certain confidence on the part of the French, and to gain some important concessions regarding German "equality," reparations, and the evacuation of the Rhineland. Yet, at the time of Stresemann's death, the major German claims—an end to reparations, restitution of Germany's eastern territory, and equality of armaments—were still unfulfilled. The essence of Stresemann's policy had been to win the confidence of the French and, since he had the majority of the country and of parliament behind his foreign policy, he had been fairly successful. Now the French saw that Brüning might fall any day, giving way to a radical nationalist government which would immediately turn French concessions against Germany's neighbors. How could one expect the French to place trust in a country where every second newspaper and compaign speech promised them that obligations would not be honored, treaties would be torn up, and the map of Europe altered by force?

"Nationalist pressure" is often considered to be the main reason for Brüning's uncompromising policy toward France—and much pressure there was; but it is easy to overemphasize this factor. His precarious domestic situation certainly made him seek significant successes in foreign affairs in order to win prestige and support at home. Yet Brüning rarely showed himself to be afraid of unpopularity; in fact, his entire foreign and domestic policy was thoroughly unpopular. By far the greatest significance of the rightist opposition—and, despite the "national" character of Brüning's policy, it must be remembered that it was *opposition* of the most violent and venomous kind—lay in its direct effect on the French attitude. It doomed to almost certain failure every possible attempt of the German government to reach a reconciliation with France.

Only in the light of this situation can one understand a policy which largely disregarded French animosity and, in many instances, did not hesitate to antagonize France directly—most spectacularly, by the Austro-German customs union project. France was still the foremost power on the continent; but, free from the fear of direct sanctions after the Rhineland evacuation, Brüning was unwilling to make any concessions to her, convinced that they would have no lasting effect. He pursued a policy of demands, but—and here lies the difference between his method and that advocated by the uniformed mob in the *Reichstag*—

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his demands were comparatively moderate and cautious. Despite all he asked and despite his unwillingness to compromise, his was not a policy of threats and vilification. In public statements and in secret negotiations, he remained calm and polite, modest and patient, appealing to facts and statistics rather than to emotion and prejudice. Therefore, even the French statesmen could not help but respect the German Chancellor, of whom their ambassador in Berlin remembers that "nothing in him evoked the rudeness and *lourdeur* of the German. . . . He did not recriminate, he did not protest. . . . He had . . . a way of . . . pleading for Germany, so full of good faith, simplicity, and dignity that he inspired in his auditors compassion and the desire to assist him."[17] These personal traits—or tactics of negotiation—had hardly any tangible results; but they prevented Franco-German relations, at least on the government level, from reaching the open hostility which was manifested by a large part of the French and German people, and thereby offset to a certain extent the effects of his provocative policy toward France.

Interestingly enough, the role of the vindictive right in Germany was the most significant single factor determining the course and the possibilities of success of Brüning's policy toward Britain, just as it was in the case of Germany's relations with France. Its effect, however, was exactly the reverse. Paris and London were equally afraid of a possible Nazi government, but the conclusions which they drew from this threat were totally different. France looked with suspicion upon every German government; Brüning might be acceptable, but what would happen to France if he fell? Britain, on the other hand, felt a strong interest in doing all it could to prevent an extremist regime from coming into power. Faced with the same situation, the French were convinced that it was necessary to distrust even the Brüning government and to refuse Germany any concessions, whereas the British decided to put their trust in the Chancellor and to strengthen his position at home by supporting him abroad.

The Nazi threat, the violent domestic opposition, proved to be Germany's greatest asset in Brüning's relations with Britain. From the very beginning, the Chancellor was well aware of the advantage which it gave him in his negotiations with the British. Hardly three weeks after the elections of September 1930, in which the National Socialists had gained 107 seats in the *Reichstag*, he remarked to Count Westarp that the strengthening of the Nazis was quite helpful ("*gar nicht*

[17] André François-Poncet, *Souvenirs d'une ambassade à Berlin*, Paris, 1946, p. 17.

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ungünstig") in view of coming negotiations on a Versailles revision.[18] Twenty-four years later, he still held that a strong domestic opposition is very advantageous to a government in international negotiations. In a speech in 1954, he explained to his countrymen that "it was only because the different governments were always exposed to the most passionate criticism in the *Reichstag* that one could achieve so much in the foreign policy of the Weimar period. Abroad, fear was always felt about the fall of a government which pursued a constructive foreign policy, and therefore there was greater inclination to make concessions to such a government."[19]

And, indeed, the British did hold the view that they must not necessarily expect too much of the German government. "It [is] the best Government we [can] hope for and [has] great difficulty in maintaining its equilibrium . . . ," wrote Sir Robert Vansittart in June 1931. It seemed likely to him that "in the near future, it would experience still greater difficulty. If we expected from them, or pressed them for, too much, we might well be instrumental in procuring their downfall. . . ."[20] This point was frequently emphasized in the British diplomatic correspondence. The invitation to Chequers in mid-1931 was extended expressly "as a gesture . . . which might strengthen the Brüning Government *vis-à-vis* its own public opinion";[21] Sir Horace Rumbold's reports from Berlin reminded Henderson repeatedly of Brüning's precarious domestic position and of the need to be lenient with his government; and Brüning himself, together with his foreign minister, did all he could to keep this notion alive in the minds of the British statesmen, and frequently used it as an excuse for Germany's refusal to make concessions demanded by the British.[22]

Together, the sympathy the British felt toward German revisionism and their wish to keep Brüning in power proved strong enough to survive even their greatest disappointments with German foreign policy; therefore, Brüning's actions that antagonized the British may not have evinced gratitude for Britain's friendship and support, but they certainly showed his realistic appreciation of the situation. This was generally true of his relations with France as well. Both to his

[18] From the Westarp papers, quoted in Karl Dietrich Bracher, *Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik*, Stuttgart, 1955, p. 377.

[19] Heinrich Brüning, *Die Vereinigten Staaten und Europa*, Stuttgart, 1954, p. 4.

[20] *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, ed. by E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, 2nd series, II, London, 1947, p. 69.

[21] Henderson to Rumbold, April 1931, *ibid.*, 2nd ser., II, p. 59; cf. also II, p. 58, and I, pp. 559f.

[22] E.g., *ibid.*, 2nd ser., II, pp. 75, 129.

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exploitation of British good will and to his provocative policy toward France the term *Realpolitik* is fully applicable.

II

When Brüning took office, the Young Treaty, the "definite" settlement of the reparations question, had just been ratified. Brüning was more cautious in his statements about the Treaty after he became Chancellor, but when he was still a *Reichstag* deputy, he expressed his attitude toward it rather clearly: "For us . . . this plan, too, is a *Diktat*; and only to this *Diktat* do we submit."[23] Yet, because it freed the Rhineland, and because, as he said with regard to reparations, "Nobody can believe that these payments can be made permanently,"[24] the *Reichstag* leader of the center voted with his party for the ratification of the Plan on March 12, 1930. When he presented his cabinet on March 30, however, it contained three men who had advocated a referendum branding supporters of the Plan as traitors and criminals. There could be no doubt that the new government wanted the Young Treaty, and all reparation payments, to be abolished as soon as possible. It would not tear the Treaty up, however, as the extremists demanded; in the declaration of April 1, it had promised "loyal fulfillment of international agreements."[25] But it would do all it could to obtain an end to reparations if this were possible within the limits of "fulfillment."

The most urgent problem facing the government seemed to be the economic depression, which had already reached frightening proportions. Yet, despite the economic suffering and the political dangers inherent in this situation—which Brüning certainly underestimated before the September 1930 elections—one cannot avoid the impression that he considered a final solution of the reparations question more urgent than an immediate recuperation of the sick economy or an energetic curtailment of radicalism. Notwithstanding the testimony of his ambassador to Moscow, according to which Brüning was unable to "devote his full attention to foreign policy, with which he was not familiar,"[26] his actions seem to indicate that the Chancellor's main interest and ambitions lay in foreign policy. Not only would this explain his assumption of the post of foreign minister after Curtius'

[23] *Verhandlungen des Reichstags*, Vol. 427, p. 4371.
[24] *Schulthess, 1930*, p. 31.
[25] *Verhandlungen des Reichstags*, Vol. 427, p. 4728.
[26] Herbert von Dirksen, *Moskau, Tokio, London*, Stuttgart, n.d. (preface dated 1949), p. 115.

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resignation, and the large amount of attention devoted to foreign policy in his speeches, interviews, and articles. His satisfaction at the Nazi gains because of the effect they would have on international negotiations also can be understood only if one assumes that foreign policy was his primary concern, even to the extent of ignoring the gravity of domestic threats. His insistence in his recent book on the advantages of a strong opposition—after he had seen where this particular opposition had led his country—confirms this impression.

But certainly personal preference for foreign affairs was not the only basis for Brüning's decision to obtain an end to reparations before finding work for the millions of unemployed. Like most of his countrymen, the Chancellor was convinced that the reparation payments were responsible, if not for the depression as such, at least for its severity in Germany. He was convinced that the German economy could recover only when the pressure of reparations had been removed. Moreover, one must remember the role played by the loathed "tributes" in German political discussions. Even the most moderate Germans were full of indignation and bitterness, and to liberate from "enslavement" a country which felt itself to be innocent of war guilt and the subject of exploitation by ruthless victors would be regarded as a most significant success, and would provide his government with badly needed domestic support. The Chancellor himself stated in his open letter to Adolf Hitler of January 23, 1932: ". . . the entire work of this government is dominated by the *Primat der Aussenpolitik*."[27]

For personal, economic, and political reasons alike, then, Brüning decided to remove the reparations burden from Germany as quickly as possible, almost regardless of the cost at home—increasing economic misery, unpopularity, and growing political danger for his government. There was no realistic possibility of tearing up the Young Plan; but neither was there much hope of reaching his goal quickly by a policy of conciliation and persuasion—and quickly it had to be, he was convinced, if Germany was ever to recover. Brüning therefore chose a way by which he did not threaten and protest, but by which, without making concessions, and also without giving the appearance of not "loyally fulfilling" Germany's obligations, he hoped to obtain the cancellation of all reparations by his *economic* policy alone.

Stresemann had considered the heavy indebtedness of his country to foreign states and private creditors a valuable asset in his foreign policy. In a speech in 1925, he explained: "One must simply have enough debts; one must have so many debts that, if the debtor col-

[27] Quoted in *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 23, 1932, evening edition.

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lapses, the creditor sees his own existence jeopardized."[28] As early as 1919, the economist Brüning had published an article in which he held that reparation payments would prove impossible as soon as large foreign credits stopped flowing into Germany.[29] Now, at a time when the situation desired by Stresemann had become reality, Brüning was going to provide proof of his contention of more than a decade earlier. The attitude of the former Allies, and particularly of the French, was such that he could hope for the definite abolition of reparations only if they were presented with such a desperate economic situation in Germany that they feared for their loans and investments. He had to convince the world that the German economy would collapse unless it was freed from the reparations burden.

The depression was well under way when Brüning took office. In December 1930, there were four million unemployed in Germany.[30] Yet the government did not make any determined effort to provide for employment or to revive production by initiating a public works program, making credit available to industry, or lowering taxes. Certainly, there is no infallible way out of a depression, and there were weighty economic reasons against such a policy. But there was also a political reason: would the Allies ever give up their claims to reparations if Germany prospered? Elaborate preparations had been made, the plans for a spending policy and public works were all drawn up—but their execution was held back until the reparations were abolished.[31]

In the meantime, Brüning pursued a deflationary policy of rigorously cutting government expenditures, wages, and prices, while taxes went up. A serious attempt was made to balance the German budget (particularly in view of a forthcoming reparations settlement[32]) and to promote exports while cutting down on imports. And, indeed, in one respect this policy proved very successful; whereas there had been no export surplus in 1929, it amounted to 1.5 billion *Reichsmark* in 1930, and reached an estimated 3.0 billion in 1931.[33]

[28] Quoted in Annelise Thimme, "Gustav Stresemann: Legende und Wirklichkeit," *Historische Zeitschrift*, Vol. 181 (1956), p. 314.

[29] Although it could not be located in the important economic journals, there is no reason not to believe Brüning's remark about this anonymously published article in a *Reichstag* speech (*Verhandlungen des Reichstags*, Vol. 446, p. 2195).

[30] Eyck, *Weimar*, II, p. 374.

[31] Schwerin-Krosigk, *Deutschland*, p. 132.

[32] An unbalanced budget had been the main factor that had forced Germany to agree to its foreign creditors' proposals during the Young Plan negotiations in 1929, since the reduced annuities would alleviate the desperate state of the *Reich's* finances.

[33] "Report of the Committee Appointed on the Recommendation of the London Conference, 1931," *British Documents*, 2nd ser., II, p. 491.

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Hand in hand with this policy at home went a radical reduction in borrowing from abroad. In 1930, Germany received foreign credits amounting only to 0.7 billion *Reichsmark*, as opposed to 2.7 in 1929 (or approximately 20 billion between 1924 and 1929).[34] At the same time, payments out of Germany, interest on foreign debts and reparations, decreased only from 3.3 to 2.5 billion, so that for the first time since 1923 Germany paid more reparations than it received credit from abroad. But whatever the wholesome results of Brüning's economic policy might be for the *Reich* budget and for the balance of trade, deflation and the refusal to receive further foreign credits could not overcome the depression. On the contrary, the economic crisis became deeper and deeper; by the end of 1931, unemployment had passed the five-million mark and the German banking system was on the verge of collapse.

This desperate situation had a variety of causes. The depression had deepened everywhere, but only in Germany had remedial government measures been postponed until a political goal was reached. Whether the economic and financial policy of the Brüning government merely failed to stop the natural course downward or actually hastened its progress is a difficult question of economic theory. But it seems clear that Brüning's foreign policy was a major cause of the rapid deterioration of Germany's economic situation. The confidence of foreign investors in German stability had already suffered from the results of the September 1930 elections; it was shattered by actions of the Brüning government that added to the political tension in Europe—particularly by the projected Austro-German customs union, the effects of which Herbert Hoover characterized as "the last push against an already tottering economic structure in Europe."[35] When the plan was made public on March 20, 1931, it caused consternation in Paris and an immediate deterioration of Franco-German relations. Mainly as a consequence of this,[36] 2.9 billion *Reichsmark* out of a total of 10.3 billion invested in Germany at the end of 1930 as short-term credits were withdrawn during the first seven months of 1931.[37] To a national economy already struggling with a serious depression and hampered by the lack of capital, this was an almost fatal blow.

Brüning, on the other hand, could find some satisfaction in this

[34] *Ibid.*, 2nd ser., II, p. 487; Hjalmar Schacht, *Das Ende der Reparationen*, Oldenburg, 1931, pp. 38, 40.

[35] *Hoover Memoirs*, III, p. 62.

[36] This is the advised opinion of Hoover (*ibid.*, III, p. 62) and Eyck (*Weimar*, II, p. 407).

[37] *British Documents*, 2nd ser., II, p. 489.

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development. As an economist, he had certainly been aware of the basic rule of economics that foreign capital, invested at normal interest rates, can be attracted and held only if stability and peace seem assured for the debtor country. There can be little doubt that he was aware of the likely economic consequences of his foreign policy. Furthermore, a withdrawal of foreign credits seems to be consistent with an economic policy that wants to get along without acquiring new ones; consequently, no attempt to stop the flight of capital by exchange control was made until very late. And in case there was any doubt left as to whether the German government might regret the loss of capital and seek to replace it, Dr. Curtius stated at the Chequers Conference that "Germany was long past loans and had neither the desire nor the ability to solve her difficulties in that way."[38] On June 20, 1931, only two weeks after this flat announcement, President Hoover declared a one-year moratorium on political debts and was able to induce France to accept it.

This was the solution the German government had hoped for. Although largely provoked by Brüning's policy, Germany's financial crisis of mid-1931 was real. If the country refused to take in new foreign capital, the payment of reparations was indeed impossible for the moment. Therefore, the Hoover Moratorium represented not only a solution of Germany's acute financial difficulties, but a success for Brüning's policy—namely, an important step toward the complete abolition of reparations.

Of course, this was only a postponement of reparation payments; if Germany's economic and financial situation improved during the following year, the payments would have to be resumed. But the prevention of such an improvement presented no problem to the German government so long as foreign money was kept out of the country and the plans for a revival of the economy in the drawer. On the other hand, even after the declaration of the Moratorium the situation remained very critical, since the withdrawals of foreign credits did not stop. The danger signals accumulated and the economy seemed to approach a total collapse. Something had to be done—everybody agreed about that. The German government would have liked to take advantage of the crisis in order to end reparations once and for all; well aware of this, the French, while offering a loan to Germany under certain political conditions, flatly refused to discuss the problem of reparations at the London Conference, convened on July 20, 1931. Since the other powers—even Britain—agreed to this restriction,

[38] *Ibid.*, 2nd ser., II, pp. 72f.

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Brüning saw himself compelled to postpone an advance in this direction, and to seek a solution that would prevent the threatening catastrophe without impeding his reparations policy by noticeably bettering Germany's financial and economic position. And, indeed, such a solution was found and agreed upon by the powers represented in London—the "standstill agreement," according to which further withdrawals of foreign credits would be stopped.

But if this fulfilled the wishes of the German government, why did Curtius declare, on the second day of the Conference, that "if no financial solution were found, Germany would break down; fresh credits were essential"?[39] It is very unlikely that these words were intended to be more than a demonstration of an apparent willingness to find a way out of the crisis by means other than the cancellation of reparations. Brüning knew that only the French were in a position to give such credits, and that they insisted on political concessions in return for financial assistance; and these concessions—the guarantee of a "political truce" in Germany's revisionist policy for a number of years —he refused to make. Protected from undue suspicion by the French demands, Brüning could continue his reparations policy. In the fall of 1931, he declared in the *Reichstag*: "I warn you against momentary solutions under the pressure of urgent material suffering. They would, in the long run, have worse consequences than the actual state of affairs."[40] He did not lose his nerve in the face of the steadily growing army of unemployed and discontented and the rapidly decreasing production figures in Germany.

Slowly but surely, Brüning's method of employing the government's "entire economic and financial policy in the service of a preparation of such a solution"[41]—that is, in obtaining an end to reparations—approached final success. During 1931, he had impressed on every foreign statesman the danger of the crisis not only for Germany, but for the entire world, and he had succeeded in preventing either a temporary improvement or the total collapse of the German economy. He was careful not to come out into the open with a clear demand for a permanent end to reparations until January 8, 1932,[42] and even then his view was made public only through an indiscretion.[43] But as early as July of the preceding year, during the London Conference,

[39] To Henderson on July 21, *ibid.*, 2nd ser., II, p. 219.
[40] *Verhandlungen des Reichstags*, Vol. 446, p. 2070.
[41] Brüning to the *Reichstag* in March 1931, *ibid.*, Vol. 444, p. 680.
[42] In a conversation with Sir Horace Rumbold, *British Documents*, 2nd ser., III, pp. 12f.
[43] *Ibid.*, 2nd ser., III, pp. 13f.

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when the negotiating governments had agreed not to discuss reparations at all—although MacDonald, Henderson, and Vansittart still appeared convinced that Germany would be able to resume paying reparations at some time in the future—the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip Snowden, had greatly embarrassed his colleagues by taking the German side even more energetically than the Germans themselves, and coming out with what was in effect a demand for abolition of all reparations.[44] The Prime Minister and the Foreign Office did not concur with this as yet, but the reports of the Basle Committee of August 18, 1931, and that of the Special Advisory Committee of December 23, 1931, stood strongly on Snowden's—and thereby the German—side and did not fail to impress the rest of the British government.

Early in January 1932, Brüning achieved his second significant success in regard to the reparations question, after the Hoover Moratorium. The British were finally convinced that he was right: on the morning of January 6, the new Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir John Simon, had declared to the German ambassador that "the British Government were convinced that the only effective solution would be provided by the complete cancellation of reparations, and that the difficulties of Europe would not be finally removed by any other course.[45] Simon had added some warnings to the effect that public opinion in France and in the United States could not bear the shock of a categorical German demand for a definite end of payments at the Reparations Conference. But Brüning, with the British definitely on his side, now felt secure enough to show his intention of making exactly this demand, on January 8,[46] only to see from the French reaction when the news leaked out that Simon's caution had been well founded. But Brüning was no longer worried about that—British support would make his final success possible.

The Chancellor was close to a triumph now. A few months earlier, he had explained to the *Reichstag* what the motive behind his policy was. Germany had tried, for the first time, to make the reparation payments without the help of foreign credits; she had, for one year,

[44] "The Governments represented here have . . . been concentrating upon some measure which will give immediate relief to Germany, without undertaking to deal with what are the fundamental causes of the trouble from which Germany is suffering at the present time. President Hoover . . . recognised what was the root cause of Germany's present financial plight, that it was due to political obligations of Germany. . . . We cannot shirk hard facts indefinitely" (Stenographic Notes of the Meetings of the London Conference, *ibid.*, 2nd ser., II, pp. 460f.).

[45] *Ibid.*, 2nd ser., III, p. 8.

[46] *Ibid.*, 2nd ser., III, pp. 12f.

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succeeded in fulfilling her obligations this way, but it had immediately become obvious that she could not continue to pay reparations. "Just once one had to have the courage to follow this course, despite its unpopularity at home. . . . I believe that the method chosen by the government to explain to the world Germany's real situation was more effective than . . . memoranda, heavy volumes, exposés, and fulminating speeches. . . . This is the method, and the method is not new: again and again in history it has been used by defeated peoples to achieve a success."[47] And a speech of May 11, 1932, again revealed the principle behind his policy and at the same time his certainty of being close to success; speaking about the reparations problem, he concluded: "There is one danger,[48] and in it one hope; it lies, for all the countries of the world, in the fact that the crisis will make rapid progress all over the world during the next weeks and months, so that waiting even a few weeks and months will bring the world into a situation from which perhaps nobody could find a way out. Gentlemen! Let us not become weak during the last five minutes!"[49]

The Chancellor followed his own advice. He remained strong and stubborn, and saw how well the policy that he had pursued during the two preceding years worked out at Lausanne; he saw what he could consider *his* success in the Lausanne agreement of July 7, 1932; but his country, the parties, and the *Reich* President were not willing to bear with him during the "last five minutes." Only two weeks before the Lausanne Conference convened to decide on a *de facto* end to reparations, he was forced to resign. Germany, under a new government, benefited from the policy to which Brüning had clung so stubbornly, and for which he had decided "to bear the unpopularity of such a position."[50] He had risked—and finally lost—his office, not only because he was not the astute statesman on the domestic scene that he was in foreign affairs, but also—and there is little reason to discard this as mere rhetoric—because he had no desire "to bear the historical responsibility for being maneuvered into a position from which certainly no salvation and no improvement can be expected for Germany."[51]

[47] *Verhandlungen des Reichstags*, Vol. 446, pp. 2195f.

[48] The version of the speech given in *Schulthess, 1932*, p. 31, is slightly, but significantly, different: "There is one hope, and this hope lies. . . ." This may be more authentic than the official version, from which such revealing passages have possibly been expurgated.

[49] *Verhandlungen des Reichstags*, Vol. 446, pp. 2596f.

[50] Brüning in March 1931, *ibid.*, Vol. 444, p. 680.

[51] *Ibid.*, Vol. 444, p. 680.

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III

An eminent historian of the Weimar Republic condemns much of Brüning's foreign policy on the grounds that "a debtor country has to avoid anything that shakes international confidence. . . . the withdrawals as a consequence of the customs union experiment surpassed in volume the reparation payments which Germany was spared [by the Hoover Moratorium]."[52] Of all of Brüning's foreign policy moves, aside from his efforts to end reparations, this "experiment" has received the most attention from historians, and generally their strong disapproval.[53] If one assumes that Brüning's primary concern was to remedy the economic crisis as quickly as possible and to obtain new loans, the German government's action with regard to the customs union at that particular time appears highly ill-advised and disastrous indeed.

The reasons advanced for this step by the participants themselves do not sound at all convincing. It is difficult to grasp what "setting matters in motion"[54] or bringing Germany "over the dead point . . . in German-French relations"[55] mean when these relations were already highly strained and this action could hardly fail to antagonize the French even more.[56] If the depression was the government's main problem at the time, it is also hard to see how a union with small, impoverished Austria could help, and to say that, of all Germany's foreign policy problems, a move toward closer economic relations with Austria was most likely to succeed at that moment,[57] and that there was "no major question which took precedence,"[58] sounds rather dubious.

What, then, could the real reasons for initiating the action have been?

[52] Eyck, *Weimar*, II, p. 407.

[53] Nazi historians used to accuse him of "weakness" in pursuing the project, whereas liberal historians generally share Eyck's point of view or simply deplore the resulting growth in tension between France and Germany. On the other hand, a recent German study (Oswald Hauser, "Der Plan einer Deutsch-Österreichischen Zollunion von 1931 und die Europäische Föderation," *Historische Zeitschrift*, Vol. 179, 1955, pp. 45-92) takes the side of the government in claiming the legal and moral right of Germany to propose the customs union ("no intention of a political *Anschluss*, a view of the union as the first step toward a European federation") and, while blaming Curtius for the secrecy of the negotiations, apportions the greater share of blame for the failure and its consequences to France for her lack of good will.

[54] The head of the Economic Department of the German Foreign Ministry, Dr. Ritter, to J. W. F. Thelwall, Commercial Counsellor to the British Ambassador in Berlin, *British Documents*, 2nd ser., II, p. 37.

[55] Curtius, *Sechs Jahre*, p. 190.

[56] The German ambassador to France, von Hoesch, had predicted that the French reaction to the Austro-German step would be "a storm" (*ibid.*, p. 194), but held that in the long run the French would resign themselves to the established fact (*ibid.*, p. 190).

[57] Bülow, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Rumbold, *British Documents*, 2nd ser., II, pp. 45f.

[58] Ritter to Thelwall, *ibid.*, 2nd ser., II, p. 36.

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It was and is generally assumed that Brüning was seeking a foreign policy success for domestic reasons. It is not very significant that Curtius in his memoirs indignantly rejects such a contention.[59] But considering that, whereas there was strong internal pressure on the government regarding other foreign policy issues, the voices calling for the *Anschluss* had become fairly quiet, and, furthermore, that the government leaders were not at all sure of success,[60] it seems evident now, and could hardly have escaped them then, that the loss of prestige if the project failed would be infinitely greater than any possible gain. The only advantages that could be expected from the venture were in taking another step toward the revision of Versailles by bringing the *Anschluss* closer, and perhaps in assisting Austria in her economic plight in the tradition of Austro-German friendship.[61] These gains would be slim, indeed, when compared with the losses if the plan failed—economic losses from the withdrawal of further short-term credits, and political losses from the further deterioration of relations with France. If one assumes that Brüning wanted quick relief from the depression and thought friendly relations with France to be possible at the time, one cannot help but be shocked by the apparent incompetence, or at least desperation, of the German statesmen and diplomats.

A more likely explanation is that Brüning, although aware of the probable economic and political consequences of failure, did not attribute as much importance to them as he did to the possible gains, small as they might be. He was without hope for a conciliation with France in the near future and therefore felt free to provoke the French even more; and, because of his reparations policy, he did not want further foreign credits and would not mind some credit withdrawals. What thus appears clear in the context of his general foreign policy is also supported by the remark of a high German Foreign Office official to the effect that the Germans had been "perfectly well aware what the effects of a customs union were likely to be on their neighbors."[62]

In this light, the customs union venture loses much of its weight as a "disastrous failure" and as bad policy. Yet a failure it certainly remains[63] in the sense that the project could not be realized and that

[59] Curtius, *Sechs Jahre*, p. 191.

[60] Curtius considered it risky enough to go to Vienna alone in order to spare Brüning from the domestic reaction in the event of failure (*ibid.*, p. 191).

[61] Curtius speaks about "our attempt to help Austria out of her economic misery" (*ibid.*, p. 196).

[62] Ritter to Thelwall, *British Documents*, 2nd ser., II, p. 36.

[63] It should be noted here—for what it may be worth—that Sir Horace Rumbold reported to London that he "was informed . . . that the Chancellor was an unwilling adherent of the proposed Customs Union" (*ibid.*, 2nd ser., II, p. 278).

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Curtius had to resign; and it was bad policy in timing and in the secrecy of the preparatory negotiations, which caused the intensity of the French reaction and seemed to support the French contention that it represented nothing but an attempt to reach the *Anschluss* by the back door.

For Brüning, the failure of the project meant a failure to remove the limitations of Versailles with regard to the *Anschluss*; seen in the context of his entire foreign policy, however, it was not the great disaster which it is usually taken to be. The customs union with Austria—or the *Anschluss*[64]—was but one of the many revisionist claims he pursued so energetically and vociferously, and which were denied. Criticism of the technicalities of the customs union venture is therefore justified, but criticism of the principle behind the action would have to be extended to his entire foreign policy (quite apart from the reparations question), since it was, despite being his most spectacular move, in full accordance with the rest of his policy.

And, indeed, Brüning was often blamed—even while he was still in office—for the "activity" in his foreign policy, for raising all the German revisionist claims simultaneously and thereby antagonizing the other powers and destroying confidence in Germany, while making success in regard to any one question very unlikely. It was, ironically enough, a Social Democrat who felt he had to remind Curtius in the *Reichstag* of Bismarck's maxim about the right way of eating artichokes, and solving problems one by one.[65] These reproaches seem very reasonable on first sight; but they lose much, if not all, of their force when one fully realizes Brüning's position, opportunities, and intentions.

It must first be noted that some progress and some success were achieved in regard to several questions. The Council of the League of Nations, at its January 1931 session, sustained the German objections to the Polish minority policy and practically adopted the German view as to the source of the constant frictions and incidents on Germany's eastern borders. At the same meeting Curtius spoke out against plans for uniting what had formerly been German East Africa, then the British Tanganyika Mandate, with other British colonies,[66] and in November 1931 he scored a success when a joint committee of both

[64] Considering all the available evidence, and particularly the reaction of German public opinion, one can say that there was no thought of immediate political *Anschluss* within the German government, but that the French accusations contained considerably more than a kernel of truth.

[65] Deputy Stampfer in February 1931, *Verhandlungen des Reichstags*, Vol. 444, p. 888.

[66] Eyck, *Weimar*, II, p. 376; Curtius, *Sechs Jahre*, pp. 173f.

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British houses decided against the plan.[67] Finally, on the armament issue, the German government succeeded in obtaining the support of Italy and Russia and, to a certain extent, of Britain in its claim for equality.

These successes were certainly meager compared with the long list of German claims. But it must be noted that, under the prevailing circumstances, more substantial and immediate gains were practically out of the question. One of the reasons for this was certainly the lack of French confidence in Germany; but the main reason lay simply in the nature of the two major revisionist claims. A change in the border with Poland and the acquisition of armaments were, at least for Germany's neighbors, mutually exclusive. So long as Germany demanded Polish territory, how could one give her the means of acquiring it by force? And even if the Brüning government promised not to use force, what if the Nazis took power? Thus, because of their very nature, and because of the political instability in Germany, the solution of these problems had to be postponed.

Germany could not hope to settle these issues in the early 1930's; all she could do—and was compelled to do, if these aims were to be pursued successfully later—was to hold her position by not making any commitments that limited her liberty of action or prejudiced further efforts. Here is the reason for Germany's stubborn refusal to agree to any of the concessions demanded by the French in the negotiations during the summer of 1931—a refusal which shocked the British and Americans who expected Germany to make a conciliatory move by abandoning the customs union and rearmament plans and accused the Germans of "receiving everything and giving nothing";[68] it provoked even Henderson into describing the German attitude as one of "fiddling when Rome was burning" and as an "impossible position."[69] The British showed indignation—but continued to support the government that was, in their opinion, "the best . . . we could expect."[70] Brüning knew very well how far he could go with them, and he felt that it was imperative not to yield any ground whatsoever.

One minor issue in Brüning's foreign policy seems particularly enlightening as to his motives and methods. Curtius' intervention at the

[67] *Verhandlungen des Reichstags*, Vol. 444, p. 881; *Schulthess, 1931*, p. 536.

[68] The United States ambassador in Berlin, Sacket, in a conversation with Brüning on July 2, 1931, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1931*, I, Washington, D.C., 1946, p. 131.

[69] *British Documents*, 2nd ser., II, p. 221.

[70] *Ibid.*, 2nd ser., II, p. 69. ". . . the alternative," Vansittart continued, "was one that filled me and, I believed, everybody else with real alarm."

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League of Nations against the British intention of incorporating the Tanganyika Mandate in the British colonial empire shows how strong the German government felt its position to be in relation to Britain; the constant threat of an alternative government worked so well that Germany could very well afford to antagonize Britain by such actions. But, more clearly than any other German move, it also shows the rationale behind the seemingly senseless policy of "activity": perhaps nothing could be achieved right then, but the world must not be allowed to forget the German claims; one must constantly appeal to the world's conscience and defend every legal position; and not the slightest move must be permitted which might constitute an unfavorable precedent or in any way jeopardize the fulfillment of German claims at a later date.

Aside from the reparations problem, Brüning had few and only minor foreign policy successes. But it was practically impossible under the existing circumstances to obtain more, and there was the constant threat of losing ground—even if only through the passage of time. Brüning saw as the aim of his policy the defense of Germany's position by refusing to give an inch, blocking any attempts to make the Europe of Versailles permanent, and appealing to the world's conscience with calls for understanding, justice, and the right to equality.

Taken by itself, Brüning's foreign policy was as successful as could reasonably have been expected. Yet a word of caution must be added. Success alone does not provide adequate justification of a policy and, in this case, two questions must be asked: Did the increase in economic suffering that accompanied Brüning's reparations policy add significantly to the force of radicalism in Germany? Could a statesman who was unwilling to keep a strong domestic opposition within bounds cope adequately with the Nazi threat? The answers lie outside the scope of this article and may not be unequivocal. But the very fact that these questions present themselves casts serious doubt on the over-all record of the Brüning government, whatever the achievements of its foreign policy may have been.

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KHRUSHCHEV'S REVOLUTION IN INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT

By HOWARD R. SWEARER

TWO years have passed since Khrushchev launched his reorganization of Soviet industrial management, the most daring and politically risky venture of a dynamic administration studded with unorthodox and sweeping programs. The vertical ministerial system of industrial management was abolished virtually overnight and replaced by a territorial organization centered in 105 regional economic councils, or *sovnarkhozy*; thousands of officials scurried off to new jobs in an environment alien to their previous experience; and new command and control channels had to be forged in short order.

While the industrial reorganization was drafted with a particular objective or objectives in view, it was impossible to determine beforehand the total concatenation of effects such an ambitious enterprise would have on the complex industrial society of the Soviet Union. Many Soviet leaders had grave misgivings about the outcome of this *tour de force*, and, without doubt, it was one of the prime elements that catalyzed the diverse personalities comprising the "anti-Party group" into abortive action against Khrushchev in June 1957.

This upheaval in the Soviet bureaucracy has been treated from many aspects. It has been speculated that the reorganization was primarily motivated by Khrushchev's political need to break the back of the powerful Moscow economic bureaucracy which was resisting his plans for alterations in the classical Stalinist system, and in which his Presidium opponents found their strongest support. Economists have found its *raison d'être* in the maturing and increasingly more complex Soviet economy, which has outgrown the era of fiat and the rigidly overcentralized ministerial system. Much has been written about the economic repercussions, both beneficial and dangerous, of eliminating the economic ministries which, although ossified, overstaffed, and often duplicative, did keep a tight rein on local administrators.[1]

[1] For other treatments of this subject, see Richard Lowenthal, "The Permanent Revolution on Again," *Problems of Communism*, VI, No. 5 (September-October 1957), pp. 1-7; Alec Nove, "The Soviet Industrial Reorganization," *ibid.*, VI, No. 6 (November-December 1957), pp. 19-25; P. E. Mosely, "Khrushchev's New Economic Gambit," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVI, No. 4 (July 1958), pp. 557-68; Paul E. Lydolph, "The Soviet Reorganization of Industry," *American Slavic and East European Review*, XVII, No. 3 (October 1958), pp. 292-301.

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The second anniversary of the management revolution is a propitious time to review some of the broader ramifications of this audacious project in institutional engineering for the Soviet administrative system and Soviet society in general. How successful have been attempts to rationalize and pare down the bureaucracy? What role has been assigned to the Party in the new system of management, and how well has it met its commission? How much stability has the *sovnarkhoz* system demonstrated, what problems have been encountered, and what modifications have been made in its structure and functioning? What are the centers of power and responsibility in this new balance between central control and local initiative? How have the stresses and strains that have arisen among the newly created interest groups been resolved? Finally, how significant an impact has the management reorganization had on the traditional Soviet system?

Continuous tinkering with the ministerial form of industrial management over a number of years, evidenced in a repetitious pattern of consolidation and splintering of ministries, the creation and abolishing of functionally specialized state committees, and experimentation with the structure of the State Planning Commission, revealed a long-standing dissatisfaction of the Party leadership with the operation of the ministerial system. All of these earlier attempts at reform were strictly limited in scope, however, by a commitment to the highly centralized ministry as the archetype of industrial administration. They were eminently unsuccessful in alleviating the major flaws of the system: the fantastic concentration of operational decision-making in Moscow, with resulting delays, red tape, and smothering of local initiative; and ministerial "parochialism" which often inhibited the normal flow of industrial wares among enterprises of different ministries and resulted in an irrational and wasteful use of resources.

Khrushchev sheared through the Gordian knot by abolishing over 140 all-union, union-republic, and republic ministries, and establishing regional councils more suited to active, on-the-spot management. Being physically located in the economic administrative region, the councils are more aware of local needs and potential, and better able to make timely decisions necessary for smooth industrial operations. Each *sovnarkhoz* is divided into industrial-branch departments, such as ferrous metallurgy, coal, timber, light industry, and machine construction, depending on the industrial complexion of the area; and functional departments, like cadres, planning, and administration.

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REDUCTION OF BUREAUCRATIC STAFFS?

One of the stated purposes of the reorganization was to reduce the costs of administrative overhead. However, the number of personnel released for production work was officially announced as only 56,000, a rather limited reduction.[2] Even this small number is suspect, for, by juggling job classifications and redefining production work, it is possible to compute highly arbitrary figures.

Indeed, one wonders if there was not, in fact, a total increase of administrative personnel in 1957 and 1958. There were abundant complaints throughout the summer and fall of 1957 in the provincial and central press that ministerial personnel from Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and other large cities were not reporting to *sovnarkhoz* posts in the more remote and less desirable locations.[3] For example, in September 1957 Kemerovo Sovnarkhoz officials complained that, of 83 specialists expected from Moscow, only 18 had arrived. In many areas *sovnarkhozy* had to be staffed almost entirely by local people and, in several cases, it was even admitted that people had to be taken out of production to fill administrative posts. Apparently large numbers of bureaucrats, when their ministries were abolished, managed to find new places in the key cities of culture, power, and promotions.

Moreover, *sovnarkhoz* staffs have proliferated as empire-building has moved to the localities. For example, the relatively insignificant North Kazakhstan Sovnarkhoz administers only 78 industrial enterprises, but it has 27 structural subdivisions and a staff of 363 people.[4] Official concern was expressed in a *Pravda* article in the fall of 1958: "The structures of certain economic councils are unduly complex. They have all sorts of intermediate links, in the form of administrations, trusts, associations, combines, offices, etc. A great many directors and senior specialists of all varieties have appeared in these economic councils with small structural subdivisions."[5]

[2] I. Kuzmin, "Perestroika upravleniya promyshlennostyu i novy podem sovetskoi ekonomiki" [The reconstruction of the administration of industry and the new upsurge of the Soviet economy], *Pravda*, April 5, 1958, p. 4.

[3] Some representative staffing problems are cited in G. Ivanovsky, "Blizhe k zhizni, k proizvodstvu" [Closer to life, to production], *Partiinaya Zhizn*, No. 13 (July 1957), p. 45; V. Fedorov, "Smelo vydvigat mestnye kadry" [Bring out the local personnel boldly], *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, September 11, 1957, p. 2; A. Ozersky, "Kemerovskii sovnarkhoz diestvuet" [The Kemerovo Sovnarkhoz takes action], *Oktyabr*, No. 9 (September 1957), p. 149; A. Yeremenko, "S chevo my mechali" [What did we dream about?], *Pravda Ukrainy*, August 6, 1957, p. 2.

[4] Aldesh Zhusupov, "Neustanno sovershenstvovat i udeshevlyat upravlencheskii apparat" [Let us indefatigably improve and reduce the cost of the managerial apparatus], *Pravda*, December 8, 1958, p. 3.

[5] "Sovershenstvovat i uproshchat administrativno-upravlencheskii apparat" [Let us

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STABILITY OF THE SOVNARKHOZY

With the addition of one and elimination of two regional councils, the present number of *sovnarkhozy* stands at 104, a demonstration of considerable stability. The Russian Republic has 68 economic administrative regions, the Ukrainian SSR 11, the Kazakh SSR 9, and the Uzbek SSR 5. Each of the remaining 11 republics constitutes a single region. While a *sovnarkhoz* may embrace two or more of the regular provincial administrative units (oblast or krai), the more industrially potent oblasts and krais have their own *sovnarkhoz*. Some of the following analysis may not be appropriate for a few of the industrially weaker *sovnarkhozy*, especially those located in the smaller republics.

Many Western observers thought that the creation of such a large number of economic administrative regions would have anarchic results and anticipated consolidations of *sovnarkhozy* encompassing a natural economic region. In fact, during the early stages in the discussion of the reorganization in the spring of 1957, it was generally assumed that there would be considerably fewer *sovnarkhozy*, justified in the main by economic criteria. As late as May 9, 1957, only one *sovnarkhoz* was planned for the entire Kazakh Republic.[6] The larger number was decided upon so that the new structure of industrial management could be meshed in with the existing Party and governmental administrations and thus facilitate control by established provincial and republic Party organs.

The choice of the larger number may also have been influenced by a desire to avoid jurisdictional disputes and a need to build support for the program in the political hinterlands. During the nation-wide discussion of the reorganization, it was made abundantly clear that powerful provincial officials wanted their own unshared *sovnarkhozy*.[7] This sentiment still exists. In late 1958 a Party official from Poltava Oblast in the Ukraine complained that the Kharkov Sovnarkhoz, which embraces three oblasts, favored the Kharkov Oblast in the allocation of supplies. He advocated the formation of a new Poltava Sovnarkhoz.[8]

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improve and simplify the administrative-managerial apparatus], *Pravda*, October 3, 1958, p. 1. Similar complaints were lodged in "Sovershenstvovat apparat upravelniya proizvodstvom" [Let us improve the apparatus for the management of production], *Promyshlenno-Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, January 5, 1958, p. 1; and M. Mavlyutova, "Sovershenstvovat khozyaystvennyi apparat" [Let us improve the economic apparatus], *Sovety Deputatov Trudyashchikhsya*, No. 1 (January 1959), pp. 29-33.

[6] "Rech Deputata D. A. Kunaeva" [Speech of Deputy D. A. Kunaev], *Izvestia*, May 9, 1957, p. 4.

[7] S. Petrov, "Gromozdkie ekonomicheskie raiony ne nuzhny" [Cumbersome economic regions are not necessary], *Pravda*, April 10, 1957, p. 4.

[8] M. Rassokhin, "Sovershenstvovat rabotu sovnarkhozov" [Let us improve the work of the *sovnarkhozy*], *Pravda*, December 10, 1958, p. 2.

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In actual operation there has been an attempt to retain the administrative advantages of the smaller *sovnarkhoz* unit, and yet achieve some unity of planning and production within a wider natural economic region. During the past year and a half there have been several significant articles in leading Party and economic journals which bemoaned the lack of inter-*sovnarkhoz* planning, and discussed the necessity of creating large economic regions for purposes of planning the complex development of industry.[9] This apparently is what Khrushchev meant when he told an American visitor last year that the number of *sovnarkhozy* would not be reduced, but that the system was entering a second stage of development.

Indeed, the State Planning Commission, or *Gosplan*, for the Russian Republic has already established several territorial departments in Moscow which apparently have made some attempts to prod *sovnarkhozy* within areas like the Urals and the Far East toward closer cooperation. The next logical step in this trend would be the physical location within an economic region of an organ to co-ordinate inter-*sovnarkhoz* relations and to serve as a mediator between Moscow and the *sovnarkhozy*. On November 30, 1958, *Izvestia* printed an article by a member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences advocating specialization and integration of large regions like the Urals, West Siberia, the Far East, and so forth, and calling on the Russian Republic Gosplan to set up departments within these regions located in the Republic, and for the all-union Gosplan to establish agencies in regions outside the Russian Republic.

PARTY CONTROLS

To make the managerial revolution work, Khrushchev has been banking heavily on the Party apparatus, and particularly the provincial Party secretaries. While relatively few Party *apparatchiki* have been appointed *sovnarkhoz* chairmen and deputy chairmen (belying prognostications of some Soviet experts that Khrushchev would appoint his Party acolytes as *sovnarkhoz* heads), the lower reaches of Party cadres have been given both greater opportunities to influence and oversee the industrial complex and greater responsibilities for its operation.

[9] I. Gerasimov, T. Khachaturov, Ya. Feigin, P. Alampiev, "Nazrevshie voprosy ekonomicheskogo raionirovaniya" [Imminent problem of the division into economic regions], *Promyshlenno-Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, September 14, 1958, pp. 2-3; Ya. Feigin, "Neobkhodimoe uslovie uspekha" [An essential condition of success], *Izvestia*, November 30, 1958, pp. 3-4; P. Alampiev, V. Kistanov, F. Sukhopava, "Dalneishee sovershenstvovanie ekonomicheskogo raionirovaniya" [Further improvement of the division into economic regions], *Kommunist*, No. 16 (November 1958), pp. 57-61.

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Each *sovnarkhoz* has its own Party unit which, in most instances, is broken down into primary Party organizations for each department of the *sovnarkhoz*. While the *sovnarkhoz* Party organization is not supposed to interfere directly in the operation of the *sovnarkhoz*, it serves as a watchman ready to "signal" the provincial Party organization to which it is directly responsible, about any imminent dangers or shortcomings. The composition of the *sovnarkhoz* staff is considerably influenced by the provincial Party committee, which is charged with assisting in the procurement of personnel.[10]

Under the old ministerial system, the provincial and republic Party secretaries were limited in their influence on industrial development within their jurisdictions because a large number of specialized and vertically responsible ministries were operating in their districts. The Party secretary found it difficult to short-circuit ministerial action at the provincial level, since local industrial administrators were responsible to higher echelons in the particular ministry, and the minister, sitting in Moscow, was an important personage. To influence planning or to effect remedial action in productive operations, the provincial secretary was usually obliged to work through departments of the Party's Central Committee in Moscow, often a laborious procedure, full of bureaucratic obstacles. Now the threads of industrial management in a province are held directly by the *sovnarkhoz*, over which the corresponding Party secretary can exercise considerable influence.

The creation of the *sovnarkhoz* has added another hierarch to the ruling clique of a province. Invariably, the *sovnarkhoz* chairman is a member of the provincial Party bureau—the provincial incarnation of the omnipotent Party Presidium in Moscow—and joins the Party secretaries and the chairman of the soviet executive committee as the oligarchic provincial rulers. The actual status of the *sovnarkhoz* head varies with the industrial significance of the area and the stature and competence of the man; but invariably the provincial first secretary remains the dominant figure. It is interesting to note that whereas a great majority of provincial first secretaries are members of the august Central Committee, only a handful of the present *sovnarkhoz* chairmen are officially so honored. Moreover, in the 1958 elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet, the ceremonial deputyship was bestowed upon less than one-fifth of the *sovnarkhoz* chairmen, while almost all Party first secretaries on the provincial level were given the nod.

[10] M. Yefremov, "Povyshat aktivnost pervichnykh partorganizatsii predpriyatii" [Let us increase the activity of the primary Party organizations in enterprises], *Partiinaya Zhizn*, No. 11 (June 1957), pp. 27-32, contains one of the best descriptions of the rights and duties of Party organs vis-à-vis the *sovnarkhoz*.

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Khrushchev has demonstrated considerable faith in the competence, training, and loyalty of the Party cadres; and there is little question but that the new functions of industrial supervision will be a substantial test of the resiliency of the post-Stalin Party apparatus. The local Party officials are not only charged with the negative function of checking for wrongdoing and inadequacies in the industrial management, but are also specifically commissioned to assist administrators in fulfilling the economic plan; and it is probable that production achievements are considered a better criterion of success than the investigation of shortcomings. Hence, the local Party authorities have a vested interest in presenting the best possible face to Moscow and, consequently, it is often difficult to maintain the ideal of *partiinost*, or a detached Party point of view. The Party official may often find that he has a community of interests with the very people he is supposed to watch. The opportunities for "familiness," or collusion among local officials from the various bureaucracies—Party, government, *sovnarkhoz*, and so on—to resist the all-pervasive central pressures, have probably been increased by the restructuring of industrial management.

It is noteworthy that a Central Committee resolution in May 1958, condemning regional industrial officials for illegally diverting centrally allocated capital investment funds to local purposes, also took a verbal slap at responsible provincial Party authorities who failed to prevent such abuses. *Pravda* in September 1958 enlarged on the charge: "Unfortunately, there are Party workers who not only fail to defend the general interests of the state but who not infrequently promote antistate practices. Not having themselves delved into the heart of the matter, they begin to support the incorrect proposals of managerial officials and in some cases even force such officials to carry out work not included in the plan in order to suit local interests."[11]

Thus, the industrial reorganization has not only increased the Party work load, but has compounded the task of preventing any factionalization of the Party and its maintenance as a highly centralized and independent unity responsive only to national considerations as propounded by the Party Presidium.

[11] L. Slepov, "O gosudarstvennom podkhode k delu i mestnichestve" [Concerning the conduct of state business and localism], *Pravda*, September 1, 1958, p. 2; "O grubykh narusheniyakh gosudarstvennoi distsipliny v ispolzovanii kapitalnykh vlozhenii i faktakh proyavleniya mestnichestva so storony otdelnykh rukovoditeli sovnarkhozov" [Concerning the rude violation of state discipline in the use of capital investment funds and the facts relating to the manifestation of localism on the part of individual managers of *sovnarkhozy*], *Partiinaya Zhizn*, No. 15 (August 1958), p. 23.

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LOCAL SOVIETS AND THE SOVNARKHOZY

The superimposition of the *sovnarkhoz* system on the regular administrative structure necessitated some fairly radical jurisdictional readjustments at the local level. The decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, dated September 26, 1957, which details much of the reorganization procedure, fails, perhaps purposely, to delineate clearly the *sovnarkhoz* relationship with local governmental organs. It provides that the *sovnarkhoz* shall "report" to krai, oblast, and city executive committees, "co-ordinate" with respective executive committees on the "complex development of the economy, the use of supplies, and the energy base," and "undertake co-ordination of procurements and also other necessary connections between enterprises of the *sovnarkhoz* and enterprises of all-union, republic, and local subordination."[12]

Complaints in the press, however, indicate that this co-ordination is not always smooth or effective. For example, in mid-1958 the chairman of the Karaganda Oblast Planning Commission took the Karaganda Sovnarkhoz to task for drawing up economic plans without considering the resources and requirements of enterprises subordinated to the local soviets. He lamented that the Kazakh Gosplan did not force the Karaganda Sovnarkhoz to co-ordinate plans with the Oblast Planning Commission so that an integrated plan for all branches of the local economy could be developed.[13] In May 1958 a deputy of the Lvov Soviet wrote that the reorganization, far from alleviating the difficult supply situation of industry under the control of local soviets during the pre-1957 era, had in fact worsened it.[14] The Lvov Sovnarkhoz was apparently no more willing and able to ensure a steady flow of raw materials to local industry than the old ministries had been.

In May 1957, in conjunction with the industrial reorganization, it was announced that more enterprises would be turned over to the control of the local soviets on the oblast, city, and raion levels. This was done on a moderate scale. Transfers to local soviets in the two largest republics included 767 enterprises and 160 construction organizations with an annual output of 11.5 billion rubles in the Ukraine, and over 3,400

[12] "Ob utverzhdenii polozheniya o Sovete Narodnogo Khoziaystva ekonomicheskogo administrativnogo raiona" [Concerning the confirmation of the statute relating to the Council of the National Economy of the economic administrative region], *Sobranie Postanovlenii Pravitelstva Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik*, 1957, p. 410.

[13] A. Golovin, "Za koordinatsiyu deistvii mestnykh sovetov i sovnarkhozov" [For the co-ordination of the activities of the local soviets and the *sovnarkhozy*], *Izvestia*, July 4, 1958, p. 2.

[14] V. Petrushko, "Eti voprosy nado reshat" [These problems must be solved], *Izvestia*, May 11, 1958, p. 3.

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enterprises with an annual production of 32 billion rubles in the Russian Republic.[15] While this has increased the powers and duties of the local soviets, in many cases it has resulted in the administration by different authorities of enterprises mutually interdependent, causing misallocated and retarded production and resulting in endless bickering. For example, in Stavropol Krai, the breweries were placed under the authority of the Krai Executive Committee, while producers of bottles and carbon dioxide were put under *sovnarkhoz* control. Two deputies of the Stavropol Krai Soviet complained publicly that "It is quite clear to us, for example, that the distribution of enterprises of local and republican administration between the *sovnarkhozy* and the executive committees of soviets was conducted not quite correctly. . . ."[16]

Mirroring the strategic position of the state planning agencies on the republic and all-union levels in regard to supervising the *sovnarkhozy*, Gosplan also has been granted considerable power and responsibility for co-ordinating the economic activities of *sovnarkhozy* and local soviets and for overseeing local industry. The control of soviet executive committees over local industry may actually have been weakened vis-à-vis Gosplan by the abolition of many union-republic and republic ministries.

As the system shakes down, many of the conflicts may prove to be transitory. However, a certain amount of jurisdictional wrangling in the localities is inevitable.

SIGNS OF DISAGREEMENT

During late 1957 and most of 1958, command relations between Moscow and the localities were being re-established and difficulties were being smoothed over. Underneath the ubiquitous Couéism and determined optimism of the Soviet communications media, one catches occasional glimpses of hard in-fighting between central economic authorities and regional officials to establish themselves in favorable positions under the new system.

The Soviet press made scant references to at least two high-level conferences of Party, *sovnarkhoz*, and Gosplan leaders held in Moscow

[15] R. S. Pavlovsky, "Novye polozheniya o mestnykh sovetakh deputatov trudyashchikhsya SSSR i voprosy upravleniya mestnoi promyshlennostyu" [The new statutes concerning the local soviets of the workers' deputies of the USSR and the problems of the management of local industry], *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, No. 6 (June 1958), pp. 70-71; M. Tarasov, "Nekotorye voprosy sovetskoi raboty" [Several questions of soviet work], *Sovety Deputatov Trudyashchikhsya*, No. 1 (July 1957), p. 13.

[16] A. Petrokhalko and S. Frolov, "Odnorodnye predpriyatiya—v odni ruki" [Similar enterprises—under single control], *Izvestia*, August 9, 1958, p. 2.

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in late 1957 and early 1958.[17] The fact that there was almost no reportage on the happenings at any of these meetings, in which Party Presidium members took part, suggests that they were called to work out pressing and embarrassing problems in industrial management. Then there was the peculiar episode of a Construction Conference held in April 1958, at which Khrushchev delivered the major address. At the time the press made only a brief announcement of the event. It was not until early July 1958 that a relatively obscure professional journal, *Construction Gazette*, the organ of the State Committee on Construction Affairs, published Khrushchev's speech, in which he had tentatively put forward a rather startling proposal to grant the *sovnarkhozy* considerable power over the allocation of capital construction funds: a key lever by which central authorities have traditionally regulated and molded Soviet economic growth.[18] Khrushchev tossed out this novel idea almost as though he were thinking aloud, and, in this, he symbolized the uncertainty of the period in coping with the new managerial order.

SOVNARKHOZ-GOSPLAN TUG OF WAR

The position of Gosplan was greatly enhanced by the demise of a number of ministries, from which it inherited powers, duties, and personnel. Some of the most powerful of the former ministers have found their way into the Gosplan apparatus, which has undergone considerable expansion. In the number and diversity of departments and responsibilities, the central and republic gosplans have come to resemble in some measure the old councils of ministers. In addition to its role as a supreme planner, Gosplan has given many indications of expanding into the central manager and enforcement officer of the industrial community. While the *sovnarkhozy* are legally responsible to the republic councils of ministers, in actual operation Gosplan has become the primary lever of central authority, abetted by the Ministry of Finance, the State Bank, and the newly revamped State Control Commission.

Relations between *sovnarkhoz* and Gosplan officials have shown signs of strain over the past two years. *Sovnarkhoz* authorities have publicly blasted with surprising candor the Gosplan of the Russian Republic, and to a lesser degree the USSR Gosplan and those of other

[17] "V Gosplane SSSR" [In the Gosplan of the USSR], *Planovoe Khozyaistvo*, No. 1 (January 1958), p. 82; "V TsK KPSS" [In the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], *Pravda*, February 9, 1958, p. 1.

[18] "Rech Tovarshcha N. S. Khrushcheva . . ." (Speech of Comrade N. S. Khrushchev), *Stroitelnaya Gazeta*, July 2, 1958, pp. 1-2.

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republics, for delay and inefficiency in approving plans.[19] During the winter of 1957-1958 it was charged that Gosplan, and particularly its branch in the Russian Republic, had not adapted its organization and *modus operandi* to the radical new conditions of the industrial bureaucracy. *Sovnarkhoz* spokesmen chafed under Gosplan restrictions and controls and spoke out against Gosplan delay in approving plans, inefficiency in operating the supply and sales network, and usurpation of what were considered legitimate *sovnarkhoz* planning functions.[20] There was grumbling that the central Gosplan organs ignored *sovnarkhoz* draft plans.

The complaints of overdirection by Gosplan are a latter-day version of ante-reorganization resentment felt by local authorities against the Moscow bureaucracy that had been manifested in criticism of the central ministerial departments and the Council of Ministers. Such grievances are endemic in a totalitarian society like the USSR, where the economy is being driven by central directive over a carefully mapped route at full throttle.

Criticism of Gosplan by *sovnarkhoz* authorities has not gone unheeded. In January 1958 Frol Kozlov, then premier of the Russian Republic, speaking before the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, took some cognizance of the widespread disapprobation of the Russian Republic Gosplan, and announced a modification of its structure to rectify the time-consuming and duplicative procedure required to get *sovnarkhoz* plans approved by the various departments of Gosplan. He announced that territorial departments of Gosplan were being established in Moscow. Each territorial department would be responsible for a particular geographic region, and would serve as the contact point between *sovnarkhozy* within the region and central Gosplan departments. The reverse side of the coin, of course, was that these territorial departments could more closely and consistently supervise the *sovnarkhozy* within their bailiwicks. However, even following Kozlov's statement, there appears to have been some hesitancy and indecision, for it was not

[19] The tenor of these charges is given in E. Frolov, "Nekotorye voprosy zavershenia perestroiki upravleniya promyshlennostyu" [Several problems concerning the completion of the reorganization of the management of industry], *Kommunist*, No. 2 (February 1958), pp. 49-63; P. Abroskin, "Rezervy privodyatsya v deistvie" [The reserves are being put into action], *Pravda*, November 20, 1957, p. 2; S. Kamenitser, "Perestroika upravleniya promyshlennostyu—moguchy rychag dalneishego razvitiya sotsialisticheskogo proizvodstva" [The reorganization of the management of industry—a powerful lever for the further development of socialist production], *V Pomoshch Politicheskomu Samoobrazovaniyu*, No. 2 (February 1958), pp. 27-36.

[20] B. Bukhanevich, "Che eto pravo" [Where is the law?], *Trud*, April 9, 1958, p. 2; B. Naimanov, "O nekotorykh voprosakh organizatsii planirovaniyu" [Concerning several problems relating to the organization of planning], *Pravda*, February 6, 1958, p. 2.

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until after mid-1958 that any reference was made to the functioning of the territorial departments.[21]

The cashiering in May 1958 of N. K. Baibakov, head of the Russian Republic Gosplan, may also be interpreted as a reaction to justified *sovnarkhoz* criticism of his administration. While one is always on shaky ground in speculating on the motives for personnel rearrangements in the Soviet Union—and particularly so in the case of Baibakov, who has a long history as a top industrial administrator and planner—it seems not unlikely that his removal was a sop to criticism by *sovnarkhoz* officials; and his reassignment to the boondocks as, of all things, a *sovnarkhoz* chairman has the earmarks of Khrushchev's ironic sense of humor. Of even greater significance was Baibakov's replacement by V. N. Novikov, former chairman of the Leningrad Sovnarkhoz, who is familiar with the problems in the localities and more likely to be sympathetic to *sovnarkhoz* difficulties. Parenthetically, the former Premier of the USSR, Bulganin, lately identified as an "anti-Partier" who opposed the management decentralization, like Baibakov, had salt rubbed into his wounds when he too was appointed chairman of a *sovnarkhoz*.

In October 1957 *Party Life*, the official bimonthly Party journal, briefly outlined the prerogatives of a *sovnarkhoz*: "While manipulating its material and financial resources in the effort to ensure a more rational implementation of the plan, the *sovnarkhoz* as a rule does not have authority to overstep the bounds of the basic plan indices, such as the labor plan, the wage fund, the mutual relations with the budget, the profit plan, the over-all production plan for commissioning new production capacities, living room, etc."[22]

Provincial officials in the spring of 1958 repeatedly advocated extensive expansion of *sovnarkhoz* rights in such matters as alterations of wage rates, redistribution of investment capital, and more independence in planning. The chairman of the Kuybyshev Sovnarkhoz wrote: "It is time to grant *sovnarkhozy* more rights and independence in the field of economic planning, because petty guardianship on the part of Gosplan is clearly not justified."[23]

[21] V. Biryokov and V. Safonov, "Smezhnikh sovnarkhozakh" [Adjacent *sovnarkhozy*], *Izvestia*, September 17, 1958.

[22] "Kakovy obyazannosti i prava Sovetov Narodnogo Khozyaistva" [What are the responsibilities and rights of the Councils of the National Economy?], *Partiinaya Zhizn*, No. 19 (October 1957), pp. 62-69. This is a good official description of the powers of the *sovnarkhozy* in their initial period of operation.

[23] I. Borisov, "O pravakh, samostoyatelnosti i nenuzhnoi opeke" [Concerning rights, independence, and unnecessary trusteeship], *Promyshlenno-Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, April 25, 1958, p. 2.

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In striving to increase their authority, the *sovnarkhozy* have made some, although not unqualified, gains, such as greater control over the supply and sales network, less detailed planning supervision by Gosplan, and more discretion in adjusting funds among some categories of the plan.

"LOCALISM"

In defense against further encroachments upon their powers, central planners have been able to play heavily on the widespread apprehension that regional authorities, if not tightly reined in, might run with the bit in their teeth. The Soviet leadership has always expressed an awareness that the reorganization of management and its identification with long-established administrative areas, by thus allowing local officials more leeway to devise insulation against impulses from the central control panel, might inhibit Moscow's ability to press home the nerve-jangling directives required to keep up the furious pace of industrialization. If the major flaw of the old ministerial system was the curse of "overcentralization," it was recognized long before the actual promulgation of the Reorganization Act that the main bogy of the new system would be the many-faceted phenomenon popularly tagged *mestnichestvo*, or "localism." It was feared that, under the pressure of local interests and considerations, *sovnarkhoz* officials might lose sight of the national interest, as defined by Moscow, and attempt to evade or dilute central orders.

During the initial period of operation under the new system, two particular manifestations of "localism" were successively singled out for attack: first, "non-fulfillment of co-operative deliveries" among different economic administrative regions; and, secondly, diversion of planned capital investments from high-priority projects to those of less national importance, but of greater local benefit.

In the first nine months after the reorganization, the problem of interregional deliveries of industrial goods loomed particularly large because old ties between enterprises were disrupted and new connections were being formed. The press continually harped on the sacredness of interregional contracts, dredging up numerous horrible examples of cases where regional officials had reneged on, or delayed, deliveries to another region and thus disrupted production. A *sovnarkhoz* tended to place the demands of its own plants ahead of deliveries to "foreign" regions. It was apparent also that many councils, taking advantage of loopholes in the plan, cut back production of some items

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vital to other areas but of low demand within their own regions, in order to meet gross economic goals.[24]

Directly connected with the issue of interregional supply was the problem of the disposition of the gigantic supply and marketing administrations of the former ministries. As a temporary expedient, at the time of the reorganization it was announced that they would be attached intact to the USSR Gosplan until January 1958. In effect, the old methods of supply and marketing were continued during the first few months of the reorganization. It was not until May 1958 that new arrangements were made.

There was much criticism of the supply and sales network, and Khrushchev and the *sovnarkhoz* officials may have wished to carry the management reorganization much further along by placing responsibility for supply and marketing in *sovnarkhoz* hands.[25] However, the difficulties over non-fulfillment of co-operative deliveries must have provided considerable food for second thought. The May 1957 decree was a compromise which provided that each *sovnarkhoz* and republic establish administrations for supply and distribution, while USSR Gosplan set up central divisions for inter-republic deliveries. V. Zotov, a deputy chairman of USSR Gosplan, outlined the division of responsibilities: "Responsibility for this work within each economic administrative region is being placed on the enterprises and the *sovnarkhozy*; within union republics, it is being placed on the *sovnarkhozy* and the republic gosplan; between union republics it is being placed on gosplans of union republics and Gosplan USSR."[26]

As a warning to local officials not to abuse the new system, it was concurrently announced that "disciplinary, material, or criminal" sanctions, including prison sentences for repeating violators, would be applied to officials who failed to complete planned deliveries to other

[24] The press during this time was replete with articles on the subject of localism. A few good examples are "Doklad pervogo zamestitelya predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov RSFSR, predsedatelya Gosplana RSFSR, Deputata N. K. Baibakova" [Report of the first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR, Chairman of the Gosplan of the RSFSR, Deputy N. K. Baibakov], *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, January 29, 1958, p. 2; F. R. Kozlov, "Rech predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov RSFSR, Deputata F. R. Kozlova, na zasedanii Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR" [Speech of the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR, Deputy F. R. Kozlov, at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR], *Izvestia*, January 31, 1958; B. Kashkadamov, "O svyazi zhivoi deistvennoi" [Concerning vitally effective communications], *ibid.*, October 2, 1957, p. 2; "Vazhneishaya zadacha kazhdogo sovnarkhoza" [A most important problem of every *sovnarkhoz*], *Pravda*, January 13, 1958, p. 1.

[25] A. Veimer, "Za prochnye ekonomicheskie svyazi mezhdu predpriyatiyami i raionami" [For strong economic ties between enterprises and regions], *Pravda*, January 9, 1958, p. 2.

[26] V. Zotov, "Vazhny rychag podema proizvodstva" [An important lever for the upsurge of production], *Promyshlenno-Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, May 11, 1958, p. 4.

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regions.[27] Administrators were warned that "sales organs of union republics, *sovnarkhozy*, and enterprises must facilitate the delivery of products to other union republics and economic administrative regions and for other all-union needs first, independently of the level of fulfillment of production plans for those products."[28]

In the late spring of 1958, the glare of publicity shifted to the misuse of planned investment funds by local officials. The seriousness with which the leadership viewed this matter is indicated by the fact that it was brought up for discussion at the Party's May 1958 plenum, ostensibly devoted to a discussion of the chemical industry. It was not until August that an article in *Party Life* casually mentioned that this plenum had also adopted a resolution on violations in the use of investment funds which *inter alia* warned that "similar violations of state discipline, if not checked in time in a resolute fashion, may disorganize our planned socialist economy and strike a blow at the national economy."[29]

An investigation had shown that some nine *sovnarkhozy* had been guilty of violating investment directives. For example, the Karaganda Sovnarkhoz had reduced planned capital investments for the development of the coal industry and metallurgy by 74.6 million rubles and had used the money instead for the construction of a theater, rest homes, a park, and equipment for the *sovnarkhoz*. Several *sovnarkhoz* chairmen and the chairman of the Kazakh Gosplan were officially reprimanded.[30]

It is, of course, impossible to determine how serious and widespread was (and is) the problem of "localism." It may be argued that the press campaign, the use of the criminal code, and the Party resolution were designed primarily as prophylactic measures to ward off a potentially dangerous condition. The publicized sums involved in the transfers of investment funds were not of particularly significant magnitude.

The timing of the disclosures on the misuse of capital funds, just one month after Khrushchev at the Construction Conference had suggested a plan to bolster further the powers of the *sovnarkhozy* over investment, also arouses suspicions that they may have been a device, employed by those desiring to maintain strong central control in Gosplan, to dissuade him from such a move.

[27] "V Prezidiume Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR" [In the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR], *Pravda*, May 19, 1958, p. 1.

[28] V. Zotov, *op.cit.*

[29] "O grubykh naruscheniyakh gosudarstvennoi distsipliny . . . ," *loc.cit.* (see note 11), pp. 22-24.

[30] *Ibid.*

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In the past few months, as the disruption of the reorganization has diminished and the participants have settled into their newly defined jobs, the furor over "localism" has somewhat—though not entirely—subsided.[31] However, the problem, while eased, has not been eradicated, for the institutional arrangements and the industrial policies that spawned it are still operative. In late 1958, three officials of USSR Gosplan, writing in *Kommunist,* a leading Party theoretical journal, stressed the importance of planning by natural economic regions to combat another emerging form of "localism"—the attempt to create a self-contained economy within the framework of an individual *sovnarkhoz.* "Not seldom," they said, "does a *sovnarkhoz* strive to ensure the complex development of the economy of its own region" when "it is not nationally expedient."[32] The radical new balance between central control and local initiative is one in which continuing adjustments can be expected as the participants jockey for more favorable positions.

Several Western commentators have stressed, and rightly so, that what has transpired in the administrative revamping is not a "decentralization" but a "reorganization." To be sure, Khrushchev from the outset never intended to weaken central control; rather he has sought to give it new vitality. This point was sharply made in a recent authoritative Soviet article: "The new forms of state administration of industry and construction, manifesting a new process of decentralization of operative administration with the preservation of leadership from the center, in no way violates democratic centralism as the basic principle of the administration of the economy."[33]

The semantics are misleading, however, if they tend to discount the really startling changes that have taken place, and if they imply that there has been in fact no devolution of decision-making or fundamental alterations in controls. Moreover, the industrial reorganization exerts strong pressure for changes in other areas, like administrative law and the financial and banking systems. In the words of the above-mentioned article, ". . . it is necessary to recognize that the existing legal regulations in great measure do not answer the demands of our national

[31] "Ne dopuskat narushenii gosudarstvennoi distsipliny" [Let us not permit violations of state discipline], *Partiinaya Zhizn,* No. 7 (April 1959), pp. 23-24. This article condemns the officials of the East Kazakhstan Sovnarkhoz and the responsible Party authorities for diverting investment funds from construction work in heavy industry to local needs.

[32] P. Alampiev, V. Kistanov, and F. Sukhopava, *loc.cit.* (see note 9).

[33] A. Volin, "Sotrudnichestvo i vzaimnaya pomoshch—osnova sotsialistichestkikh otnoshenii mezhdu predpriyatiyami" [Co-operation and mutual assistance—the basis of socialist relations among enterprises], *Kommunist,* No. 3 (February 1959), p. 55.

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economy and the new conditions under which the activities of enterprises and economic organizations are carried on in connection with the reorganization of the administration of industry and construction."[34] The dynamism of this multiplier effect should not be discounted.

The industrial reorganization may also be viewed as merely a single occurrence, albeit a very significant one, in a larger pattern of change. Taken along with the other developments of the last five years—including, to mention a few prominent ones, the leashing of the secret police; the regularization and simplification of the Party apparatus and the attempts to infuse it with new life; the stress on socialist legality; the striking changes in the collective farm system; experimentation with the soviets and measures taken to enliven their work as mass organizations—the industrial reorganization exemplifies a discernible trend toward erasing some of the cruder and more arbitrary features of the Soviet totalitarian system, and its adaptation to a more mature, better-educated, and increasingly more complex industrial society. This does not necessarily mean that the regime will be less able to achieve a given task or that it will be less capable of suppressing what it considers dangerous deviants; but it does imply that the leadership will probably operate with more finesse and through a more refined and subtle set of controls. This, of course, in turn could influence the goals which the leadership sets for itself.

[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 57-58.

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SINO-SOVIET AID TO SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA*

By HENRY G. AUBREY

I. The Magnitude of Sino-Soviet Assistance

IT is customary to show that total assistance by the United States to the underdeveloped world by far exceeds that of the Soviet bloc; and since the comparison is invariably much in favor of the United States, one cannot help being puzzled by the alarm displayed about Communist aid "penetration." Moreover, I feel that such global comparisons fail to impress individual countries, which either care little about aid given to others or resent it if it is given to unfriendly neighbors or to partners in military alliances disliked for political or ideological reasons. Even aid that is gladly received is not necessarily well remembered later.

For the purpose of this article, it seems more appropriate to consider only the seven countries in South and Southeast Asia to which the Communist bloc has tendered substantial assistance, and set next to Communist aid United States assistance to the same limited group of countries, without regard to how well the United States has also done by other countries in the area that are members of the Baghdad Pact or SEATO.[1] Table 1 covers the fiscal years 1954 (when the Soviet bloc signed the first agreements with Afghanistan) through 1959.

Soviet agreements often cover several years and the time interval from signing to delivery can be very long on large programs. According to recent estimates, no more than about a quarter of the Soviet commitments may have been actually delivered by 1958.[2] The comparison with United States figures in the table is thus really biased against the United States, since the American lag between commitments and deliveries is much shorter. The table shows that, even in the countries outside the sphere where defense support predominates, the United

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[1] To compile a list of bloc aid is tricky business and the result can never be fully trusted for accuracy and completeness. This caution ought to be borne in mind in evaluating the appended table.

[2] See the testimony of Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs C. Douglas Dillon before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 21, 1959.

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TABLE I

COMMUNIST-BLOC AND US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO SEVEN SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES, JULY 1, 1954, TO JUNE 30, 1959
($ million)

	Communist-Bloc Assistance		*US Assistance*
	Military	*Economic*	*Economic*[a]
Afghanistan	32	213[b]	85
Burma	–	17	71
Cambodia	–	34	173
Ceylon	–	58	54
India	–	323	1166
Indonesia	163	239	189
Nepal	–	20	19
Total	195	904	1757

[a] Data on US military assistance are classified. Some US military supplies are reported to have been furnished Burma, Cambodia, and Indonesia.
[b] Of the total, a $3.5 million credit was reported during the first half of 1954.
Source: US Department of State and International Cooperation Administration.

States far exceeds the Soviet bloc in commitments. Actually, not just United States aid but all assistance by the West should be included in these totals. While not all the details are in, contributions by the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Finance Corporation, bilateral aid (largely by the United Kingdom, Canada, and recently also Germany), and private contributions would add not less than about $1.7 billion and perhaps quite a bit more.[3] Medium-term credits and suppliers' finance should also be added, and some observers might even insist on including private investment, for which there is obviously no Soviet counterpart. But for our purpose we might let this pass, since the recipient may not equate an investment that remains foreign and the Russians' contribution, which stays behind when they go home,[4] even if the supply of financial resources increases by the same amount in either case.

On a country-by-country basis, the picture is much less conclusive. Bloc commitments in Afghanistan and Indonesia are higher than United States commitments, while in India, Burma, and Cambodia United States assistance is much greater; and the difference in amounts in Ceylon and Nepal is so small that one wonders what it could possibly matter.

[3] This does not include purchases of dollars from the International Monetary Fund totaling nearly $300 million by India, Indonesia, and Burma.
[4] Joseph S. Berliner, *Soviet Economic Aid*, New York, 1958, pp. 74ff.

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Our brief comparison of magnitudes of capital assistance thus ends on a somewhat inconclusive note. We fare no better with regard to technical assistance. Reliable statistics on the numbers of experts,[5] student exchanges, and so forth, are hard to come by. Indications are that the West is ahead, especially if the numerous non-governmental channels are taken into consideration. But are numbers really the best measure of the impact on recipient countries?

In this country, the presence of Soviet experts in underdeveloped countries is sometimes feared as if they were so many Trojan horses, but I feel that this does not do justice to the political sophistication in an area where one finds some of the world's wariest and wiliest politicians. From what I can gather from various sources, most of the bloc experts seem to behave correctly and tend to keep aloof rather than fraternize. Many have serious language difficulties. And in at least one country, I hear, the Russians were told that the sending of "cousins" from related tribes across the border was not welcome and, moreover, the contracts of individual experts are not renewed for a second term. One learns of instances of good living and high expense accounts akin to Western levels, and also of others where the simplicity of accommodations impressed some observers. On the whole, I am not convinced that the bloc's experts are a superior asset compared with those of the West, except in two important respects: they are easier to recruit, and they can point out that they are from countries that were poor only recently. What emanates from these experts is pride in achievement rather than ideology—not necessarily a less dangerous influence.

II. Aid Terms

Mere amounts of aid apart, some differences in Soviet and Western terms are frequently discussed. Except for some hospitals and "ceremonial" gifts, Soviet assistance has been in the form of credits; the Chinese Communists have also given some grants. The United States has been far more liberal with grants and it has been said that the more "businesslike" loan method of the Soviets is a psychological advantage. I am not convinced that such a generalization is justified. Much depends on the purpose and circumstances of each case. I wonder whether, for one instance, food grants under Title II of Public Law 480 to India or other countries were ever resented. In any event, Congressional attitudes are now leaning toward loans in preference

[5] According to the Department of State, there were about 2,300 Sino-Soviet non-military technicians serving in the seven countries under review during the first part of 1959, an increase of nearly 50 per cent in a half-year.

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to grants; but critics of the United States have no trouble finding fault with such a "Shylock-like" attitude as well.

The length of Soviet credits is not unusual; they are in the medium-to-long range, perhaps not unlike Export-Import Bank practice. The United States still holds the edge in the long-term field.[6] There is a great variety of repayment terms in Soviet credit agreements, ranging from convertible exchange to local currency[7] or local products at prices to be negotiated later but presumed to be at world market levels. There are indications that some early experiences with the price relationships in Soviet trade agreements have not been uniformly happy for the non-bloc partner. But we ought to recognize that we are not certain how "hard" Soviet loans will turn out to be. If eventually the Soviets want to be gentle and extend—or perhaps even forgive—payments, they might gain the psychological benefits of giving grants in two installments, first by giving "businesslike" loans, and later by being "generous" with regard to repayments.

Moreover, uncertainty about prices may be discounted by countries which are happy at the prospect of paying with commodities they are perennially unsure of placing in world markets. In fact, they may feel that they risk less in bargaining with the Soviets than in facing the erratic and wide price swings of Western markets. Some shrewd politicians might well bank on the chance that they, rather than the Soviets, can afford to be stiff-necked about prices. By accepting payment in local currency or products, the lender is in effect shouldering the task of creating a market, a grave burden that primary producers often face in the West. Except for refusing further loans, there is little the Soviets could do with a recalcitrant debtor, unless they were to apply political or military pressure in the "imperialist" manner; and by such an attitude they would risk undoing whatever good their deeds have wrought.

The United States has been slower to recognize the important place of soft loans repayable in local currency and, for obvious reasons, is not willing to accept local products in payment.[8] Actually one might speculate whether in procedures laid down for commodity disposal under Public Law 480 the United States is not getting the worst of two worlds. Although much of the sales proceeds is reloaned for de-

[6] Most Soviet loans are repayable in 12 annual installments beginning from one to three years after delivery. In the Afghanistan case, 22 annual installments, beginning after eight years, have been stipulated.

[7] Many Soviet agreements seem to provide maintenance-of-value clauses for local currency deposits.

[8] Except by the barter of strategic materials against surplus commodities.

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velopment on the "never-never," as the British aptly call their installment plans, we insist on calling the transactions "sales." As a result, some recipient countries feel they are doing the United States a good turn by taking the surpluses off our hands; but in reality these transactions are apt to become permanent investments, or perhaps even grants, unless the United States eventually becomes willing to accept more imports and in this way use inconvertible currencies. It is hardly necessary to describe what difficulties this might create in the United States, while the perennially resource-starved bloc economies find it much easier to absorb more imports without economic cost and perhaps even with benefit.

While this difference in "comparative aid-and-trade advantage" has perhaps not yet received sufficient attention, the East-West discrepancy in interest rates is frequently discussed. Soviet loans usually carry only 2½ per cent interest; United States and international loans cost more, often much more. Why the Soviets picked 2½ per cent has never been clearly explained; perhaps such a rate looked "businesslike" though inexpensive for the borrower, and at the same time comfortably lower than the Western rates, which are denounced as "exploitative." The problem is awkward for the West, where interest rates have important institutional functions in the capital and money markets which they lack under the Soviet system. One might consider getting around the problem by mixing loans with grants and thereby lowering the average interest cost. This would not work well with borrowers who do not want grants, because loans and grants register at quite different levels of political receptivity. At present there is no easy answer to the Soviet gambit, short of subsidizing interest rates. Nonetheless, it seems to me, the problem of low-interest loans would exist even in the absence of "competitive coexistence"; the real obstacle in coping with it is our difficulty in meeting certain external situations for internal institutional reasons of our own, such as the interest rate structure in free money markets.

III. Soviet Gains from Aid

Have the Soviet aid programs paid off? This is the crucial question, and one to which there cannot be a hard and fast answer. Some gains are obvious. By launching a new program with much bonhomie and a display of friendly concern, the Soviets have attracted considerable attention and certainly reaped some good will. But this may be a wasting asset. Novelty wanes, and who knows better than we how soon past aid is taken for granted and only increases (or decreases) make the news?

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The new Soviet programs, inevitably or deliberately coupled with trade, make for more contacts on all levels; and where the Soviets had formerly kept aloof in Stalinist isolation, much was to be gained by broader and much more genial relations. The benefits of this, too, must wear off after a while, but good works and good fellowship may still have promise, at least in some places; perhaps Mikoyan's reception in the United States may give pause to those who consider this rather naïve.

Novelty apart, how much is to be gained by foreign aid? Perhaps if we felt more secure about the effects of our own assistance, we could be more precise about the Soviet program. Moreover, it is still early in the game. But there is a more fundamental obstacle to confident evaluation. Aid is clearly an instrument of foreign policy; unless we know, or infer, what the Soviets' concrete intent has been, it is difficult to tell what they have achieved.

Indeed, a number of partly conflicting statements about Soviet motivations have been made with equal assurance, and perhaps I should not try to disguise my own mistrust of any single-minded assumption. Multiple motivation is common in foreign policy; any one path, moreover, can branch off in several directions. Furthermore, I am not convinced that we must assume the existence of a master plan which applies in all situations; it may well be that the Soviets are feeling their way in what is essentially a new game for them, trying to gain a foothold for whatever use might emerge later. Finally, much may depend on the West's actions and on the feedback effect of the bloc's actions on ours, and vice versa. With this cautionary remark in mind, it may be permissible to speculate on what the Soviets may have gained if their thinking moved along either of two rather divergent paths.

Western aid is justified as a means to promote stable growth by democratic methods. Surely, Soviet aid cannot be designed to serve the same purpose. Those who feel that the Soviet bloc thrives best on unrest and chaos, as a preliminary to a Communist takeover, are apt to assume that Soviet aid is not really meant to promote genuine development. It is tendered, they believe, not in the hope of seeing it succeed fully, but in order to move the economy off dead center and then leave it to flounder in a morass of frustration, full of promise for extremist movements.

However, another observer of the same concrete situation might instead assume that the Soviets genuinely favor development, because industrialization tends to break up stagnant social patterns and create groups amenable to Communist influence, including a working class

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under disciplined union leadership. Moreover, the Soviets perhaps honestly believe, in line with their dogma, that rapid development by democratic methods cannot succeed, but that the initial momentum can eventually be made to serve their own purposes. Hence it would pay them to string along until the leaders in developing countries can be tempted or prodded into attempting progressively more authoritarian methods if the rate of achievement by democratic means lags behind the rising pressure of impatient expectations. Then, boasting of rapid rates of growth in the bloc, the Soviet system could emerge as the shining hope for rapid development in the eyes of still uncommitted or vacillating countries.

It is not difficult to visualize the application of either assumption in the case of India, though I personally find the second more plausible. Both are long-term considerations that might coexist as alternatives in a planner's mind, with some additional motivations. In either event, and in the short run, the Soviets might consider it well worth while to be associated with the "revolution of rising expectations" and gather whatever good will, or even "influence," can be wrung from concrete developments as they unfold. And, of course, in some situations, such as that existing in the Middle East, the Soviets may well have still other objectives that are not primarily related to economic development.

This would be an eclectic and, it seems to me, a practical approach and the Soviets have great aptitude for pragmatic adaption, no matter how dogmatic they often sound. They, like the United States, have been working equally well with democratic countries like India and with feudal ones like Afghanistan. They cannot hope that their assistance, though large in absolute figures, could sway a country like India, where the total to be delivered over several years barely reaches $1 per capita. In Afghanistan the "impact" is ten times as high, by this measure.[9] And yet those most impressed by Soviet success in Afghanistan do not necessarily evaluate it in magnitudes, but point to such tangible reminders as the shiny grain elevators on the skyline and the paved streets in Kabul. If Soviet influence is feared in Indonesia, it is hardly on account of the credits that have been only fairly recently accepted after great delay and have barely begun to be implemented. In Ceylon, too, whatever influence the Communists possess can probably be only very remotely related to aid.

Long-range evaluation also often differs from early apprehensions. Afghanistan was once feared lost under the impact of massive Soviet aid; but, after several years, the outcome is still in doubt. And while

[9] Berliner, *op.cit.*, p. 38.

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Burma at one time seemed endangered by Soviet bulk purchases of rice, they were perhaps the best thing that could have happened from the point of view of the West, because the Burmese leaders learned a lesson about bilateral trade which Western representations would never have managed to get across.

IV. Policy Implications

For our present purpose, these strands of thought can be gathered in three conclusions. First, since aid is only one of a number of instruments of foreign policy, we cannot be certain of the precise extent to which Soviet aid has paid off, or will do so; and I suspect the Soviets are no wiser in this respect than we. Secondly, in the face of this indeterminacy, it seems risky, perhaps even futile, to let competition be the primary guide of Western aid policy. In concrete instances, as in Afghanistan or India, one cannot fail to note the extent of complementarity of Soviet and Western aid programs which, for reasons of differing economic philosophies, have been concentrating on different sectors of the economy; and if one believes that greater development in the uncommitted world will ultimately benefit the West along with the developing countries, this may be all to the good.

True, it is often said that the Soviets build impressive monuments of modernism in places where people can see them rise in short order, while the Americans seem to putter around in the countryside and initiate projects that will not bear fruit until many years later. This is not the place to pass on details of foreign aid programs and I do not wish either summarily to endorse or to condemn the direction United States aid has taken in various countries. For the purpose of the present article, my third point is that, whatever policy may be decided upon in a specific situation, the decision ought not to be primarily or preponderantly dictated by what the Soviets do. I am not saying that the policy-maker can ignore the actions of the other party, for he can never afford to overlook tactical considerations, knowing that our failure to act properly will be capitalized upon by the Soviets. But I do believe that we might well be less concerned with Soviet motivations and more concerned with our own.

By way of an example, I would like to refer once more to Afghanistan. The Russians, probably encouraged by repeated faltering in the United States programs, have perhaps deliberately decided on a radically different approach. While they may have made some gains, the United States has not lost in the process. On the contrary, with a certain dogged determination, possibly in the absence of a realistic alternative, an

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independent course was pursued by the United States. And I have been told by disinterested observers that the recent American moves to help with air transportation and patch the vital rail link through Pakistan (physically and politically) were more appreciated than if we had tried to do as the Russians did.

But such pragmatic reasoning is not the only, or the most important, argument against a policy of response and in favor of a broadly autonomous approach. If the American foreign-aid policy has seemed to lose support in Congress and elsewhere, I believe the reason has been not so much the lack of demonstrable results as the paucity of inspired purpose. It was probably heartening to many to hear the Undersecretary of State point to the obligation of rich nations toward the poor.[10] But whether one speaks of a moral obligation, or of greater equality of opportunity, or of enlightened self-interest in a shrinking world, one seeks a broad, autonomous motivation as the foundation of a policy that we would want to pursue even in the absence of Soviet competition. It is the incurable weakness of the "security" argument that it is inevitably governed by an adversary who is thereby implicitly accorded an important measure of initiative in policy formation. In contrast, a confident, autonomous policy of assistance, based on a genuine community of interest between donor and recipient in world economic development, would find its reward in whatever appreciation foreign aid can still kindle in a cynical world. And I suspect that whatever psychological success the Soviets may have so far reaped from their economic assistance program has been due to their vocal and unqualified endorsement of the recipients' development aspirations.

[10] C. Douglas Dillon, "Imperatives of International Economic Growth," speech delivered before the Foundation for Religious Action in the Social and Civil Order, Washington, D.C., January 16, 1959, Department of State Press Release No. 37.

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Research Note

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON POLITICAL GAMING

By HERBERT GOLDHAMER and HANS SPEIER

DURING the past five years the Social Science Division of The RAND Corporation has been developing a procedure for the study of foreign affairs that we call "political gaming."[1] This article gives a brief description of the technique and some of our observations about its utility.[2]

I

Political gaming has antecedents both outside and within RAND. Prior to World War II, political gaming was applied to questions of foreign policy in Germany and Japan, although we were not aware of this at the time that we started our own experimentation.

Before Hitler assumed power in 1933, the leaders of the German Reichswehr were much concerned about Polish military strength and political designs. The German armed forces were then restricted to 100,000 men in strength. In 1929, a young staff officer, the later General Erich von Manstein, charged with the responsibility for the organization of a war game involving German defense against a Polish attack on East Prussia or Upper Silesia, realized that the outbreak of war would be preceded by mounting political conflict. In that conflict, he thought, Germany would have to avoid giving France and Czechoslovakia cause for entering the war as Poland's allies and the League of Nations a pretext for not declaring Poland the aggressor. Manstein proposed that the strictly military exercise be introduced by a political game in order to let political and military leaders learn from each other.

[1] This work was made possible in part by funds provided by the Ford Foundation.

[2] The Social Science Division of RAND has prepared a series of internal papers on gaming. Several of these have been made available to persons outside RAND who have expressed an interest in experimenting with the technique. Some of these papers are: H. Goldhamer, "Toward a Cold War Game" (1954); P. Kecskemeti, "War Games and Political Games" (1955); H. Goldhamer, "The Political Exercise: A Summary of the Social Science Division's Work in Political Gaming, with Special Reference to the Third Exercise" (1955); J. M. Goldsen, "The Political Exercise: An Assessment of the Fourth Round" (1956); Social Science Division, "Experimental Research on Political Gaming" (1958). The present article has incorporated some material from the papers listed above, particularly from the last-mentioned item.

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High-ranking members of the Foreign Office played the roles of the president of the League of Nations Council and of the Polish and German Foreign Ministers. In his recently published memoirs, Manstein writes that the inventiveness of the player representing Poland in alleging German provocations left his German counterpart "completely speechless" and that the skillfully simulated procrastination of the League was grimly appreciated by all participants. "We had the impression also," Manstein reports, "that the gentlemen from the Foreign Office, to whom such a playing-through of possible conflicts seemed to be completely novel, were thoroughly convinced of the value of the game."[3]

According to exhibits offered in evidence at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, the Japanese Total War Research Institute, established in 1940, engaged in games of aggression that involved having teams of high-ranking specialists in the Japanese government play the political and military roles of leading powers in the Pacific area. In these exercises Japan was represented not by one team, but by several—Army, Navy, Cabinet—and the views of these teams had to be co-ordinated before Japan as a whole could act. Some of the moves in this game anticipated actual measures taken by the Japanese government after Pearl Harbor.

From an article in the Sunday *Times* (London), December 9, 1956, it appears that the Soviets may have made use of a similar procedure. Alexandre Metaxas, who is identified as a Russian-speaking French journalist, reports that Soviet political specialists try to anticipate the results of international political moves by putting themselves in the role of each interested party in turn. Metaxas claims that the course to be followed by the Soviet Foreign Office is determined in part by the results of this simulated interaction. It is not clear from his account whether actual gaming procedures are involved.

RAND's interest in political gaming grew out of work in political analysis and previous experimentation with the use of gaming techniques for other purposes. For several years RAND has worked extensively with various sorts of highly formalized war games. At one point an attempt was made to devise a "cold war game" in which a few political and economic factors were assigned numerical values so that the relative worth of alternative strategies could be assessed quantitatively. Players were allowed only a limited choice of specified moves. This experiment was abandoned when it became clear that the simplification imposed in order to permit quantification made the

[3] Erich von Manstein, *Aus einem Soldatenleben*, Bonn, 1958, pp. 131-33.

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game of doubtful value for the assessment of political strategies and tactics in the real world.

The first proposal for a political game of the type with which we have been working was made by Herbert Goldhamer in 1954.[4] He suggested a procedure that avoided schematic simplifications of the international political situation and attempted to simulate as faithfully as possible much of its complexity. The government of each country was to be represented by a separate player or group of players. (In practice, of course, all countries never were represented, but only those regarded as most significant for the geographical or problem area around which the game was centered.)

In addition, "Nature" was to be represented by an individual or a team, and there was to be a team of referees. The role of "Nature" was to provide for events of the type that happen in the real world but are not under the control of any government: certain technological developments, the death of important people, non-governmental political action, famines, popular disturbances, etc.

Participants in the game were to be area specialists who could draw on their knowledge and accumulated area experience.[5] With the exception of the American Team, all government teams were to act as they judged "their" governments would in the circumstances prevailing at any given time of the game ("predicted strategy"). The American Team was less restricted; it was permitted to pursue any strategy which it judged to be optimal; in particular, the United States Team was not required to follow the foreign policy line of any administration or to have special regard for the constraints placed upon American foreign policy in reality by domestic considerations. The game was thus designed to permit tests of a wide range of United States strategies.

The referees had the task of ruling on the feasibility of each move; that is, they were to disallow any move that they did not regard as within the constitutional or physical power of the government proposing it. For three reasons the referees also played the role of "Nature." This arrangement saved manpower; it restricted the number of arbitrary moves which might have been made had full-time players represented "Nature"; and it permitted the referees to make certain non-governmental moves which constituted indirect, partial evaluations of the state of affairs that had been reached at any chosen point of the game. For example, the referees could introduce such evaluations in

[4] H. Goldhamer, "Toward a Cold War Game" (1954).

[5] All players had spent some time in the country whose government they represented and were familiar not only with its political system but also with many members of its ruling groups.

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the form of press roundups, trade union resolutions, intelligence reports, speeches made in the United Nations, etc. (The governmental players were permitted, however, to challenge the plausibility of such moves.)

In the course of 1955 and early 1956, four political games were played, starting with the rules suggested by Goldhamer and gradually developing additional refinements. The first two games extended over only a few days. The third game lasted four weeks in the summer of 1955, and a dozen RAND staff members devoted approximately half time to it. The fourth was conducted during the month of April 1956. Three senior Foreign Service Officers from the Department of State participated in the fourth political game, along with specialists from RAND's Social Science, Economics, and Physics Divisions. In the fourth game, unlike previous plays, all thirteen team members devoted practically full time to the exercise, one of them spending part of it on liaison functions. In addition, a number of consultants were called upon whenever the development of the game required competence in fields of which the full-time players did not have special knowledge. The players were assisted by a sizable secretarial staff. Prior to the start of gaming, considerable time was spent on the preparation of a "scenario" and "strategy papers."

Since the fourth game is by far the most exhaustive test we have given this technique thus far, the following observations refer primarily to it. One reference to the earlier games will, however, be useful in order to explain what is meant by the "scenario." In our first attempts at political gaming, we started with the historical present as a backdrop. From then on, game events moved into the future under their own momentum. It sometimes proved difficult to prevent the initial action in the game from being overtaken by or becoming entwined with developments reported in the daily newspaper. The fourth game, therefore, was projected further in the future, with the opening moves to be made as of January 1, 1957. The "scenario," written in March 1956, represented an effort to describe how the world of January 1, 1957, would look. It provided the players with a common state of affairs from which to begin. The scenario rid them of the intrusion of current news into the game and served to focus it on problems of special analytical interest.

In this game, as in the third, all moves by national teams were made in written form and submitted to the referees for clearance prior to distribution. The government teams were generally required to state (to the referees) the motives of their moves and the expectations on

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which they were based. The referees could challenge not only the feasibility of the moves but also their plausibility or the reasoning behind them; and if the government teams so desired, the referees could be asked to state their objections in writing.

Some moves were "open" and available to all teams; others were "game classified." The referees determined the distribution of each paper and, as controllers of information, could "leak" the contents of "game classified" papers, in whole or in part, sooner or later, accurately or in distorted form; thus the referees served as surrogates for the intelligence function in the political process or for actual "leaks" of classified information in the free press. They did not act for the Communist press, since it is government-controlled.

Prior to the April 1956 session, the government teams drew up strategy papers. These were "game classified" and were distributed only to the referees. Also certain parts of the scenario were "game classified"—e.g., sections containing descriptions of certain weapons developments.

During the three weeks of actual play, 150 papers were written by the participants. Many of these consisted of moves by government teams; moves were dated in "game time" and numbered sequentially with reference both to the action of each team and to the game as a whole. "Game classified" background papers served to give the referees a basis for judging the motivation of any given move, and to provide a written record of the analytical thought relating the move to the strategy paper of the actual team.

The fourth game was focused on the activities of the United States and the Soviet Union with respect to each other and to Western Europe. In the first week some major activity did develop involving the Middle East and some minor activity involving North Africa and Asia. But on the whole these areas received secondary attention because of limitations in time and a determined effort to keep the game focused (and not because of an *a priori* judgment about the political importance of these areas).

Events of the game carried well into the summer of 1957 (game time). After three weeks of play, the complete set of records was thrown open to all participants, including the strategy papers and all other "game classified" documents. Time was allowed for the study of these papers, and then a few days were devoted to meetings of all participants to assess and evaluate the game.

In short, the game was so designed as to meet six main requirements:

(1) *Minimal formalization*: The government teams were not lim-

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ited to any prescribed set of moves, as is the case in a game like chess and in some war games; nor did the game contain any pre-established prescriptions automatically entailing certain consequences from particular types of moves.[6] Such formalization would beg many questions that we regarded as the proper subject of discussion and inquiry within the exercise itself or as resolvable only by research outside the game. Rather than work from highly simplified and schematic assumptions up to a richer and more complex game world, we followed the opposite approach.

(2) *Simulation of incomplete and incorrect information*: In foreign affairs, state secrets, which all governments keep with varying degrees of success, are important obstacles in the process of decision-making. In our game the introduction of "game classified" moves and their unpredictable handling by the referees tried to take account of this factor.

(3) *Simulation of contingent factors*: In political life many events are beyond the control of the most powerful actors, a fact designated in political theories by such terms as *fortuna*, "chance," "God's will," "changes in the natural environment," etc. We tried to simulate this fact by moves of "Nature."

(4) *Plausibility of game events*: We vested insurance against implausible game events not only in the political judgment of the referees but also in that of the participants responsible for governmental moves. We found no tendency for politically knowledgeable and responsible players to invent "wild" moves in order to relieve the tedium of the often slow and deliberate maneuvering of the governments involved in the game. Indeed, we found that some players in their desire to behave responsibly were at times unnecessarily cautious in their moves. We believe that continuing participation in political games resolves this difficulty.

(5) *Clarification of issues*: Our aim was not to move on rapidly from point to point of the game but to clarify by discussion the issues raised in the course of the play. Such discussions took place during the game within each team before a move was proposed or on occasion between a government team and the referees, and after the game among all participants. Furthermore, we directed effort toward the clarification of intellectual issues by providing a focus of the game in the scenario and the strategy papers, by restricting the number of teams participating full time, and by selecting highly qualified specialists as players.

(6) *Exploration of novel strategies*: We tried to stimulate efforts to

[6] In war games, these prescriptions are called "planning factors."

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meet this requirement by prescribing "predicted" and "optimal" strategies respectively to various teams in advance of the play.

II

The Social Science Division has carried on several discussions to assess whether the game procedure is worth the substantial investment of time and energy that it requires. The immediate stimulus to the Social Science Division's venture in this field was the difficulty of deriving from the results of research and from general political and military knowledge a sense of the probable trend of future international affairs and the most likely consequences ensuing from policies and military postures that might be adopted by the United States or other countries.

Evidently the principal difficulties here are those inherent in scientific and applied scientific work, especially in the social sciences. Any basic improvement in our ability to forecast the consequences of an actual or hypothecated change in the political-military world will surely depend on advances in our theoretical and empirical knowledge. Granted this, there still remains the problem of making the most effective use of any given level of empirical knowledge and theory. In this connection the political game was primarily envisaged as a means for securing a more effective collaboration of the specialized skills involved in political-military analysis. The political game provided an easily and sharply defined division of labor for the participants, and it gave them a more systematic means of adjudicating the conflicting claims of different lines of argument. It also demanded of them extensive and explicit statements of the political and military assumptions from which they argued. In these ways it helped the participants to achieve a more effective co-ordination of the knowledge and intellectual talents at their disposal. In addition the game provided, through its sequence of moves and countermoves, a "calculation" of consequences (anticipated and unanticipated). In this respect the political game is somewhat similar to the use of Monte Carlo methods, whereby machine simulation takes over the job of a purely mathematical derivation of results.

It should not be supposed, however, that the political game displaces customary forms of intellectual collaboration such as the writing of political analyses, by individuals or jointly, and seminar-style discussions. On the contrary, we found that one of the most useful aspects of the political game was its provision of an orderly framework within which a great deal of written analysis and discussion took place. In describing our experience to others, we have continually emphasized

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that oral or written discussion of political problems that arise during the game is one of its most valuable features.

Making effective use of a given level of knowledge and theory does not, of course, preclude advancing knowledge and theory through gaming. While obviously such benefits will vary from player to player and from problem to problem, participants in our games did find opportunities to check their suppositions, both of a factual and of a more theoretical character, against the game events. It is not easy, however, to derive these benefits, and we suspect that they often get lost in the process of playing the game. A critical and self-conscious effort is needed to retain these benefits in a more lasting and transmissible form.

We did not expect and we have not so far found that the political game enables us to test strategies or to forecast political developments with any real degree of confidence. Unlike a written analysis, however, the game does provide some testing of a strategy prior to the test made by history itself (if that strategy is indeed followed in the real world). However, the political analyst working in his study "controls" not only the political maneuver he is analyzing but also the responses of hostile, neutral, and allied countries. In the political game, the analyst must contend with responses made by other players and not those which he assumes will follow from the line of action he is proposing. In a fairly comprehensive political game, there are numerous plausible alternative moves that governments may make, and the one line of many branching lines of development pursued in a single game cannot usually be accepted as an adequate test. To test strategies and to forecast political developments would require several replications of the gaming problem. This we have not yet attempted. On the other hand, our experience does show that even though an over-all strategy may not be tested (in terms of a clear payoff) by a single game, players do become aware during the game of pitfalls and problems that surround a strategy or some aspect of it.

The requirement of the political game that the participants make definite acts on behalf of their governments provided a very real stimulus to political inventiveness and a keen realization of possible contingencies that in analytical work might have seemed less important or less likely. On several occasions in our fourth game, certain developments in the game suggested the need for particular types of contingency planning in the real world or anticipated events that did occur later.

We hoped that the political-military questions arising in the game

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would indicate problems for further research and that gaming would thus help to shape our research program. This proved to be the case, but probably the major benefit lay in the fact that the game served to suggest research priorities for problems of which we were already aware and to define these problems in a manner that would make the research more applicable to policy and action requirements.

We believed when we began our work in gaming that the political game would prove to be a useful educational device. Our experience (and that of academic institutions with which we have collaborated) has increased our conviction in this regard.

First, the political game provides a lively setting in which students of politics, acting as observers or apprentice participants, can learn a good deal about the structure of the contemporary political world and about some of the reasons behind political decisions. Factual information takes on a new interest and importance when it is required for intelligent participation in the game, and political principles assume special significance when they are illustrated by political actions and situations with which the student is associated as a participant. Needless to say, these benefits are realized only if the students receive continuous criticism from politically knowledgeable persons or participate in a game with such persons.

Secondly, the political game performs an educational function also for individuals with considerable political training and knowledge. We found that the game provided excellent opportunities and incentives for such participants to acquire an overview of a political situation and to amass relevant information that the ordinary intellectual division of labor and specialization by area or discipline do not make available. Some players found that they were exploring new fields of knowledge, some of which they had not previously associated with the conduct of foreign policy, such as developments in weapons technology. Area specialists were not infrequently made more keenly aware of the specific ways in which the world outside their area of specialization affected the politics of countries within their area.

A third educational benefit of the political games we played was to give players a new insight into the pressures, the uncertainties, and the moral and intellectual difficulties under which foreign policy decisions are made. This, of course, is in part a tribute to the earnestness and sense of responsibility with which the participants played their roles, since otherwise these pressures and perplexities would not have made themselves felt.

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III

Even before the first four games had been completed RAND began to receive requests for information about its political gaming procedures, and staff members have by now taken part in a substantial number of discussions about it. In the summer of 1956, Hans Speier presented a summary of our experience as of that date to a Social Science Research Council summer institute in Denver, and in 1957 to the Fellows at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford. On several occasions during 1956-1958, Herbert Goldhamer lectured on the political game at the Army War College, and Joseph Goldsen discussed it at faculty and student gatherings at Yale and at a conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace at Princeton. Informal discussions about political gaming have been held with personnel of the Department of State, the Center for International Affairs at Harvard, the Brookings Institution, Northwestern University, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In June 1959, the Social Science Research Council held a conference at West Point, N.Y., on teaching and research in the field of national security. At one of the sessions Hans Speier described the RAND experiments in political gaming, and several social scientists from various academic institutions, including all those mentioned immediately below, reported on their own experiences with such games. Finally, in September 1959, Herbert Goldhamer presented a paper on political gaming at the annual meeting of the Political Science Association in Washington, D.C.

We have not attempted to collate the experiences other institutions have had in using political gaming techniques derived from the RAND experiments or worked out independently.[7] Such a collation might be useful at some future time.

Because of RAND participation we do, however, have rather detailed information about various experiments with political gaming at MIT. During the academic year 1957-1958, W. Phillips Davison of the RAND staff served as visiting professor at MIT, and while there tried out political gaming in his graduate seminar on international communications. This game was conducted according to greatly simplified rules. Players sat around a large table and could make their moves orally, although a fairly detailed written record was kept. The instructor acted as referee and "Nature."

In spite of the limitations imposed by the simplified procedures

[7] Work in this area at Northwestern University is partially summarized in a paper by Harold Guetzkow, "A Use of Simulation in the Study of Inter-nation Relations" (mimeographed).

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and the brief time available, Davison concluded that the experiment achieved worthwhile results from an educational point of view. While it did not approach the realism of the RAND games, it showed that even with less expert players the game could provide real benefits. Perhaps the most outstanding of these was the intense interest generated among the students. When formal gaming came to an end, students continued the game at lunch and at other informal gatherings. A related benefit was the increased sophistication with which students approached their research problems.

Later in the same year Professor Lucian Pye—also at MIT—assisted by Professor Warner Schilling (now at Columbia), adapted the RAND technique to the requirements of his course in American diplomacy. During the term each student was asked to write a paper setting forth the major foreign policy goals of some country and to outline a foreign policy for achieving these goals. Then, during the last four meetings of the course, political gaming was conducted, with students taking the parts of the countries whose foreign policies they had discussed in their term papers.

This experiment appeared to be a highly successful pedagogical enterprise. In many cases students found that the foreign policy they had constructed in their term papers proved unrealistic when they attempted to follow it in the game. The game thus provided a means of obtaining critical insight into their own previous thinking. Both Pye and Davison have noted that political gaming, when conducted with students, places a very heavy burden on the instructor (who acts as referee and "Nature").

A further use of the gaming technique at MIT was made by the Center for International Studies, in connection with a research project on the United Nations headed by Professor Lincoln P. Bloomfield. One session took place in September 1958. Several RAND staff members discussed the plans with Professor Bloomfield, and the informal records on RAND's gaming experience were made available to him. Paul Kecskemeti of the RAND staff participated in this game. Professor Norman J. Padelford, also at MIT, has since organized various other games for undergraduate students, in some of which political scientists from other institutions have participated.[8]

We believe that there are a great many political questions and questions of technique that could be clarified by more work in political gaming, but that this should not lead to a neglect of customary research

[8] For one of these, cf. Norman J. Padelford and Seth P. Tillman, "Report on Political Exercise on Berlin Crisis," January 1959 (mimeographed).

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and study. Gaming is most productive if one is able to bring to it the results of continuous research in the field of foreign affairs and weapons development.

IV

In conclusion we are setting forth a few variants in the form and content of the game that any thorough exploration of this procedure ought to test.

(1) *Time*: In our experiment the initial scenarios with which the games began still resembled reality rather closely. The effect of more extreme deviations from current political and military reality in the game remains to be tested. For example, the character of the game might be strongly modified by a scenario in which NATO had been dissolved, various national states in addition to the present three nuclear powers were in possession of nuclear weapons, and the political leaders of the major powers of the world were replaced by unknown persons. Such a game, removed from immediate political reality, could conceivably lead to the discovery of entirely new problems and to new insights and provide a greater emphasis on analytical results or generalizations. It might also be of interest to play games covering *past* history.

(2) *Tempo*: While the groups involved in the exercise at MIT played the game in rapid-transit fashion, this procedure has not been tried out by senior players. The best "tempo" of the game remains to be determined.

(3) *Replication and variant strategies*: Fast games would lend themselves especially well to replication, and without replication certain results of the game cannot be validated. Alternatively, it would be desirable to have two or more sets of teams play simultaneously a game with the same scenario,[9] or else to begin a single game with sufficiently large teams so that they could be split to explore branching strategies when important alternative continuations develop at any stage of the game.

(4) *Predicted vs. optimal strategies*: Our own experience has been largely, though not exclusively, based on allowing the United States Team to pursue any strategy it deems optimal, but requiring other government teams to pursue the strategies to be expected of them ("predicted strategy") in the given circumstances of the game. More experimentation would permit games in which the United States plays ex-

[9] Since this article was written, such an attempt has been made on the undergraduate level in three institutions—Columbia University (Warner Schilling), MIT (Lucian Pye), and West Point (Major Abbott Greenleaf).

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pected strategies and other governments optimal strategies, or in which all governments play expected strategies or all governments play optimal strategies.

(5) *Scope*: There are a number of variants to be explored in which the scope of the game is changed so as to encompass smaller or larger political-geographical areas or more or less specialized policy problems. It is possible that the value of the game to students increases when its scope is enlarged, while the inverse relation may exist regarding the value of the game to decision-makers. The latter, however, will want some assurance that specialization of the game problem does not obscure important side effects of the policies involved in the game.

(6) *Political behavior*: The game offers opportunities for studying problems other than policy choices and their consequences. For example, by simulating international conferences within a given game (which we have tried on occasion), additional data can be developed for the study of negotiatory behavior. To be sure, special arrangements toward this end for observation and recording have to be made in advance. Similar opportunities exist with regard to the study of, and training in, specialized political and economic warfare problems, the drafting of diplomatic notes, the study of the effect of uncertainty and stress upon decision-making, and a host of other problems that arise in the conduct of foreign affairs.

(7) *International participation*: It would be desirable to have a few foreign political analysts play the roles of their own governments so that close consideration of each nation's interest would be increased. (Teams representing Communist governments could be composed of both American and foreign specialists.) It is to be expected that such a game, if carefully prepared, would substantially enhance among all participants the understanding of national "bias," collective security, the nature and problems of coalitions, and the viewpoints of neutrals.

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Review Articles

INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY FORMATION

By ALLAN EVANS

Roger Hilsman, *Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions*, Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1956, 187 pp. $4.00.
Washington Platt, *Strategic Intelligence Production*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1957, 302 pp. $4.00.
Harry H. Ransom, *Central Intelligence and National Security*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1958, 287 pp. $4.75.

THREE volumes that employ analytical approaches to the process of intelligence give us a notable increment of thought about matters that are too often neglected for more glamorous and picaresque branches of the subject. Happily, too, the effort is well distributed. Hilsman focuses on the relation of intelligence to the formulation of policy, Ransom discusses the organization and functioning of the intelligence agencies in Washington, and Platt explores the actual working of the intelligence mind. With these bold attacks upon the relation of knowledge to decision, of organization to action, and of thought to reality, it cannot be said that the intelligence profession ignores theory!

The authors show temerity in other ways. General Platt earns respect for tackling so awesome a subject as the process of thinking, but he does have the advantage that the quirks of the human brain seem fairly unchanging. The other two authors, while they address themselves to more easily observable phenomena, incur the risks associated with writing of situations that are in high degree fluid. In fact, important elements of the organizational structure they describe have changed even in the short time since they finished their manuscripts. This fate not uncommonly befalls authors who discuss the allegedly static (or stagnant) world of bureaucracy.

It would be a pity, however, to take up this space with an updating of detail—an updating which could itself be stale before it reached the public. Nor is there need to deal with minor points of accuracy—the reviewer has found notably few issues of fact in these books and none that will do the reader harm. Rather, in the hope that these pioneers will arouse emulators, he proposes to suggest a few of the additional lines of examination which might profitably be developed by later writers.

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Hilsman, for example, has ably and eloquently dissected the decision-making complex, to show the inextricable interaction of the thought processes involved. He rightly draws from this analysis serious questions affecting the organizational separation of intelligence and policy, of knowledge and action. There are, however, a couple of points still to be explored before we can reach a fully rounded conclusion. For the contact of intelligence and policy does not run solely on a one-shot, or shot-by-shot, basis of individual decisions. The single decision, especially the weighty decision, may well require a specific immediate intermingling of intelligence-knowledge and policy-action which can only with great difficulty develop as a bridge between two organizations. But this nexus has many variations. Policy officers normally have much knowledge in their own right, so that union of knowledge to action is only in part limited to occasions when intelligence submits its interpretations to the policy mind. There can grow a more continuous relationship of intelligence to policy, a relationship in which the two sides seek a running familiarity with each other's needs and views, and in which the contribution of intelligence is cumulative and organic.

The first point shows up sharply if we contemplate the relation of intelligence to an operator who has no knowledge of the area on which he has to work. Here we skirt, but must avoid, the fascinating debate as to whether, given a choice, one should hire the technician who knows nothing about his area or the area expert who has yet to learn the technical skill required for his function. (Or the related issue of whether to employ for area research the candidate whose chief qualification is brightness and general training or the one with accumulated knowledge about the particular area.) One thing is certain. Intelligence has no harder job than to serve from outside, so to speak, as the very brain of a would-be area operator, especially in the situation—now so common—of the domestic technician suddenly flung into employment on foreign problems. Everyone has heard stories of the crises in psychological warfare that resulted or nearly resulted during the last war from attempts to apply appeals of domestic value to the making of friends in foreign countries and strange cultures. No flow of formal intelligence can be invented which will bring to the minds of operators in timely fashion the detailed knowledge they require of the taboos, the symbolic connotations, the customs—the host of factors, in short, under the head of values—that govern the reception of their propaganda or their efforts at public relations. Only the continuous presence of a knowledgeable area expert will do the trick. The principle applies in greater or lesser degree to technical operators in all fields, from publicity

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to engineering. It is indeed doubtful whether separation to this degree of knowledge and action can result in useful synthesis at critical moments through normal intelligence procedures.

By the same token, however, the problem of interaction is eased to the extent that intelligence and policy officers share much of the same knowledge. Especially in current interpretation, in judging the significance of daily events, there may be little difference between them, and any division of labor is largely a matter of securing more hands for similar work. The distinctive contribution of the intelligence officer is in the depth of analysis or the breadth of perspective that he can add to the more immediate pattern. Under these circumstances, the issue for intelligence is less that of injecting knowledge in general into the action process than, as Hilsman concluded by a different route, that of injecting particular kinds of knowledge.

If the intelligence system is functioning properly, its relationship also goes far beyond occasional or intermittent contact with policy over a self-contained "problem." In Departmental staffs, intelligence officers theoretically maintain almost daily contact with their operating opposite numbers. They may in actual fact participate widely in the network of staff meetings and working groups which generate concerted policy reactions and initiatives in the face of the world's changing contingencies. Here, to be sure, is one of the problems of the centralized agency which is not integrally associated with an action Department. But the agency participates in parallel fashion with bodies of the central NSC policy-making structure, and, through close liaison with the Departmental intelligence branches, it can maintain satisfactory working familiarity with Departmental problems also.

The knowledge of the intelligence community thus has constant impact in detail on the policy mind, far beyond the specific moments of major decision. There is a return benefit which brings some—though by no means total—mitigation of the problem of guidance, for when the big assignment comes, intelligence will already have a pretty good inkling of the necessary elements of the problem. Even in the course of research, interaction continues, for the intelligence officer will be apprising his operating colleague of his thinking as the project proceeds, and will not wait to deliver his wisdom in one lump as a finished report. These practices have spread apace in recent years, and an analysis of them and of their effectiveness might modify or throw new light on the question of the kinds of work suited to handling by a specialized intelligence organization.

Relationships of the sort just described have a bearing on the

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balance between central and Departmental efforts within what Ransom calls the federal system of the intelligence community. It seems to this reviewer—perhaps naturally—that the distinctive benefits of Departmental responsibility require more attention than they have yet received in comparison with the more conspicuous offerings of central organization. The subject is full of entertaining questions, to which it would be useful to have answers from an independent observer. Is the impact of intelligence on policy increased by association of the two under the jurisdiction of one Department head? The impact may well be increased if operators feel a great deal more comfortable about intelligence, or have more confidence in it, when the producing organization is subject to the discipline and control of their professional chief. On the other hand, the product of a central agency has its own attractions, and gains compensating glamour and repute for being remote, imbued with the glow of unknown and therefore exotic sources.

Is there some qualitative difference between the products of Departmental and central intelligence? There are those who say that each has a characteristic virtue and a corresponding danger. Departmental intelligence, they say, through its closer association with operations, more easily sticks to the earth and remains aware of obstacles and the variety of unpredictables—of the facts of life, in short—but is also susceptible to the besetting complacency of operators who tend to feel that their operations must be going right. Central intelligence, on the other hand, is alleged to keep a sharper alert, to be keener at detecting ominous potentials, but to suffer a liability to see more ghosts and goblins than exist. Study into these delicate matters might reveal distinctions and complementary qualities of a wholly different order—or perhaps none at all; it would, in any case, clear up an important corner of speculation.

Some attention has, of course, already been given to the intelligence community, on the assumption that for full intelligence coverage we need the complementary approaches of diversified intelligence agencies. Much less notice has been accorded the equally important interplay of diversities, the balance of specialization and integration, that must characterize the internal working of these agencies.

The presentation of this subject needs to be pondered deeply, for here is where intelligence departs most sharply from academic traditions of research and may incur suspicion of dubious practice, but this aspect cannot be omitted from any analysis of the intelligence function—and it has been surprisingly overlooked. For the fact is that, in the intelligence community, pooled thinking, various sorts of communal com-

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position, joint action of many kinds, have grown to an extent which in social science research is probably unprecedented. Intelligence itself would benefit from careful examination of its procedures and of the pitfalls they may present.

Ransom shows a proper skepticism about the use of committees as production units for intelligence reports, and indeed a committee, in hearing and accommodating all participants, may well seem to be reaching for the last syllable of recorded time. Yet it is also true that the intelligence business faces not only a division between operation and research, but also, within its production processes, a necessary division into compartments of area and functional work. The attention given to devices that are intended to compensate for the separation of research from action has by no means been matched by analysis of the procedures designed to knit together the strands of thought and knowledge within the intelligence staff itself. Granted that, as a production process, the distilling of a single project through a single mind—let us say, in the manner of Gibbon—takes first place. It is useless, however, to lament the old blessed scarcity of materials, the charmingly straightforward method—to say nothing of the leisure—that once permitted individual action unqualifiedly to suffice for the concentrating of thought and interpretation on the broadest of subjects. The question for intelligence work is pretty clearly not whether joint research is necessary, but whether we have gone the right way about constructing and articulating group action to that end.

Doubtless the committee is the least efficacious of the devices for pooling thought, but even so there are variations. The gathering of plenipotentiaries from sovereign agencies, each armed with a *liberum veto*, is indeed a dismaying spectacle to the onlooker who hopes for a taut, coherent, and penetrating report. Alleviation can, however, follow the introducing of dissent, with provision for minority reports that will save the product from the lowest common denominator of flabby agreement. At best, a committee may actually achieve community of thought, and, once members forget their jurisdictional isolationism in pursuit of some general idea, may deliver a report more varied and comprehensive in thought, though probably less attractive in style, than the work of any one person. But the literature on committees has grown large, and there is no need to belabor this particular device.

Far more interesting are the complex informal procedures for joint action. It would be hard to find outside the intelligence community so extensive and so varied an array of devices for the fusing together of different persons' knowledge. What the academic community accom-

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plishes over time measured often in terms of years must in the intelligence business be done in hours. In the private world, experts deliberately publish their views, ideas, and methods (the mere printing may take ten months); these ideas then percolate into the minds of others to form partial fusions which in turn emerge to cause further reactions. In this way, individual creation and the cross-fertilizing process steadily build society's broad common tradition of tested knowledge and imaginative interpretation. The process is indispensable—is, indeed, basic to our culture. But we have come to believe that, quite apart from the element of speed, other processes may blend and produce knowledge soundly. The intelligence profession will contend that its very different procedures are capable of building knowledge of a caliber far above *ad hoc* guessing or factual accumulation—knowledge, perhaps, of distinctive, even unique, quality.

Many who have passing acquaintance with bureaucracy may think I refer to the process of "clearance." This procedure is, to be sure, the sanction for the process; joint action cannot be avoided if you have to secure on your paper the initials of some other officer whose field of concern the paper touches. But the impersonal paper-initialing is no more than the stark framework within which a host of variations are possible, most of them beneficently designed to make sure that the future initialer will at an early stage have so participated in the production process that his agreement has already been secured—together, very often, with a positive contribution. They will also be designed to forestall a procedure even more destructive of wholesome work relations than the impersonal clearance, and that is the writing of comment by a clearer who does not want to clear. There are persons who can equably write such memos of disagreement, and authors who can equably read critiques, but the chance of both parties to any given episode being among them is small. The object of the clearance procedure should be to stimulate prior, and preferably verbal, agreement.

Within this framework, the opportunities are manifold. Most common, I suppose, is the *ad hoc* grouping of an author with interested colleagues who will suggest changes and corrections. The session or sessions will be smooth and efficient largely in proportion to the officer's having consulted his colleagues in the formative stages of his project. Or it may be a very different kind of partnership, in which an idea-man pumps an encyclopedist and writes up a balanced selection from the outpouring of fact; the reader of the report will find his feet firmly on the ground, and his view of the forests unhampered by trees. A tense variation on this theme is the relation of writer to editor. The

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haste in the intelligence business, the peculiar "customer" relationships and requirements, intensify the editor's role; it seems as though in intelligence the editing process has a specially high potential for sharpening or even eliciting ideas (or, at worst, for shattering the very fabric of a working unit). Interesting results have flowed from another variation on this theme, when one officer serves as rapporteur to a group. Viva-voce pooling of ideas makes a small contribution to reducing the vast flood of papers, and, provided the rapporteur subordinates personal views to those of the group, the process can quickly and with economy of effort produce a tightly woven treatment of a complex topic. And there are happy times when it is possible to form a relatively stable group of analysts who through use and wont develop a corporate interest in ideas, who participate freely and without jurisdictional worries in group action, and who thus strike from one another sparks which would otherwise perhaps never appear.

Through these and countless other forms the typical intelligence organization makes of itself an intellectual community (always, be it understood, on the premise that actual writing and composition on any extended scale must be the work of an individual). Its actions reflect the profession's belief that only so can it produce in time that blended knowledge for which it is responsible. Few foreign policy problems of any importance concern one country alone. Few are susceptible to treatment by one discipline alone. To achieve the necessary blend of area and subject knowledge, an organization can only combine depth through individual expertise with breadth through interplay of the experts' minds. It seems not too bold to state that the accomplishments of the system have been great—that without it the agencies could never have produced the impressive works of interpretation, of imaginative projection, and even of method, now available. These works cannot, unfortunately, be brought forward in public proof of our claim. Under favorable circumstances, however, study could be made of the processes, and the resulting observations would certainly help to improve the system itself; they might even be found of profit in centers of more traditional scholarship.

From a study of this sort might come light on yet another question. With great regularity, but with equally conspicuous lack of constructive result, government circles debate about what kinds of research are best suited to official agencies and what to private effort. Answers so far are more likely to be determined by budgetary necessity or the inevitable prestige of the remoter object than by any rational analysis of relative advantage. Literature makes few references to the issue,

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but General Platt's book does remark that for work in depth it may be best to have recourse to private research. What has been said above is already enough to suggest qualifications to this judgment. For certain kinds of research in depth, for research that involves a complex of approaches, a short deadline, and perhaps a set format, the intelligence agencies may well be better equipped and more practiced than private researchers. When time and form are not of the essence, and an individual can work on general background material within a single discipline, then the job is well suited to private resources. Where between these limits the line should be drawn will of course vary with circumstances—useful principles for action might result from a systematic exploration. Perhaps it is in this connection that account should be taken of the semi-private institute, like The RAND Corporation and others that were recently publicized for their war-gaming. They offer yet another form, somewhere between the official and the private patterns of action in research, the uses of which are yet to be examined.

The volumes under review unite in one thought—that intelligence research is of profound importance to our national security. They raise hopes that more research will be focused on the nature of intelligence work, so as to improve the contribution which it can make. This review touches on only a few of the subjects which offer themselves for study. These authors, applying methods of research by interview and documentation, have given us useful lights. The same methods applied to these new fields should produce ideas to the profit of both the research tradition in general and that branch of it known as intelligence.

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A HYPOTHESIS ABOUT THE NATURE OF AN ARCHAIC SOCIETY

By ROBERT WAELDER

Edward C. Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*, Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1958, 204 pp. $4.00.

I

SINCE the early days of recorded history, European man has come into contact with peoples to whom he was greatly superior in his ability to control his environment. Such contacts led to conquests or other forms of overlordship, temporary or lasting. Relations between the strong and the weak, be it individuals or groups, always have two aspects—that of leadership, fundamentally protective, and that of dominance, fundamentally abusive and exploitative. The two aspects appear in different ratios in individual cases, ranging from the extreme of a purely protective leadership relationship as in the normal case of parenthood, to the opposite extreme in which the weak one is used merely as a means to the ends of his master. There is often a considerable difference of opinion as to where a specific case is located in the spectrum, and the very same hierarchical order is described as a leadership relationship by some and as exploitative dominance by others.

European colonialism in non-European continents was for a long time seen by most Europeans as legitimate by virtue of an all-embracing superiority which they took for granted, and as ultimately beneficial for the conquered, too. But around the turn of the last century, a new climate developed gradually among European and American intellectuals and colonialism came to be seen in a new light. On the one hand, a new relativism saw European nations and their colonial dependents no longer as occupying different stages of development but rather as representative of different cultures, different solutions to the problems of living, fundamentally of equal value or, as Ranke might have put it, equidistant to God. On the other hand, the relationship between the dominant European and the dependent Asian and African peoples was seen as exploitation and the "backwardness" of the colonial lands was attributed to European domination.

A more radical version of anticolonialism, propagated by the political left, went further and attributed to exploitation by European imperialism not only Asian, African, and Latin American poverty

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but also European and North American opulence. When the facts in Western Europe and North America all too obviously contradicted the "iron wage law" of Marx, according to which wages were bound to equal the production cost of labor—i.e., the cost of subsistence—the glaring disparity between fact and theory was attributed to the exploitation of colonial labor, in the fruits of which the working classes of Europe and North America had been permitted a share—an international application of the exploitation theory of capitalism.

These ideas were soon eagerly adopted by the new Asian and African intelligentsia. Non-European cultures, so the various Asian and African nationalisms claim, must be looked upon as the equals, if not the spiritual superiors, of European civilization; at the same time, the Western nations must be held responsible for the economic backwardness of Asian and African lands and owe it to them to provide them with the means for rapid economic development. Asian and African nationalists do not seem greatly disturbed by the contradiction between their claim of equality or superiority and their impatience to emulate the European and American pattern in science, technology, and industry, a desire which can hardly be fulfilled without laying themselves open to the influence of other aspects of European and American civilization as well.

In all of this the new nationalisms have been vigorously supported—and sometimes manipulated—by a revolutionary force within European civilization—communism—which found in the resentment of Asia and Africa a powerful instrument to be used to weaken the Western world.

In recent years, the climate of opinion in the West has been slowly but perceptibly changing. A few things have not gone according to expectations. European nations have lost large colonial empires; according to the exploitation theory of colonialism these imperialist nations should have suffered a marked decline in their prosperity, while the liberated colonial countries should have experienced a corresponding rise in their fortunes. What has happened is almost the exact opposite: the European nations have continued to prosper, while the newly independent areas have progressed but little economically and many of them face serious economic crises. Furthermore, the domestic political development of the new nations has often taken a turn toward authoritarianism or totalitarianism. Experience of this kind provides the background for the new consideration that is now being given to the possibility that the backwardness of much of the non-European world may have more to do with conditions characteristic of these societies than with the actions of the West.

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II

Banfield's book is a symptom of the change in the climate of opinion, and a serious contribution to the understanding of backward societies. His field work was not done in Asia or Africa but in one of the backward areas of Europe, the Italian *Mezzogiorno*, in a Calabrian village which he calls Montegrano. The study of a backward area in Europe offers some advantages over the study of, e.g., an Arab, Indian, or African village, because it is much closer to the West and therefore more easily comprehensible to a Western observer. The features of backwardness in a European community can be studied in the absence of many factors that are operative in Asian or African societies. On the other hand, the results of the study cannot be automatically applied to the different conditions of Asia or Africa.

Banfield and his family spent nine months in Montegrano. His material consists of interviews with about 70 persons, official documents and statistics, some autobiographies, and the results of a thematic apperception test applied to 18 persons (peasants and farm hands), using as controls the results of the test applied to similar groups in northern Italy and in Kansas. No attempt was made to employ "sophisticated techniques of interviewing" or, one might add, other techniques of gathering and evaluating material which have been designed with a view to eliminating, or at least substantially reducing, the need for interpretation but which, in this reviewer's opinion, have more often succeeded in hiding than in actually eliminating the subjective aspects of such investigations.

The author informs us at the onset of the final result of his inquiry: the backwardness of the area is due, mainly, to the inability of the people to co-operate for a common purpose. "Most of the people of the world live and die without ever achieving membership in a community larger than the family or tribe. Except in Europe and America, the concerting of behavior in political associations and corporate organizations is a rare and recent thing" (p. 7). ". . . the extreme poverty and backwardness [of Montegrano] is to be explained largely (but not entirely) by the *inability* of the villagers *to act together* for their common good, or, indeed, *for any end transcending the immediate material interests of the nuclear family*" (p. 10; italics added).

There are, e.g., no organized private charities in Montegrano; the Church maintains an orphanage but receives no local help of any kind for it. Meetings of the (advisory) municipal council are poorly attended and often fail to reach a quorum. There are no active political

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party organizations; an attempt made by a popular physician immediately after the last war to organize a Socialist party unit was at first eagerly welcomed by many villagers, but enthusiasm faded away immediately as soon as they realized that they had to contribute a few lire as dues. "There is no spirit," said the doctor who had taken this initiative; "there is no feeling of working together."

Among the issues which might be approached by concerted action Banfield mentions that there is no secondary school in the community and no hospital. No child can attend school beyond the fifth grade unless it goes out of town to boarding school—for most villagers a financial impossibility. The nearest hospital can be reached in five hours by automobile. In addition to the educational opportunities that it would open to the village children, a secondary school or a trade school in Montegrano would have an even more direct importance for the welfare of the community since it would facilitate the settlement of prosperous people in Montegrano. Schools and hospitals are, in Italy, public responsibilities but the villagers could, by concerted action, bring effective pressure to bear on the authorities. Also, several communities might join together for private actions that would provide some improvement of the situation—e.g., the equipment of an ambulance. Nothing of this kind, we hear, has ever been done or contemplated.[1]

Banfield discusses the explanations commonly offered for this lethargy: poverty, ignorance, greed on the part of the upper class and resentment on that of the lower, a form of land tenure which allegedly conditions small owners to a stand-pat conservatism and landless peasants to communism, the peasant's alleged distrust of the state, and the fatalism allegedly characteristic of the people of southern Italy. While allowing some weight to these factors, the author points out that they cannot explain the whole picture. Poverty, however dire, need not prevent people from giving some of their spare time, of which they have a large surplus, to some common endeavor. Ignorance in terms of school learning is great, but the peasants are politically not uninformed and have a remarkably sound political judgment, by no means inferior to that of Americans of low educational status. Class antagonism cannot explain why the peasants do not unite to translate this antagonism into action, i.e., against the upper class. The attitude toward the state appears to be reasonable, not distorted by

[1] Regrettably, the author has not quite succeeded in eliminating signs of moral condescension and impatience with the people for failing to act as they should for their own good.

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ingrained prejudice. Fatalism fails to show up in many of their actions as individuals.

The main cause for the backwardness of Montegrano can be found, according to the author, in certain behavioral characteristics which were mentioned at the beginning of the book and which are summed up again in these words: ". . . the Montegranesi act as if they were following the rule: *Maximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family; assume that all others will do likewise*" (p. 85). Banfield calls this state of affairs "amoral familism." An impressive case is made out to show that this formula effectively covers the behavior of the villagers, and that they fail to co-operate either because the goal transcends the interests of the nuclear family; or because the individual engaging in such activities would have to be willing to accept as reward for his activities not financial gain but honor, prestige, or the mere satisfaction of enjoyable activity or of a contribution made; or because he would have no chance of immediate compensation in any form and would have to be willing to wait for whatever reward might be in store for him.

"Amoral familism," according to the author, is due to the poverty of the region and to the people's ever-present fear of dying prematurely before they can raise their children to adulthood. This fear appears to be well justified, as the mortality rate is high—or, rather, was so until recently[2]—and the lot of orphans, in the absence of the institution of the extended family, is pathetic. The fact that the extended family, which over so large a part of the globe has provided security under conditions of great poverty, did not develop in these regions is attributed to the system of land tenure, in which "the peasant had neither incentive nor opportunity to organize a family to provide labor and management for the enterprise" (p. 154). The point, however, is not worked out in sufficient detail.

Finally, "selfishness in all relations except that of parents to children

[2] At the present, we hear, the mortality rate is very low, a change which the author attributes, as a matter of course, to antibiotics (p. 167). The validity of this interpretation could only be judged if one knew whether the killers which are now taking a diminished toll are diseases responsive to antibiotics and whether antibiotics have actually been administered to the survivors. But even if that were proved, it would still not be conclusive that credit for the lowered death rate belongs to the new drugs. There are other possibilities; their introduction could, e.g., have coincided with a decline in the toxicity of some invading organisms or the increased adaptation of the human population to them, both on the ground of evolutionary changes. (Cf. René Dubos, *The Mirage of Health*, New York, 1959.) Also, the lowering of the death rate in general does not necessarily indicate that the life expectancy of the parents of young children has increased. These are minor points in the context of the study, but they suggest that Banfield's conclusions cannot always be taken at face value.

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and [the] tendency to think of the individual as moved principally by forces outside of himself" (p. 154)—the latter somewhat at variance with the statement, made in another context, that fatalism is not apparent "where individualistic action is called for" (p. 40)—are attributed to childhood experiences which are said to be typical for this area: selfishness is ascribed to overindulgence by the parents, who applaud selfish and irresponsible behavior on the part of their children even though they may punish it as part of the game; and fatalism to the fact that punishment is meted out erratically, without any recognizable relationship to a moral code, and without regard for the principle *nulla poena sine lege* so that the child is unable to foresee it and to plan accordingly.

"Amoral familism" cannot maintain a working society; without an outside agency—the state—performing some of the functions which the people do not perform themselves, it would collapse in anarchy.

Future possibilities are weighed. A change for the better would presuppose change in the ethos, leadership, and a willingness on the part of the people to tolerate organization. Banfield considers the possibilities for "planners" either so to manipulate the conditions that a different ethos will emerge, or to influence the people through education. The ethos might change through prosperity. Manipulation of the conditions, Banfield realizes, could misfire. Among educational possibilities, the author speculates that a Protestant mission (*sic*!) or Catholic missions from Northern Europe or the United States might bring about the desired effect, but he dismisses the idea as impractical (p. 171).

Finally, the author considers administrative decentralization to encourage local self-government, the improvement of schools, the establishment of weekly newspapers, and the encouragement of the upper classes to take leadership in community affairs, but he is not overly optimistic about the efficacy of such measures.

III

Banfield's analysis invites psychological considerations which may help to articulate the substance of his findings while throwing a slightly different light on some points.

Talcott Parsons has suggested[3] that the application of psychoanalysis or other psychological theories to sociological problems is likely to be most fruitful if the psychological categories are not brought to bear directly on the social material, but if the latter has first been subjected

[3] "Psychoanalysis and the Social Structure," *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, XIX (1950), pp. 371-84.

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to thorough analysis in terms of the appropriate social science, and if the psychoanalytic categories are applied, in a further step of abstraction, to the end product of this analysis. Banfield has carried the analysis of his data to a point where further reduction to psychological formulations requires no great effort.

The three characteristics of "amoral familism"—exclusive emphasis on the interests of the nuclear family, to the disregard of the interests of others; on material advantage, to the disregard of non-material gratifications; and on short-run returns, to the disregard of long-term advantages—amount to an *absorption* of the people *by basic needs*—basic with regard to the persons to be benefited, the nature of the benefits sought, and the waiting time allowed.

(a) The nuclear family. We begin our lives with an exclusive concern for ourselves, our own personal needs. The infant seeks nourishment and relief from pain and discomfort; soon, very soon, it also seeks love. The objects that supply satisfaction of these needs—primarily the mother or her substitute—are, and for a long time remain, for the child a means to a selfish end. They are suppliers. The child learns to love his mother but this love is, for a long time, a direct function of the satisfaction received; she is appreciated as the source of the gratifications of the child's self-preservative needs—such as nutrition and bodily care—and of his need to be loved and caressed. It takes years for the child to learn to look upon his mother as a person in her own right; every mother knows how self-centered children usually are and how difficult it is even for a child of beginning school age to realize that his mother may be tired or sick and that the denial of a wish need not indicate lack of love. It takes a long time until the child's relations to others go beyond the need-fulfilling stage and the child is able to love not only because he receives and while he receives. Some people never reach this stage and live their days out without having ever truly loved anybody but themselves, with their relations to others determined by their intake from them. Psychoanalysts suspect that one must have received a great deal of love—which does not mean indulgence—in early childhood to be capable of genuine love for others later. The ability to love seems to be related to a surplus in an early developmental stage.

Furthermore, we know that even those who have reached the full ability of object love may regress to former conditions of exclusive selfishness in situations of great frustration or danger. We are not surprised if people who are severely sick, or in intense pain, or very old, appear to be exclusively interested in themselves.

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Nobody can say that the people described in Banfield's book have not reached the stage of object love. They are all intensely interested in, and devoted to, the welfare of their families. But while they have reached the stage of genuine object love, they have limited themselves to the small biological group—the "nuclear" family. They do not take much interest in the welfare of their neighbors, or of the other members of their community—not to mention still larger groups; or, rather, their interest in the welfare of their neighbors or of the community at large, while not entirely absent, is not strong enough to command any sacrifice from them.

(b) Insistence on material rewards does not in itself indicate that we have to do with basic needs. There are material benefits that do not, and non-material benefits that do, command a high priority for most people. In order to evaluate what "material advantage" means psychologically, it is necessary to know for what purpose income would be used: whether, e.g., for more luxurious living, or for more leisure, or for treasures to be hoarded and enjoyed in loneliness, or for conspicuous consumption, or for masses to be read after one's death, and so forth.

We are informed on what the income of the people is being spent and to what use additional income presumably would be put. The existence of most of the people is marginal; they spend their income for food, household goods, and clothing, all of a very simple kind, for some farm necessities, and a small amount for the doctor and for medicine. The doctor hesitates to prescribe expensive drugs because the patient will probably not be able to have the prescription filled. Beyond these "nuclear" needs, the peasants are hounded by the pressure to save some money for a dowry for their daughters, as without it they have no hope of ever finding a husband. They also wish to be able to send a boy out of town for schooling, which is his only chance of escaping the misery of the peasant's existence. These are elementary needs which would command high priority among most men in our own society. What Banfield calls insistence on material rewards appears as concentration on high-priority needs.

(c) The short-run gratification. Immediate gratification is demanded whenever the needs are imperative or the tolerance for frustration is low. The latter is true of childhood; only gradually do we learn to stand frustration and to comfort ourselves in the meantime with the anticipation of future gratifications; once again, the final level of frustration tolerance that we achieve varies with persons and circumstances. Equally we insist on immediate gratification if the urge is very strong;

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sometimes it may well be beyond the tolerance of anyone, as is shown, e.g., by the fact that a wanderer in the desert, exhausted by thirst, may drink water which he knows to contain salt or to be polluted, thus disregarding the virtual certainty of an even more tormenting thirst, or of pestilence, a little later.

In the light of these considerations, the three characteristics of "amoral familism" seem to stem from the fact that the existence of the people is marginal and that they are dominated by the most elementary urges as regards the persons for whom they care, the goals of their desires, and the time they can wait for fulfillment. A vicious circle is thereby established. In order to raise themselves out of their condition, the people would have to make concerted efforts which will not necessarily benefit each one or his immediate family directly, will not necessarily bring him monetary reward or, perhaps, any short-term returns at all. The people would have to be more at ease, live a less marginal existence—in short, be less pressed by frustration—to be able to do these things.

Are Banfield's results characteristic only of the *Mezzogiorno* or do they have a more general significance? The psychoanalytic reading of his results suggests that they are of wider significance, because emancipation from backwardness is seen as a question of the conditions that allow man to go beyond the struggle for gratification of his most elementary needs. Circumstances, no doubt, vary from society to society, but absorption in fulfilling basic needs and lack of the surplus energy or impulse necessary to transcend them may be factors which many archaic societies have in common.

Perhaps these considerations can throw some light on Max Weber's theory of the origins of capitalism. The idea that the Calvinist search for earthly success as a sign of a place among the elect provided the main motive for the Puritan dedication to the business enterprise was psychologically plausible, and in the light of it many facts, particularly of the development of New England, seemed to fall into place; but, on the other hand, there was the hard fact that capitalism did not emerge only in Calvinist lands and that countries of, e.g., Lutheran and Catholic faith have contributed to it.

Perhaps Weber's hypothesis shows *one*, but only one, way of breaking through the vicious circle of a backward society. The vicious circle, apparently, can be broken at more than one point. A windfall of wealth may come to a people accidentally and raise them from a marginal level of existence, thereby providing some with the leisure

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and the means for adventure, for study, or for education, and making it possible for others to set their aspirations higher or to wait longer for a return from their efforts. Or, a determined ruler, with a well-organized and loyal elite to carry out his orders, wielding a monopoly of the tools of coercion, may force the people, however marginal their existence, to accept great sacrifices for the building of a modern production machine. Or, in times of supranaturalism, a religion of secular asceticism may achieve the same result through fear of hellfire; the latter was, after all, the motive force in Max Weber's theory.

There is no doubt that, judged on the basis of its record over several generations, modern European and American society is better adjusted to its environment than other societies and greatly superior to them in its ability to provide the people with the things which they—whether Europeans, Asians, or Africans—seem to desire most. But that does not mean that modern society is without grave dangers or that its difficulties may not, in the very long run, turn out to be even more serious than those of archaic societies; a few generations or even centuries are too short a time for a final assessment. It may be that modern societies will yet turn out, *sub specie aeternitatis*, to have been even less well adjusted than archaic societies.

But the frustrations and dangers of modern societies are radically different from those of archaic societies; they are not the difficulties of stagnation but those of rapid change. The problems which will plague modern societies will probably be, first, the need for periodical readjustment between the various parts of the productive apparatus (particularly between those producing consumer's goods and those producing producer's goods), which cannot all expand at equal speed for a prolonged time—the essence of the business cycle and of cyclic unemployment. Then, there must be constant change, at an ever-accelerating pace, if an economy a large and growing part of which is devoted to investment is not to collapse, and this necessity presents an enormous task, which we are just beginning to see, of constant human adjustment to a perpetually changing environment; we will increasingly be confronted with the difference between the speed of technological change, to which no limit is apparent at the moment, and the limited speed of biological processes. Then, man is now doing on an immensely increased scale what he has been doing since the dawn of civilization—that is, destroying the balance of nature—and it is questionable whether he will always be able to find a workable substitute for it. Finally,

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modern societies with their ever-growing consumption may some day face the limits of the resources within their reach.

But these are worries that belong to a later station in man's pilgrimage through time than do the difficulties of transition from an archaic to a modern society, to the understanding of which Banfield's book, despite some weaknesses, has made an important contribution.

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INDIA'S POLITICAL FUTURE

By MYRON WEINER

Joan V. Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1958, 269 pp. $5.00.
G. Morris Carstairs, *The Twice-Born: A Study of a Community of High-Caste Hindus*, London, The Hogarth Press, 1957, 343 pp. $4.75.
S. V. Kogekar and Richard L. Park, eds., *Reports on the Indian General Elections, 1951-1952*, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1956, 322 pp. $4.00.
W. H. Morris-Jones, *Parliament in India*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957, 417 pp. $8.50.
Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller, *Communism in India*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1959, 603 pp. $10.00.
Richard L. Park and Irene Tinker, eds., *Leadership and Political Institutions in India*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1959, 486 pp. $10.00.
Myron Weiner, *Party Politics in India: The Development of a Multi-Party System*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1957, 319 pp. $5.00.

WILL India be able to modernize within the framework of democratic institutions and values? And within what kind of political framework, democratic or otherwise, is modernization possible? The political setting in India and in other newly independent states is increasingly being recognized as a critical factor in the achievement of sustained economic growth. Recent events in Pakistan, Indonesia, and Burma make it evident that political factors may be decisive in determining the direction and pace of economic development and, indeed, whether there will be any economic development at all. In the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, the major impetus for change in the West—in economic relations, economic performance, social structure, and cultural values—came from within the society itself. As one modern historian of English history has written, "The main feature of British history since the seventeenth century has been the remoulding of a State by a powerful Society" and "The expansion of England in the seventeenth century was an expansion of Society, and not of the State."[1] In contrast, the dynamism for change in the new nations of Asia and Africa has come thus far from the state, less so from society. The burden on the state in newly independent areas is thus greater than in most pre-modern Western societies, where revolutions and political disorder could occur without causing economic stagnation.

[1] George Unwin, *Studies in Economic History*, London, 1927, pp. 28 and 341.

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On the contrary, political disorder was often an impetus to investment and economic expansion. Economies were often truly "self-sustaining" in the sense that, in the *absence* of government decisions, development could still occur. Not so in much of present-day Asia and Africa, where the absence of public policies may mean the absence of economic growth.

Until economic growth is self-sustaining, the kinds of political changes which take place in newly independent areas are likely to determine whether there will be modernization. How to determine what factors facilitate or retard what kinds of political change, how to isolate conceptually and empirically those variables affecting political behavior, and finally—the payoff—how to predict and control the direction of political change are some of the fundamental and very difficult problems facing the political scientist concerned with political development in the new states.

In one way or another, each of seven recently published books throws some light on the problems of political change in India. Windmiller's and Overstreet's study assesses the factors which have conditioned the growth of communism in India and specifies the kinds of changes now taking place within the Communist movement which may affect its capacity to win power. Kogekar and Park examine the way in which the electoral process is operating and the interplay of political forces that is set in motion by universal adult suffrage. Morris-Jones wants to know whether the institutions of parliamentary democracy are taking root in Indian soil. The volume edited by Park and Tinker explores the way leadership has been developing at various levels of Indian society—in government, administration, political parties, and villages—and assesses the capacity of this leadership to initiate and carry through programs directed toward economic development and social change. Weiner deals with the kind of party system that is emerging in India, the behavioral patterns that account for the multiplicity of parties that exist, and the effects this multiplicity has upon the prospects for political stability and democracy.[2] Carstairs, the only non-political scientist in this group, is a psychiatrist interested in uncovering basic behavioral patterns in an Indian village. And Bondurant is concerned with analyzing the kinds of solutions to the problem of conflict offered by Gandhi, how these solutions have grown out of and been applied in the Indian environment, and their potential for more general application.

[2] While it is not customary for a scholar to review his own book, it seems justifiable in this instance in order to provide a comprehensive survey of recent studies dealing with political acculturation in India.

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I

In spite of the relative stability and orderliness in India—in contrast to her neighbors—her functioning democratic institutions, her relatively efficient administrative system, and her politically neutral military, the shadow of communism is ever-present. The Communist Party of India is large (230,000 members in 1958), is reasonably well organized, has a substantial electoral following, until recently wielded political power in one state (Kerala), and has considerable strength in at least two others (West Bengal and Andhra). *Communism in India* by Gene Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller is a magnificently well-documented attempt to trace the changes which have occurred in Indian Communist Party strategy and tactics from the Party's formation after World War I to 1958, in the context of what the authors call the Party's dual environment: the international Communist movement and the Indian political scene.

Windmiller and Overstreet note that the Communist Party has wavered between "left," anti-capitalist, and "right," anti-imperialist strategies. They further note that the strategies pursued, which determined whether the Party collaborated with or opposed the nationalist movement, have been conditioned by the goals of the Soviet Union, although in several notable but temporary instances the Party wavered from the international line. According to Windmiller and Overstreet, this subservience to the Soviet Union has, on balance, been a liability to the Party. While international guidance has enabled the CPI to avoid the splits and defections so disintegrating to other political parties in India, the Party has been stigmatized by many Indians as being an agent of a foreign power and disloyal to Indian interests. "Indeed, more often than not Soviet advice has failed to incorporate a realistic view of Indian conditions and has called upon the Indian Party to follow a policy which has seriously damaged its chances of gaining political power. . . . It is probably not an exaggeration to say that the greatest obstacle to the success of the Communist movement in India was Joseph Stalin. . . . How different the history of communism in India might have been had the Comintern recognized the revolutionary qualities in Gandhi, and had it played upon the socialist ideas of Nehru in such a way as to draw him into leadership of all the leftist forces in the country. Instead, at the direction of Joseph Stalin, the Comintern opposed Gandhi and turned its back on Nehru. Had the Comintern formed a firm alliance with either, the CPI might possibly have shared power when India became independent in 1947" (pp. 533-34).

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In a rather alarming conclusion, the authors show that since the death of Stalin the CPI has become less dogmatic and more adaptable to the Indian environment. The Party is proving itself able to work successfully through parliamentary institutions. By minimizing its autocratic organization, and becoming more gentle in its attitude toward Gandhi and the tradition of non-violence, it is making itself more attractive to potential recruits and followers. One might add that in Kerala, in spite of a united opposition, the Communists have won by-elections and have strengthened their party so that they may be able to increase their popular vote beyond 35 per cent. Indeed, the Communists' recent defense of parliamentary institutions and law and order against a Socialist and Congress attempt to overthrow the Kerala government through civil disobedience may have served to arouse sympathies for the Communists in other states, as the public image of the differences between the attitude of the Congress and the Communist parties toward parliamentary institutions, non-violence, and law and order are blurred.

The argument of Windmiller and Overstreet that the Soviet's and, in particular, Stalin's guidance of the CPI has been a handicap to the Party is unconvincing. On the contrary, evidence provided elsewhere in their book points to the opposite conclusion. Communist support for Indian participation in World War II and Communist opposition to the Quit India movement allowed the Party the freedom to organize and infiltrate student, trade union, and peasant movements and to strengthen itself in the princely states, while Socialists and Gandhian Congressmen languished in jail. Much of the present organizational strength of the Communists is a residue of this era. Then, too, the unpopular decisions of the Communists—their opposition to Gandhi and to non-violent civil disobedience, their criticisms of the national movement, and their opposition to the Quit India wartime movement—gave the Party a special distinctiveness which attracted dissident intellectuals who might otherwise have joined the Socialist movement. Much of the organizational strength of the Communists and much of their *esprit de corps* are a consequence of having to endure isolation. One may even wonder whether the present rapid growth of the Party and the more friendly atmosphere in which it now operates may not result in an organizational deterioration which will minimize the Party's effectiveness as an insurrectionary and subversive group. A shift to the "left" might very well require a massive purge.

Communism in India is best in its description and analysis of the changing tactics and strategy of the Communist Party. It is weakest when it attempts to enumerate the factors likely to affect the future

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prospects of the Party. Windmiller's and Overstreet's list—"the durability of popular confidence in parliamentary government, the ability of the Congress Party to recruit young dedicated leaders, the role of Prime Minister Nehru, and the international situation, especially relations with Pakistan" (p. 538)—begs the basic problem of which particular factors are important and how one determines that they are more important than a whole range of others that come to mind, such as Communist relations with Krishna Menon or the army and the police, or the extent to which Congress retains control of state governments, or employment opportunities for college students who are potential recruits for the Party, or the extent to which the Communists are able to evolve a program and organization that reach deeply into rural areas.

Communism in India tells us very little about the orientations toward politics, the aspirations and expectations, of those who join or support the Communist movement. Nor, as the authors frankly admit, does the study treat of the operations of the Party on the state level, which is, after all, the level at which Communist success or failure is likely to be determined. The tendency of so many Party leaders to devote their energies to the provincial units of the Party rather than to the exercise of general authority at the Party center, and the Party's success in utilizing linguistic and even caste loyalties (remarkably unencumbered by Marxist theory and heavily guided by Stalin's thinking on the "national" question—still another example of the benefits which accrued to the Party from Soviet guidance), further indicate the need to study the Communist Party at the state and local level. Any comprehensive attempt to assess the prospects of the Communist Party of India must involve an examination not only of the past and present strategy and tactics of the Party and the factors which determine which strategies and tactics are most likely to be pursued in the future, but also of the Party's internal capacity to pursue a particular line, and the vulnerability of the environment toward which these strategies and tactics are directed.

II

The decision by India's Constituent Assembly to allow universal adult suffrage in free elections created a vast market for the wares of India's politicians. Political parties mushroomed and political ideas and controversies entered villages which had not been reached before. The stability of the government became a function not only of a government's internal cohesion but of its popular support, as expressed through the ballot. Under the guidance of S. V. Kogekar (of Poona)

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and Richard L. Park (of California), members of the Indian Political Science Association were asked to observe and report upon the electoral process in their respective states during India's first general elections. The result is a modest collection of papers entitled *Reports on the Indian General Elections, 1951-1952.* The preface to the volume contains a long list of woes of the authors arising from their efforts to organize the project. It is remarkable, and to the credit of the editors, that anything was published at all. The result is a series of papers which treat with varying degrees of competence the selection of candidates by parties, election issues, the election campaign, party alliances, and descriptions of polling, as well as the election results in the various states.

As the editors point out, more attention should be given in the future to the use of surveys and special attention should be given to intensive *local* surveys of voters' attitudes and behavior. The absence of systematic survey data (except in the Bombay and Hyderabad reports) is perhaps why the papers jump illogically from a description of the election campaign to an analysis of why results were what they were. What part local rural leaders played in determining how voters voted, to what extent the vote was an expression of village solidarity or factional ties and conflicts, to what extent and how local Congress Party organizations have built up a system of local ties, and what role kinship, occupational, caste, religious, and other affiliations played in determining voting behavior are questions which remain unanswered and which, given the nature of the techniques employed by the authors of the papers, could not be answered. The reports variously attribute the results to Nehru's personal appeal (but do not explain why the appeal "succeeded" in some states but not in others), government corruption (when Congress failed), the "personality" of candidates, party propaganda, the influence of the local-language press, and party organizational strength or weaknesses.

Unsystematic as the reports may be, some interesting generalizations do emerge. Many of the writers note that the rural turnout exceeded the urban turnout in a number of areas. Many found great apathy toward the elections among the upper middle class and the intelligentsia. Many of the Indian contributors, obviously guided by an extremely rational model of what the electoral process is supposed to do, how much information the voter is supposed to have, and the degree to which rational issues are supposed to be paramount in democratic elections, are critical of the extent to which, in their judgment, "irrational" considerations entered into voting behavior.

As in other democracies, the selection of individuals for public office

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and the holding of government representatives accountable for their behavior are central functions of the election process in India. How people vote and why they vote as they do are likely to affect the kind of party system which emerges and the existence or non-existence of a stable government. But elections also play a part in acculturating the individual to a new relationship toward government, to a new set of attitudes toward the state, toward authority, and toward his capacities as a citizen. In the past, the Indian villager identified government with local administration. Elections and the existence of legislators who serve as a link between the villager and the state or central government have introduced the rural voter to a new concept of politics. If Daniel Lerner is correct that modernization involves a broadening of individual horizons and the emergence of a capacity to identify oneself with the role of another ("High empathic capacity is the predominant personal style only in modern society, which is distinctively industrial, urban, literate and *participant*. . . ."[3]), then elections, election campaigns, and the growth of new ties between villager and government may be important socializing forces in the process of modernization. It may very well be that the members of the state legislative assembly and the members of Parliament are more important as socializers than as legislators. Further research into the legislator's non-legislative functions, the attitudes of villagers toward their representative, and the attitude of the legislator toward his constituents would not only throw more light on the ways in which modernization occurs, but could also suggest possibilities for enhancing the socializing role of the legislator.

III

The British quite consciously set out to induct Indians into the process of responsible government. The constitutional acts of 1919 and 1935 were directed at giving some measure of responsibility to Indians as voters, as legislators, and even as government ministers. Although nationalist Indians were on the whole skeptical of British intentions, the fact of the matter is that prior to independence many Indians did step into new political roles. When independence came, it was the British form of parliamentary government which was established and which the Indians used as a model to judge their own political behavior. These early though limited experiences with representative institutions have made it possible for many Indians in the state and central legislatures to operate these institutions effectively and with a measure of

[3] Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*, Glencoe, Ill., 1958, p. 50.

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confidence found in few other newly independent countries of Asia.[4]

Two recent volumes focus on the extent to which Indians are successfully operating the institutions of representative government. Morris-Jones, in his *Parliament in India*, takes as his starting point the proposition that "For the parties, for political life as a whole, Parliament has become the focus of attention" and then proceeds to explore how Parliament is functioning. The papers in the Park and Tinker volume, *Leadership and Political Institutions in India*, have a broader scope and are concerned with the performance of leadership at many institutional levels.

The Morris-Jones book contains an excellent study of the operations of India's Parliament and a briefer survey of some of the state legislatures. He analyzes the social backgrounds and behavior of members of state and central legislatures, looks at the role played by parties in Parliament, and at the procedures and committees which the Indians have evolved. He shows that while British experience has been a major guide in the organization of the Indian Parliament, there have been some procedural and institutional changes, especially in the operations of committees within Parliament. As a result of his examinations of the internal operations of Parliament, he is somewhat optimistic about the future of representative institutions in India.

Given India's record during the past decade, especially when it is compared with the record of many other new states, Morris-Jones has reason to be optimistic. But, after all, what has made India's representative institutions viable thus far and is likely to affect their viability in the future is not so much what happens within the halls of the legislatures as outside. The attitudes of those outside of Parliament, particularly the extent to which political parties, interest groups, and the citizenry accept representative institutions as legitimate channels through which goals and aspirations can be satisfied, are likely to be critical factors. At present the continued strength of the Congress Party, in contrast to the Muslim League in Pakistan, the AFPFL in Burma, and the PNI in Indonesia, has been the surest guaranty of

[4] It is beyond the scope of this article to assess the utilitarian and liberal theories which guided the British efforts at inducting Indians into new political institutions and values. It would be useful to examine the concepts of the various colonial theories concerning the ways in which natives could be inducted from one political process and one set of political roles and relationships to another in the light of what has happened since the colonialists have departed.

Perhaps the single best study of the impact of utilitarian theory on British policy in nineteenth-century India is the recent book by Eric Stokes, *The English Utilitarians and India*, Oxford, 1959. Stokes shows how land taxes, land tenure systems, and the character of administration and government grew out of utilitarian theory. His study is a welcome answer to some of the naïve theories of imperialism.

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stable government and representative institutions. Were the Congress Party, owing to internal fragmentation or loss of external support, to lose control of many state governments or of the center, the prospects would not be exceedingly hopeful. The presence in many states of irreconcilable opposition groups raises the possibility of shaky, immobilist coalition governments or instability and administrative rule. And the possibility that the Communists might use representative institutions to win power and then destroy such institutions cannot be ruled out, although Windmiller and Overstreet consider it within the realm of possibility that the present ideological ferment in the international Communist community concerning the question of new paths to socialism may result in a change in attitude toward parliamentary institutions. And Morris-Jones notes that "It is not wholly unrealistic to hope that in the case of the Indian Communist Party, experience of Parliament may have a mellowing effect" (p. 331). What, however, may be mellowed are the tactics of the Party, not its totalitarian impulses.

If at the moment order and stability and representative institutions depend upon the role of Congress, then one must assess the performance of the Congress Party and its capacity for the future.[5] Until these questions are answered, the future of representative institutions, of communism, and of free elections remains uncertain. Then, too, while Congress has thus far provided a framework of political stability which has permitted Parliament to operate, free elections to be held, and Communists and communalists to be kept in check, to what extent has Congress performed modernization functions and, in particular, mobilized corporate action for social and economic change?[6] Or, to place the problem in its broadest context, to what extent is it possible for the state to sponsor large-scale economic and social change without a wide range of popular corporate action? If peasants and workers, for example, are not well organized, neither land reform nor labor welfare legislation emanating from legislative bodies is likely to be effective. Again we return to the basic argument that the future of representative institutions in large measure depends upon what happens outside these institutions.

Certainly, among the critical factors are the kinds of leadership which emerge at various levels of Indian society, the attitudes of such leaders

[5] Surprisingly, there is no such systematic study of the Congress Party.

[6] One has only to compare the role played by the Chinese Communist Party as a modernizing organization with that of Congress in India. Admittedly, one is totalitarian and the other is not, but we might still ask whether the present Congress Party could not carry on more modernizing activities than it does now, within the framework of democracy.

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toward social and economic change and toward representative institutions, and the capacity of leadership to mobilize people toward these objectives. Unfortunately *Leadership and Political Institutions in India*, edited by Richard L. Park and Irene Tinker, does not investigate these fundamental problems. The papers which appear in this volume were originally prepared for a seminar of the same title held at the University of California, Berkeley, in the summer of 1956. While the conference planners hoped that some basic problems would be examined by the conferees (some of the main issues are raised by the editors in their preface), it did not prove possible. The conference was too large (sixty-three Indian and American scholars), met for too short a period, and tried to cover too much territory. Fortunately, some of the individual papers presented to the conference are valuable and the editors have done a remarkable job in assembling as coherent a volume as the one they have put together.

The papers on village leadership are among the most interesting. John Hitchcock's paper deals with a North Indian village in which the most influential leader, a school principal, has been able to mobilize people partly because of his position as a Rajput, partly because of his affiliation with government and the Congress Party, partly because of certain personal qualities, and partly because he came from outside the village. Two papers (Orenstein and Beals) point up the ineffectiveness of government-sponsored panchayats (local councils) as a source of leadership for change. Several villages which they describe are rife with factional disputes, indicating that leadership is often not village-wide, but faction-wide. Beals concludes that "lacking political unity, the investment capital and much of the energy of the village is dissipated in factional disputes" (p. 437). Opler's paper on tradition and change in a local village election demonstrates that in a society in which notions of hierarchy and prestige are so important and in which factions are endemic, the introduction of panchayat elections simply provides a new institutional framework in which old conflicts are fought out. In none of the villages described has an internal leadership arisen capable of mobilizing all or parts of the village for social action. Those who believe that the impetus for change must come from outside the village will find much support in the material provided in these papers.

From what sources new leadership will be derived, with what groups and interests such leadership will be affiliated, what demands it will make on government and on the groups it leads, and how government will react to new leaders, new groups, and new demands are questions touched on by a few of the papers included in the volume. Selig Har-

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rison, in his article on leadership and language policy, notes that the English-speaking national leadership is diminishing in importance and that, with the rise of regional languages, the importance of new regional leaders is increasing. While recognizing the advantages that the growth in regional languages has in narrowing the chasm between leaders and citizens, Harrison is understandably disturbed by the possibility not only that India may be cut off linguistically from other areas, but that the communication of ideas and mobility of leaders within the country may decrease. Morris David Morris, looking at still another level of leaders, those in the trade unions, is concerned with the growing use of unions as a device to discipline labor and as an instrument of government policy. Morris, in effect, is suggesting that the kinds of interest groups which develop, the functions which they perform, and the relationship which they establish with government are in large measure a consequence of the kinds of policies pursued by government toward such groups. Is there, one might ask, the danger that as voluntary associations grow in India, they will increasingly be used as instruments of the state? The objectives of economic planning may push policy-makers toward such an omnivorous attitude, which may in turn effect a diminution of free associations, without which it is hard to see how representative institutions can become "self-sustaining."

The Harrison and Morris papers both note that between the village and the central government there are levels of leadership which may facilitate or retard modernization, and which may determine the kind of modernization, if any, which occurs. Do the emerging regional-language leaders and those of the trade unions, peasant associations, tribal and caste organizations share the goals of national unity, economic development, social change, and democratic institutions advocated by the national leadership?

The importance of the lower echelons of leadership is indirectly highlighted by the various papers on administrative leadership. The papers by Merrill Goodall ("Organization of Administrative Leadership in the Five-Year Plans"), A. D. Gorwala ("The Public Services and Democracy"), and Richard L. Park ("District Administration and Local Government") stress the role played by administration in development programs. All three papers are rightly impressed with the performance of India's administrators. Goodall sees the Congress Party's link with government and administration as a stabilizing influence. Gorwala stresses the role of administration, not as an implementor, but as a stimulator of public participation in development. Park questions the assumption that local affairs should be non-political, and notes that

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there is now a trend away from administration to politically oriented local government, with unpredictable consequences. Each paper, therefore, conceives of the bureaucrat in a limited role, as one whose very success is gauged by the extent to which his own role as initiator is diminished and greater participation in local government and development on the part of the villager (and, in effect, a non-bureaucratic leadership) is increased.

IV

Myron Weiner, like Morris-Jones, is concerned with the ways in which people are inducted into new political processes. But while Morris-Jones focuses on Parliament, in *Party Politics in India* Weiner focuses on the development of a party system. He notes that the Congress Party is confronted not with one or two or even a half-dozen opposition parties but with a vast number, so that the prospects for stable government on either the state or the national level are not very good in the event that Congress loses and no single strong opposition party or coalition of parties emerges. Why this fragmentation of parties has occurred is the major question of Weiner's study. Seeking his answers in the behavior of party members and leaders, he explores a number of splits and mergers which have taken place since independence. Many parties simply represent different social strata in Indian society—hence, there are tribal, caste, and religious parties. Others represent fundamental cleavages in political attitudes—hence, there are Communist, Socialist, Hindu communal, and nationalist parties. But beyond these there are cleavages caused neither by ideology nor by social structure, and it is these latter cleavages which are of special interest to Weiner. Why, for example, are there three major Hindu communal parties, countless Marxist left parties, and now two Socialist parties? Weiner notes that the rank and file of parties seldom think about limited demands and issues of public policy, that those who join parties are more concerned with the values, roles, status, and sometimes the livelihood derived from them, and that strong feelings of identification with factions within parties are major elements in splits. He offers a considerable amount of case-study material to show that the nature of factions, the attitudes of the rank and file within them, and the leaders who bind factions together are critical elements in determining whether a party remains united or fragments. The author is weakest when he argues that the persistence of factionalism is a function of *disintegration* of Indian social structure—that because party

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members often have left their joint family or community, they seek associations which can perform the same functions as did the joint family, the caste, and the village in providing status and standards of behavior. The studies of village politics in the Park and Tinker volume indicate that factionalism is a feature of village politics and indeed may be an ancient phenomenon in Indian society.

There is, I think, a real danger in assuming that factionalism, mutual mistrust—often accompanied by political cunning—desire for status and recognition, and other features of Indian political behavior are a consequence of disintegrating features of Indian social life. These and other forms of observable behavior and attitudes may simply represent the projection into higher levels of politics of attitudes and behavior shared under more "traditional" circumstances in rural India. This latter explanation is supported most persuasively by the kind of material and observations presented by Morris Carstairs in *The Twice-Born*.

The Carstairs book is rich in ideas and, as one says of any good book, the reviewer can hardly do justice to it in a brief summary. Carstairs, an English psychiatrist who spent the greater part of his childhood in India, is interested in the personality structure of Hindus in a village in Rajasthan. In an effort to explore the relationship between adult traits and formative experiences, he decided "to select a community whose values, culture and social customs were consistently different from those with which we middle-class westerners are familiar; to learn their language and live among them, and in so doing, to try to observe on the one hand those formative experiences peculiar to their society, and on the other any personality characteristics common to their adult members and differing from my own conceptions of the normal" (p. 11). Carstairs selected Udaipur, the chief town of a former princely state in the present state of Rajasthan. He confines his study to members of three high, twice-born castes: Rajputs, Brahmins, and Banias—that is, warrior-landlords, priests, and merchants, respectively. The book is based upon an intensive analysis of 45 case-histories.

I am not competent to judge whether Carstairs has satisfactorily demonstrated the adequacy of certain theories of personality development. Although he views an adult personality as "the product of biological, physical, economic and social factors as well as of the material and emotional influences peculiar to his individual experience" (p. 170), he tends to find explanations for behavior primarily in parental, particularly mother-child, relations. Whether one accepts

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or rejects this position probably depends upon one's faith in Freudian and post-Freudian theories. But one can, I think, put aside Carstairs' explanations and find in his description of behavior and attitudes a substantial contribution to our understanding of India, and perhaps even of Indian political behavior. In brief, Carstairs found the following: suspicion and mutual distrust were common features of interpersonal relations, even of relations between neighbors and kin. Prompt, generous, idealistic responses to friendly overtures soon proved to be ephemeral. Ideal standards of friendship proved unattainable. "Most friendship is feigned," said one villager. "Only one friend in a thousand is the kind who is ready to forget his own interests entirely out of regard for you. There are no true friends in this village—I stand alone" (p. 44). Only toward the beneficent guru could one feel and express warmth of affection and trust. Ill-feeling was restrained, but when it did find expression, as happened on several occasions, there was an utter collapse of self-control: "During a quarrel, the participants' faces were contorted with hatred, their eyes bloodshot, their whole bodies quivering. They abandoned themselves to anger with a completeness which previously had been familiar to me only in the temper-tantrums of young children. Looking at these changed features of men who were usually so polite and affable, I was able to understand for the first time the epidemic of massacre and counter-massacre which had swept over this 'non-violent' country only a few years before" (p. 46).

The impossibility of reposing trust in anyone and the supreme virtue of self-restraint are thus related basic patterns. A lack of empathy expressed in an indifference to the feelings of one's fellows, a belief that nothing is sure and reliable except one's inmost self, a readiness to hold logically incompatible views even when made aware of the fact—without feeling that one view must be sacrificed for another—and an almost compulsive optimism combined with utter despair at failure are some of the patterns of behavior in Udaipur described by Carstairs. Beyond these shared traits, he found many differences among Rajputs (who stress the importance of authority and obedience, of personal fortitude, pride, and self-assertion), Brahmins (with their emphasis on self-restraint), and Banias (who believe in non-attachment, while competing avidly in business), as well as many personality differences within these castes.

Some who read this study may be doubtful about the causal explanations given by Carstairs for observable behavior and testable attitudes. More seriously, some may question whether one can generalize from the village of Udaipur, which had only recently lost its status as the

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capital of a princely state and whose population was undergoing great insecurities as a result of these changes. The fact of the matter is, however, that regardless of causal explanations, much of what Carstairs describes can be found elsewhere in India, and often in the behavior of politicians.

Few political scientists have been willing to make use of the kinds of material presented by Carstairs because of the disrepute into which national character studies have fallen and because of the psychoanalytical interpretation often placed on such materials. Then, too, the political scientist is not a psychiatrist and the use of psychoanalytic interviews, Rorschachs, TAT's, and other psychological tests are not normally within his competence. Where available, however, such material, particularly when it throws light on politically relevant behavior, can be invaluable. The politician is, after all, a part of his own culture.[7]

The rules which guide men's political behavior are difficult to arrive at in any society and can either be deduced from their behavior or be uncovered through depth interviews. In the West one can also turn to a body of political philosophy which has often underpinned the ways in which our institutions were created and the ways people behaved within those institutions. In India, as in many other countries of Asia and Africa, there is very little in the way of a well-developed contemporary body of systematic political philosophy and much of what exists is a repetition or modification of Western thought. Political philosophies as they appear in India usually represent a statement of aspirations and only very partially, if at all, a guide to behavior. This enormous gap between the kind of behavior people aspire to (which is often based on a much higher standard than in Western societies) and the way in which people actually behave often results in disillusionment or, worse, hypocrisy.

One of the few well-developed doctrines which has guided political behavior in Asia is Gandhi's conception of *satyagraha.* This concept, developed by Gandhi as a means of effecting social and political change through non-violence, is carefully examined by Joan V. Bondurant in her *Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict.* No previous work has succeeded as well as this in expositing Gandhi's political theory—in a manner, one might add, that is far more system-

[7] An excellent example of what can be done by examining the relationship between basic cultural values and political behavior is Edward Banfield's recent book, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society,* Glencoe, Ill., 1958. This is an excellent study of the basic rules and principles which guide behavior in a southern Italian village. Banfield shows that the particular principles which govern interpersonal relations in this village inhibit corporate action for the common good and affect both political organization and economic development.

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atic than Gandhi was able to be. What logical inconsistencies exist in this work are clearly Gandhi's, not Bondurant's. She can be criticized only for being so much the disciple of Gandhi, so eager to call our attention to the possible uses of Gandhi's approach in our own society, that enthusiasm often wins out over critical reflection. On page 171, for example, she writes: "He believed that the state should exist to fulfill the needs of its members . . . and that when the state ceases to perform services for its members which will fulfill their needs, then the individual has the duty to disobey and resist." But only a few pages later (p. 174), she quotes Gandhi as saying, "That State is perfect and non-violent where the people are governed the least."

More seriously, Gandhi failed to reconcile his principles of civil disobedience against "untruth" with the principles of representative institutions. Gandhi wrote: "When law fosters untruth it becomes a duty to disobey it. . . . No rules can tell us how this disobedience may be done and by whom, when and where, nor can they tell us which laws foster untruth. It is only experience that can guide us, and it requires time and knowledge of facts" (p. 166). Bondurant adds that "*Satyagraha* may become an instrument of social change, and through it untruth can be deflected. Untruth is determined by the extent to which the needs of society's members are left unfulfilled" (p. 167).

It is obvious what difficulties such principles raise in a society in which most needs are unfulfilled and in which government is attempting to inculcate a belief in the use of the ballot and Parliament as a means of changing men and laws. Gandhi's principles are, no doubt, widely misused by many political parties, and many individuals mistakenly consider all forms of non-violent civil disobedience as *satyagraha*, but Gandhi's very vagueness as to the conditions under which his techniques should be employed contributes to the popular confusion.

There does, moreover, remain the larger question of coping with conflict, tension, and unfulfilled needs and expectations in a society in which demands exceed available resources. No matter how successful planning is, for at least several decades the gap between demands and resources is likely to be great and may even grow as demands and aspirations are still further awakened. Insofar as Gandhians propagate the values of restraint and self-help, demands may be minimized or deflected away from the state and directed toward voluntary activities. The *bhoodan* movement for the voluntary redistribution of land and the many Gandhian organizations for improving the lot of untouchables, women, tribals, etc., may contribute more in the long run to the growth of representative institutions and to social and economic change than Gandhi's technique of *satyagraha.*

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V

One of the basic problems before the policy-oriented political scientist is to discover what political institutions and practices, commensurate with our belief in representative government and civil liberties, can best facilitate the emergence of a modern society. How can values and attitudes be changed so as to mobilize people into voluntary corporate action on behalf of social and economic change? Who—administrators, political parties, legislators, businessmen, trade unions, religious associations, or other voluntary bodies—can mobilize people? And insofar as people are mobilized to participate (*participation* is often viewed by Indians as the essence of democracy), are they not also likely to increase their demands? How can one inculcate into organized groups the belief in some sort of public interest which would moderate the kinds of demands made and the techniques used to influence government, so that government can function with a minimum of recourse to coercive methods to maintain law and order?

Plans for economic development in the new states are not wanting. The stumbling bloc is often in building the appropriate machinery to carry through proposals for economic and social change. There are those who believe that the non-totalitarian answer lies with the military,[8] and they may be right. But the problem of mobilizing a whole society (or at least substantial portions of it) is no less of a problem for the military than it is for a society based upon representative institutions and civil liberties. To find the appropriate means for mobilizing a society within the framework of freedom is a major intellectual challenge of our time.

[8] See Guy J. Pauker, "Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade," *World Politics*, XI, No. 3 (April 1959), pp. 325-45.

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PRAGMATIC APPROACHES TO POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

By W. PHILLIPS DAVISON

William E. Daugherty, in collaboration with Morris Janowitz, *A Psychological Warfare Casebook*, Baltimore, Md., The Johns Hopkins Press, 1958, 880 pp. $12.50.

Murray Dyer, *The Weapon on the Wall*, Baltimore, Md., The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959 (in press).

Robert T. Holt, *Radio Free Europe*, Minneapolis, Minn., University of Minnesota Press, 1958, 249 pp. $5.00.

L. John Martin, *International Propaganda: Its Legal and Diplomatic Control*, Minneapolis, Minn., University of Minnesota Press, 1958, 284 pp. $5.75.

AT first sight, these four volumes on international political communication appear to range over such varied categories of material that they have little in common. Nevertheless, they all employ the same basic approach to their subject matter, whether this is labeled propaganda, psychological warfare, or information. All start from the recognition that during the past half-century communication activities have come to play an important part in international relations and that there is now a tremendous body of descriptive and analytical data bearing on them. All suggest that we can learn to use international political communication more effectively by familiarizing ourselves with what has been done in this area in the past. It is also striking that all four have more to say about organizations, institutions, and procedures than about the psychology of the individual or the structure of society (although there are a few selections in the Daugherty-Janowitz *Casebook* that deviate sharply from this generalization). A lawyer, newspaperman, or specialist in administrative management would find himself more at home with much of this material than would a psychologist or sociologist.

Lest he be misunderstood, the reviewer should hasten to add that this is not intended as a negative criticism. While a science of communication will ultimately have to be rooted in an understanding of the characteristics of the individual human being and the social organism, the gap between what we know about individual psychology, on the one hand, and the behavior of nations, on the other, is still far from being bridged. We cannot afford to slacken our efforts to apply the hard-earned principles of the laboratory psychologist or sociologist to international relations, but neither should we ignore the

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very useful rules of thumb that can be formulated on the basis of what practical politicians, journalists, military men, and others have already done by way of employing communications in the service of national policy. The two approaches to understanding the communication process start tunneling from different sides of the mountain of ignorance; one may only hope they will eventually meet in the center.

I

Of the four volumes being considered here, the one most sharply set off from the other three is L. John Martin's *International Propaganda: Its Legal and Diplomatic Control*. The author has, with great care and patience, surveyed the controls that nations throughout the world have imposed or attempted to impose on communications from outside their borders. Among other forms of control, he examines international agreements regulating propaganda, laws governing dissemination of foreign propaganda within a state's borders, and efforts to regulate communications from abroad by threats and protests through diplomatic channels. The multiplicity of controls on information crossing state boundaries is impressive; indeed, when they are considered all together in this manner the effect is overwhelming, and one wonders how freedom of information has been maintained even to the degree that it has.

Because of the nature of the subject matter, and the formal manner in which it is treated, the readability of this book is not high. Nevertheless, it is an important work, both as a compendium for reference purposes and as a source of insights into the nature of the international communication process. The technique of studying social phenomena by studying the laws relating to them is, after all, a highly reputable method of social analysis. As Durkheim observed, ". . . social life . . . tends inevitably to assume a definite form and to organize itself, and law is nothing else than this very organization. . . ."[1]

A few references to specific portions of Martin's text may illustrate their suggestive nature. He points out that as early as 1758 legal thinkers were concerned about subversive propaganda from abroad. In that year Emer de Vattel wrote: "It is in violation of the law of nations to call on subjects to revolt when they are actually obeying their sovereign although complaining of misrule." Recently, however, there has been a tendency to recognize that propaganda from abroad can also be beneficial, and to encourage such friendly communications.

[1] Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, trans. from the French by George Simpson, Glencoe, Ill., 1949, p. 65.

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Resolution 110(II) of the United Nations General Assembly, unanimously adopted on November 3, 1947, requests the governments of member nations "to promote, by all means of publicity and propaganda available to them, friendly relations among nations based upon the Purposes and Principles of the Charter. . . ." More frequent, of course, are efforts of various blocs to promote "good" propaganda among the associated states.

Another observation with broad implications is that bipolarization of the world has now led to a situation in which governments of small and weak states have almost as much freedom to spread their point of view as do governments of large states. Before World War II, when a large state protested to a small state about propaganda emanating from the latter's territory, the result was usually a hurried denial or apology from the smaller nation. Now, however, small states aligned with one or the other of the major powers can hurl imprecations at any nation on the other side of the iron curtain with impunity. And the prevailing balance has placed most neutral states in a position where their propaganda can be highly critical of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

One probably unintended implication of the study is to support the position of those who maintain that international propaganda can be a very powerful instrument. The mountain of legislation devoted to the control of communications is eloquent testimony to the extent of the effects that these communications are thought to be able to achieve.

II

In *Radio Free Europe*, Robert T. Holt, a University of Minnesota political scientist, gives us an excellent picture of a major propaganda organization and its operations. RFE is an "officially non-official" network of five stations, employing approximately 2,000 people, operated by the National Committee for Free Europe and broadcasting to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and Rumania. It was founded in 1949 in large part as a result of sympathy felt by United States government leaders and private citizens for the exiles and refugees from the captive countries behind the iron curtain. These people needed employment, and their countrymen under Soviet oppression needed encouragement. The exiles appealed to the State Department on both scores, and the result was a meeting of a number of people from inside and outside government under the informal leadership of George Kennan. This meeting "came to the conclusion that the proper place

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for help and comfort lay not in the official chambers of the United States government, but in the hearts of the American people" (p. 10). Dean Acheson, then Secretary of State, accordingly requested former ambassador Joseph C. Grew to see if he could organize a private group to deal with the problem. Mr. Grew, in turn, discussed the matter with leaders from business, academic, religious, and other circles, who established the Free Europe Committee. Radio Free Europe is one of the instrumentalities through which the Free Europe Committee works.

A major purpose of RFE is to give exiled leaders and their countrymen behind the iron curtain an opportunity to keep in touch with each other. Although in the last analysis it is controlled by Americans, it is not an American voice. When addressing their audiences its refugee announcers say "we," not "you." The station does not have to *follow* United States policy, although as an American-supported operation it cannot take a line contrary to United States government policy. In 1957 RFE's function was described by its principal staff members as follows: "RFE's broad role would appear to be to keep alive the pressure for freedom among our peoples, supplying them with the facts, the comprehension of free democratic methods, and the inspiration of free-world achievement which will enable them to chart effectively their own courses toward freedom" (p. 22).

Mr. Holt is not, however, primarily interested in the history or goals of RFE but in the process by which propaganda policy is produced, the operation of the machinery that turns propaganda policy into program content, and the effectiveness of the total activity in attaining its objectives. He deals with these subjects in a painstaking, thorough fashion, and in the process makes it clear that a competent propaganda operation such as this is not a succession of brilliant inspirations, but a back-breaking exercise in continuous attention to detail, day in and day out. These chapters will be fascinating to the reader interested in the technical side of a communications operation, but possibly disappointing to others. All will be interested, however, in the analysis of the role of RFE during the 1956 uprisings in Poland and Hungary. In regard to this station's role in Hungary the author concludes: "The most serious indictment, namely, that RFE incited the revolution and, when it had burst into flame, added oil to the fire by promising western armed intervention, is simply not supported by a study of RFE's scripts" (p. 197). If such an indictment is to be made to stick, he affirms, it must be addressed not to RFE or any other radio, but to the United States government and its foreign policy. American spokesmen had for years talked about liberation, and indicated that the cap-

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tive peoples should keep up their hope, but had no policy ready to deal with the uprising when it came. RFE and other media simply reported their remarks.

In a final chapter the anomalous role of RFE as a "non-official instrument of foreign policy" is discussed. The station is privately managed but, as the author points out, "it is commonly believed that it has received funds from the United States government" (p. 7). Furthermore, many of its listeners consider it an official voice of United States policy, even though it is not. The advantages of such a form of organization are that RFE has greater flexibility than a government operation, its statements can be disavowed by Washington, and above all it is spared the paralyzing effects of periodic governmental investigations and reorganizations. On the other hand, even if a privately operated station wishes to support United States policy, it inevitably will have difficulties keeping informed as to what this policy is. Furthermore, since most listeners believe RFE to be an official spokesman, it is, in effect, able to commit the United States to positions that the nation might not want to support. The author concludes that, whatever the merits or drawbacks of RFE's anomalous arrangement, it is an embodiment of the American tradition of voluntarism applied to foreign affairs. Mr. Grew and his associates are part of the long line of American citizens who have taken upon their own shoulders responsibilities that in most societies are left strictly to the government.

III

The monumental *Psychological Warfare Casebook* (of nearly 1,000 pages) is a gold mine for anyone concerned with international communication. Messrs. Daugherty and Janowitz have performed a signal service in making available a well-selected wealth of case material, much of which might otherwise never have seen the light of day. Since the work was sponsored by the Operations Research Office of the Johns Hopkins University, working under contract with the Department of the Army, the editors had access to government files, and were able to have some of the material they found cleared for inclusion. They have also reprinted classics from numerous journals, such as "The Radio Siege of Lorient," from the *Hollywood Quarterly*, and have abstracted gems from longer accounts, such as Wallace Carroll's *Persuade or Perish*. The editors, both of whom have had practical experience in psychological warfare, make extensive original contributions. Altogether, there are more than 120 selections by 73 authors.

Organization of the massive volume is along "how-to-do-it" lines.

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After preliminary sections that contain essays on psychological warfare doctrine and psychological warfare in American history, the material is grouped under the following businesslike headings: Organization and Personnel; Policy Goals and Planning; Operational Objectives; Role of Intelligence, Research, and Analysis; Media, Methods, and Techniques; and Evaluation of Effectiveness. A final section includes 10 selections on Soviet psychological warfare. An excellent bibliography is appended to each section.

Users and potential users of the *Casebook* may appreciate warnings along two lines. First, the title is far too narrow. This is not a collection of writings limited to military psychological warfare, but includes material that could be subsumed only under a broad definition of "political communication," although special emphasis is indeed given materials bearing on military situations. One can scarcely include a discussion of an exchange-of-persons program or of the diplomatic activities of an American ambassador in a neutral country under the heading "psychological warfare." The second quibble is that good case histories do not easily lend themselves to dissection and classification under the headings used. They tend to be rounded little units, complete in themselves, and would fit under a number of headings. For instance, L. H. Butterfield's fascinating description of the Jefferson-Franklin Plan to Cause Hessian Desertions in 1776 can indeed be classified under "Psychological Warfare in American History," but it could also be listed under "Policy Goals," "Media and Techniques," or any one of a number of other headings. The moral is that the user must really familiarize himself with the whole volume if he is interested in locating material on any given subject.

IV

Of the four treatments under consideration here, *The Weapon on the Wall* by Murray Dyer is the most abstract. Yet it, too, is based on case material. Mr. Dyer, a staff member of the Operations Research Office of the Johns Hopkins University, has combed through the operational records of government propaganda agencies, as well as much of the published literature on international communication, and has emerged with a thoughtful appeal for more extensive and intelligent use of this instrument by our government.

On the basis of his analysis, the author sets forth what he regards as the chief premises and operating principles for a governmental propaganda agency, summarizes some of the difficulties experienced in our wartime and postwar use of political communication, and then reviews

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the problems to be overcome if the instrument is to be employed effectively in the present international situation. The premises and principles that emerge from the author's analysis of our past experience are solid, but not especially exciting: a government's political communications and its policies must be in accord, the best propaganda is truthful, communication cannot be more than an auxiliary instrument of policy, creative leadership and specialized machinery are required, and so on. To dismiss these injunctions merely as a restatement of common-sense principles would, however, be a serious mistake in view of the frequency with which they have been and still are violated in propaganda operations. The author also emphasizes the necessity for rethinking propaganda operations in democratic terms. Totalitarian states have used communications effectively—more so than the democracies, some think, but this does not mean that we should ape Soviet or Nazi techniques or that a democracy cannot use the instrument to good purpose. Democracies have certain limitations on their propaganda operations, for instance, the constraints imposed by domestic public opinion; but they also have certain advantages, for instance, higher credibility.

In his analysis of the administrative problems facing a governmental political communications program, the author presents some fascinating case-history material on bureaucratic warfare. Having had the records of various interdepartmental committees available to him, he is able to demonstrate graphically how difficult it is to achieve agreement among the departments concerned on the form and authority of an information agency. Indeed, his incisive comments on organizational questions are among his best: "A single propaganda agency with authority to coordinate government propaganda is too powerful; if there is not this coordination it is ineffective" (p. 87). Or, a few pages later: "What is required is an organization that will permit propaganda to serve several masters at the same time . . ." (p. 89). He concludes with some specific suggestions for providing a more effective organization for international communication within the United States government, including more effective liaison arrangements between the State and Defense Departments, and the establishment of a National College to engage in research and instruction in the principles of international communication.

While Dyer's analysis of bureaucratic problems connected with the conduct of propaganda operations is particularly valuable, the reviewer cannot escape the impression that the author's interest in interdepartmental negotiations may have obscured somewhat the accom-

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plishments of the U.S. Information Agency (and its predecessor organizations). The day-to-day operations of this information program have led to some valuable lessons and have also achieved some notable successes. The rich body of experience that has thus been gained should someday be analyzed systematically.

V

Books such as the last three discussed, and to a lesser degree even Martin's legal study, raise the problem of the proper relationship of communication policy to national policy. How much does the communicator have to know about national policy? And should he have a voice in determining it? Related questions that often can be seen lurking between the lines and that Holt mentions explicitly are: To what extent should the foreign information activities of a democracy be a governmental monopoly, and to what extent should private initiative in this area be encouraged?

A variant of the first question is one of the principal subjects of Dyer's study. Having recounted the story of wearisome bureaucratic wrangling over the control, functions, authority, and other aspects of a government information service, he makes a disarmingly simple suggestion: if one first determined exactly what one would like to accomplish with such an agency, and how this was to be accomplished, then perhaps many of the administrative problems would fall into place. This suggestion is certainly sound, but it takes us back to the problem noted at the beginning of this review: namely, that international communication does not yet rest on a body of established principles, although one can derive a number of useful general rules from the analysis of past experience.

In this case, however, the lessons of past experience seem to lead us into a dilemma. Those who have studied government propaganda usually agree that the propagandist, to be effective, must be fully acquainted with his government's policy and that he must even have a voice in determining certain aspects of this policy. How can one expect a propagandist to achieve results, these students ask, if he says one thing and his government does another, or if he is supposed to persuade his audience to move in a given direction while the policy of his government makes them want to move in the opposite direction? As writers of this school often point out, the important thing in influencing foreign peoples is not words but deeds. A Marshall Plan is worth many thousand radio broadcasts. Mr. Dyer remarks, "The art of great political communication lies in action that is consonant

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with the great ideas that have made us a great nation" (p. 192). Therefore the communicator has a vital interest in seeing that the action taken is, from the point of view of the effect he would like to achieve, the appropriate one.

This reasoning is attractive, but if carried to its logical extremes it is likely to arouse choleric reactions from officials concerned with foreign policy, who point out that, since all major policy decisions are likely to have an impact on foreign opinion, the propagandist suddenly emerges as a policy-maker of first rank. Nobody can ever decide anything important without first consulting him, and the competence of the officials who have traditionally dealt with foreign policy is severely whittled down. One can therefore argue that to give a communications agency such broad policy functions is administratively unfeasible.

The necessity as well as the feasibility of such a close propaganda-policy link can also be questioned. Radio Free Europe, for instance, learns about United States policy largely by reading the *New York Times*, and it certainly has little or no influence on the formation of such policy toward the countries to which it broadcasts. Yet its propaganda operation is a highly effective one, as Mr. Holt convincingly shows. True, he suggests that perhaps it might benefit from being in closer touch with United States policy, but he can provide no assurance that this would actually be the case. Indeed, the record of RFE, and a variety of instances in the Daugherty-Janowitz *Casebook*, demonstrate that under some circumstances a propaganda organization can be very successful without an administrative tie to policy. It depends, apparently, on what one wants the organization to do.

This reviewer feels that additional light can be thrown on the question of the proper relationship of propaganda agencies to national policy by examining the way in which communications can, in theory, influence behavior, since influencing the behavior of individual human beings is in the last analysis the goal of all national propaganda programs. Communications can affect behavior in three principal ways: (a) They can play upon tendencies already present in the individual; e.g., a soft drink advertisement reminds a person that he is thirsty; a broadcast to citizens of country *X* recalls their traditional hatred for country *Y*. (b) They can interpret, explain, or organize existing facts in such a way that these facts have a new meaning to the individual; e.g., Marxist philosophy attempts to interpret economic experience in one way, capitalist theory in another. (c) They can report new facts, events, or developments that a person is likely to act on when he learns about them; e.g., news that a heavy tax on corporate earnings

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is being considered is likely to produce reactions on the stock market. Of course, persuasive communications often use all three approaches at once: "Vote for Mr. *X*! He is a veteran and father; his record as a successful businessman shows that he will make a good mayor; and he pledges if elected to see that all the streets in town are paved."

If we accept this simplified, three-way division, then it is clear that a propagandist can engage in the first two forms of appeal—that is, he can play on forces already within his audience and can offer interpretations of the existing world—without any direct policy connections at all. Furthermore, a link to policy-makers does not assist a propaganda organization in reporting new events unless these events are under the control of the policy-makers in question. Thus, a United States information agency is, at least theoretically, in no better position to report the explosion of an atomic weapon by Sweden if it has close links to policy-makers in the United States government than if it has none. What matters in this case is a good source of intelligence, whether official or unofficial. Certain ways of affecting behavior are thus just as available to the propagandist who has no special link to policy—let alone influence on it—as to the one who has.

The fact remains, however, that this still leaves a very important area in which close connections between the propagandist and the policy-maker are vital. Close connections are, of course, necessary whenever a propaganda agency must speak for a government officially on current problems, or when national goals are not publicly stated or are subject to frequent shifts. They are also necessary when it is desirable to plan in advance for informational treatment of future actions to be taken by the government in question. These situations are the ones of which students are thinking when they emphasize the importance of intimate and continuous liaison between the policy-maker and the propagandist. Lack of liaison, or poor liaison, in such instances can certainly make the propagandist—and his government—look ridiculous.

But the argument we started out to examine was not only that the communicator should have detailed knowledge of what policy is, but that he should also have a voice in the formulation of policy, since in this way he can help frame actions that will have a desirable effect on those who are told about them, or who learn about them. At this point the communicators seem to want to swallow foreign policy. Since each major military or diplomatic action is likely to influence foreign opinion, a super-agency appears to be necessary to co-ordinate the policies of the Departments of State and Defense and of any other

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agencies whose actions are likely to impinge on foreign publics. Some students have suggested that such an agency could have the necessary authority only if it were based in the White House.

This reviewer, however, believes that the history of successful propaganda activities points to a quite different conclusion. In stressing the influence of action on foreign opinion and of the role of foreign opinion in the attainment of national objectives, students have simply noted the increasing importance of one of the factors that statesmen have always had to take into account. National leaders who have achieved great foreign-policy successes have usually been those with a keen sense for the psychological impact of their actions abroad. This is why we often find such names as Benjamin Franklin, Winston Churchill, and Otto von Bismarck mentioned in studies of communications, along with the names of those who were particularly successful as members of propaganda organizations. (The *Casebook* offers several examples in both categories.) The action-opinion relationship as it applies to foreign policy is nothing new; it merely can be observed more frequently. Therefore, the moral to be drawn is not so much that communications specialists should play a larger part in policy formulation, but that makers of foreign policy should be more careful about taking into account the probable effects of their nations' actions on foreign opinion. If the implications of a policy on foreign opinion have been weighed during the normal process of policy formation, no super-agency is required to perform the communication function. The tendency to overlook the importance of foreign opinion, often noted by students of political communication, can be remedied more adequately by fostering increased awareness on the part of the policy-maker than by expanding the functions of the propagandist. All this does not in any way minimize the importance of agencies of international communication; it is only that these are communication agencies, and not agencies for the formulation of foreign policy.

A related question, which can be discussed more briefly, is whether, in a democracy such as the United States, more foreign information functions could be performed by private bodies. The government is only one agency for the achievement of national goals in our pluralistic society. Indeed, most of our economic and cultural goals are pursued primarily by private initiative. It may be that there is greater scope for private initiative in the field of international communication than has hitherto been recognized. Academic, business, and labor groups, as well as several philanthropic foundations, already engage in various types of international political communication. They do not officially

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reflect the foreign policy of the United States government, but they do reflect the views of important segments of American society, and they often work toward the achievement of national goals as well as toward the more limited immediate goals of the bodies concerned. We have seen that there is no theoretical reason why communicators who have no official connections cannot exert an influence on the behavior of foreign audiences. It may be that increased private initiative in this area could yield worthwhile results.

Some advantages of non-governmental activity in the foreign information field have been alluded to in connection with Holt's study of Radio Free Europe. Others are suggested in the Daugherty-Janowitz *Casebook*, which recounts several instances where governmental services broke down and private individuals—although usually government employees—stepped into the breach. During the Korean War, for instance, USIA employees paid many operational expenses out of their own pockets, since there was no way they could obtain what they needed through governmental channels. The same was true of some information personnel in Germany after World War II.

How private initiative in the international communication field could best be encouraged, the forms it might take, and the results it might expect to achieve are questions that have received very limited consideration to date. Yet, as Holt points out, this type of activity is squarely in the American tradition. It deserves further exploration.

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DISARMAMENT OR THE BALANCE OF TERROR?

By ARTHUR LEE BURNS

Semour Melman, ed., *Inspection for Disarmament*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1958, 291 pp. $6.00.
Philip Noel-Baker, *The Arms Race: A Programme for World Disarmament*, New York, Oceana Publications, 1958, 579 pp. $6.00.
Bertrand Russell, *Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1959, 92 pp. $2.50.
Tom Slick, *Permanent Peace: A Check and Balance Plan*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1958, 181 pp. $2.95.

EACH of these four books either advocates or presupposes the desirability of reducing armaments in quantity and of restricting their qualitative development. Russell argues that a change of attitude and settlement of issues would be a precondition for effective disarmament. Noel-Baker denies this, contending that the arms race constitutes an independent though contributory cause of war. Tom Slick's ambitious Plan is in essence a scheme for disarmament, through five annual steps, down to a low level of conventional forces (including international forces) with a small "sealed-off" store of nuclear weapons maintained under United Nations control. The Melman book stands apart from the rest, being a technical study of certain difficult subsidiary problems which would arise in the course of almost any present-day approach to arms control.

None of these writers seems to have been motivated, in his advocacy of disarmament, by the scruples of total pacifism. The three first-mentioned simply maintain that the security of the whole world and of the nations in it would be greatly increased by a drastic reduction of armaments. Nor do they recommend world government, though all four agree that the measures of inspection and control required for effective disarmament would curtail national sovereignties. Slick, Noel-Baker, and Russell are thus obliged to show not only that their proposals are politically feasible, but also that they are militarily sound—i.e., each must demonstrate that if arms were to be reduced to the levels and in the manner that he recommends, the security of the disarming Powers would be in some measure increased. The latter proposition will be challenged by believers in the policy of establishing mutual deterrence.

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Not all schemes of disarmament are open to such a challenge. Thoroughgoing ethical or religious pacifism is not, since it incorporates no military policy. Neither is the more restricted "nuclear abnegation" —i.e., the moral conviction that, whereas conventional and predominantly counterforce armaments are permissible, nuclear weapons (and probably also most biologicals), being designed in large measure to hold as hostages the populations of potential enemies, so clearly violate the rules of just war that nations which cannot resist effectively with traditional counterforce weapons ought to submit to nuclear conquest rather than themselves acquire, let alone use, nuclear weapons.[1]

I

Nuclear abnegation would seem to be politically feasible in a way that thoroughgoing pacifism probably is not. Its military implementation would at least avoid irrationality by clearly defining the limit at which resistance should cease. But by that very fact it differs categorically from the systems under review, each of which claims to provide as much security as is obtainable in the present era. Those too involve moral valuations, though implicitly; but they also compete, as the abnegatory position does not, with other schemes for maximum security, notably the several deterrent policies.

Noel-Baker's view of the arms race, moreover, stands in conflict with that which follows from deterrent doctrine. He argues along generally accepted lines, implying that *either* both sides must continue to increase armaments *or* a war must result *or* an agreement to disarm must substantially reduce armaments. He does not consider the deterrent hypothesis—that the arms race, given weapon-systems of a certain type and capacity, sometimes ceases of itself, each side acquiring and maintaining just that quantity of armaments which would enable it to retaliate after a "first strike" by the other, since no possible further increase would put it in a position to launch a successful first strike itself.[2]

[1] Certain Catholics and Protestants construe the imperatives of their faith in some such way as this. George F. Kennan states a similar position in "Foreign Policy and Christian Conscience," *Atlantic Monthly*, CCIII, No. 5 (May 1959), esp. pp. 47-48.

[2] The deterrent position is usually stated less laboriously and explicitly. See, e.g., G. L. Goodwin, *Britain and the United Nations*, New York, 1957, pp. 155-85 (esp. pp. 156-57: " . . . the growing belief . . . that mutual possession of the 'Great Deterrent' may usher in a 'Pax Atomica' has now cast some doubt on the desirability as well as the feasibility of atomic disarmament. . . ."); and Hedley Bull, "Disarmament and the International System," *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, v, No. 1 (May 1959), pp. 41-50. The position is most clearly spelled out in Thomas C. Schelling's chapter, "Surprise Attack and Disarmament," in *NATO and American Security*, ed. by Klaus Knorr, Princeton, N.J., 1959. Schelling specifically argues for the type of arms control that, under the balance of terror, would ensure

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Less than these quantities, according to deterrent doctrine, could positively endanger peace, giving one or both sides a military motive for launching surprise attack. If both adhered to deterrent doctrine, they would be apt, presumably, to engage in a benign arms race until each had forces in quantity that it believed would deter the other. Objective determinants for such a quantity could in principle be found—e.g., there are physical as well as narrower limits to the numbers of bombs, of bomb-vehicles, of bases, etc., that any particular nation can produce and maintain within a given time; the probability of eliminating a base by attack with a single bomb is in most cases significantly less than unity; and so on. The characteristic deterrent weapon-system is imagined to determine, as adequate for deterrence, a quantitative level well below the upper limits of physical and economic resources of the defending country. Beyond the level of "deterrent adequacy," no increase of strategic forces can be supposed to add anything to the defender's security. In theory, therefore, the level of strategic nuclear armaments should settle within a small range, below which danger of war or coercion and above which redundant expenditure should be expected. Deterrent theory can thus become a variety of *laissez-faire* social doctrine, and may be used in order to contest *ex hypothesi* the need for arms control in any form. Even in more modestly stated versions, such as Schelling's, rearming is as likely to be entailed by arms control as is disarming.

Recondite though this may appear, it is all contained in the notion of a "balance of terror" or "nuclear deterrence." But the implication is not always recognized, especially not by those who advocate gradual disarmament. The latter is not merely an alternative policy to the balance of terror: it presupposes a completely different state of military art. Gradual disarmament—of the kind that Tom Slick recommends, albeit with great caution, in his Plan—makes sense only if the dominant weapons are such that, for all possible ratios of arms between any two possible opponents, the larger force is always the likelier to win should it attack (e.g., the state of affairs modeled by Lanchester's Square Law). In that kind of situation, the danger of war arises less from any momentary disparity of forces as such (except when the disparity is large and is recognized to exist only by the stronger party) than from either or both sides' reflecting that, since national resources are limited, a momentary advantage in size of forces may afford the *last* opportunity

minimum rather than maximum levels of certain armaments. The earliest work known to me that touches upon the latter and a number of other arguments developed in the present review is Warren Amster's *A Theory for the Design of a Deterrent Air Weapon System*, San Diego, Calif., Convair (General Dynamics Corp.), 1955.

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for fighting on favorable terms. Reflections on those lines tend to produce the classic accelerating arms race, which feeds back to and reinforces these reflections. To make agreed and graduated arms-cuts is then the best and perhaps the only way of stopping the feedback since, provided forces are believed by both sides to be equal at every stage, no absolute level agreed upon will be more provocative of war than any other—except that very low levels of equal forces are likely to be safer than any high level. Considered formally, the military picture is here one of instability, with at best just one possible point of unstable equilibrium[8]—i.e., when both forces are close to zero.

When, in contrast, the state of military art allows of a balance of terror, at least one point of stable equilibrium must exist *ex hypothesi*, with areas of war-danger below it, and of redundancy of forces above. (Slick, who discusses the claims of "mutual terror" on pp. 27-29, nevertheless holds that "there is no guarantee that the weapons of terror will continue to be held in more or less balanced quantities. . . ." But though there is indeed no "guarantee," there is a case of sorts for automatic balance.) Here, therefore, continuously graduated disarmament would involve moving step by step ever deeper into dangerous regions. This kind of situation is thus radically different from those that call for gradual and *ad hoc* reduction of arms.

II

The foregoing, however, should be qualified in three important ways. As between two rival Powers, the ratio of forces, given a dominant terror weapon and an appropriate geographic context, may be in stable equilibrium at more than just one point—depending upon the geography and the nature of the weapon-system. For example, forces may be in equilibrium when there are on both sides very large numbers of bases or rocket-sites imperfectly protected, and also when there are quite small numbers all within a reasonably effective air-defense and warning net, while between those two levels of forces the situations would be more or less explosive. (A necessary condition for having two such points would be, of course, the physical impossibility of one's own side making a secret and decisive increase.) In particular, it will be

[8] Throughout this review a "point of equilibrium," stable or unstable, in an arms race means a point at which no party has any incentive to increase or decrease its forces. An "explosive" area is one in which one or more parties have a motive for making war immediately. Points of unstable equilibrium are non-explosive points in the lower ranges of a generally explosive area. Points of stable equilibrium occur in non-explosive areas, and ratios of forces greater than those at points of stable equilibrium fall in ever-less-explosive areas.

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always worth examining whether total nuclear disarmament, or total elimination of bomb-deliverers (a policy strongly supported by Noel-Baker, pp. 376-80 and 420-22), or both, would not produce stable equilibrium. Near-zero ratios of armament have special formal properties that we shall refer to again.

Another important opportunity for graduated, though not continuously graduated, nuclear disarmament might be provided by the creation of a third and truly independent nuclear force, whether in the hands of a third grouping of Powers, or in those of some international organization. (Tom Slick recommends an international force as an essential element in his Plan, and Noel-Baker also considers it practicable.) The introduction of a third force could of course either lower or raise the position of stable equilibrium or balance of terror as between two forces—if each of the two thinks that there is a decided possibility of the third's being brought into an offensive alliance against it, each will require *more* nuclear forces than it did when there was only one other possible opponent; but if each is convinced, for political or military reasons, that an effective agreement between the others to strike first is not feasible, it may be content with smaller forces (e.g., fewer bases) than before, since it will argue that an attack against it by only one of the others would leave the attacker itself highly vulnerable to attack by the third. The second line of reasoning would presumably be the more plausible if the third force were international.

The third opportunity for graduated reduction of terror weapons may be provided by weapons-technology itself. If retaliatory forces could be made highly invulnerable, fewer of them than of the more vulnerable kind would be needed to guarantee a capacity for striking back. Unfortunately, calculations of cost apparently tend to work in the other direction: invulnerability seems likely to grow more expensive, and thermonuclear explosives much less. The typical nation will presumably wish to retain a greater capacity to strike first, its second-strike capacity remaining the same, and will therefore not wish to trade quantity of explosives for vulnerability of bases. On the other hand, a formal agreement to do so might be possible, provided an adequate system of inspection and nuclear accounting were available. The Melman study is immediately relevant to this type of disarmament.

Much is implied by our three qualifications of the deterrent theorists' case against disarmament. What immediately concerns us is that the deterrent case does not follow from the sheer existence of thermonuclear weapons and long-range rockets. Circumstances *may* allow more than one point of balance of forces, and, of these, one may be attainable by

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an almost total reduction of weapons. We cannot say, before examining them, just what the circumstances will allow. The possibility of disarmament therefore remains a quite technical military question.

But, as we have seen, it is not only a military question. In considering the possibilities of a third and especially an international force, and in adverting to problems of inspection, one has to recognize that disarmament is also a political matter and a most critical one, touching as it does the quick of every nation's interests, security, and relationships of power with others. The peculiar intractability of arms-control problems—recognized, though without despair, by Noel-Baker as an old hand in the field—has much to do with this need to resolve simultaneously the technical-military and the political problems. The military aspect has independent characteristics that forbid statesmen, having agreed on a general plan, merely to hand over the details, about levels and types of force, to the "technical experts." Conversely, as has been demonstrated in the recent negotiations over a ban on nuclear testing, the most expertly devised scheme in this dangerous area poses the political problem, but cannot finally settle it.

In passing, we may notice (as do all the works under review) that inspection for arms control would make inroads upon the sovereignty of states as deeply as and more immediately than the actual reduction of armed force. The power to require secrecy has always been among the chief of sovereign powers—as witness the summary treatment of native and foreign spies. The century's changes in the nature of war have made secrecy more urgent in practice. Totalitarian societies have carried the trend to its extreme—privacy is suspect *per se*, and the maintenance of its own secrecy is literally of the essence of the totalitarian state. This bears upon the hope, which is at least in the background of Slick's, Russell's, and Noel-Baker's books, that participation in disarmament, or even in a ban upon nuclear tests, would soften the acerbities of Soviet totalitarianism. Their hope, in a sense, does not go far enough; for should the USSR and, even more, Communist China come to allow inspection, they will be demonstrating and not merely promising liberalization.

III

At this point, let it be said why Russell's luminously written little book is in places irritating. Though he brings out very clearly the effects of ideological conflict in intensifying the struggle for power between nations, he *will* suggest that only a little clear thinking is required for their removal, and is lacking: "It is profoundly unfortunate

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that the danger of nuclear warfare is regarded nationally rather than humanly. The East fears Western armaments; the West fears those of the East. In fact, the armaments of East and West alike threaten West and East equally. This is obvious to anyone who has time to consider the matter and who is not obsessed by the nationalist ambitions of Foreign Offices. If it were apprehended by the statesmen of East and West alike, the differences at present dividing the two blocs would soon be found no more intractable than those that divided Britain and Russia before 1907" (pp. 57-58).

One may disagree with Russell here in a number of different ways. That nuclear weapons threaten East and West alike seems to be "apprehended" by the statesmen of both blocs, whether obsessed by nationalist ambitions or not. The "apprehensions" may be in fact incorrect, at least as far as concerns the immediate future, if development of missiles has put one or both sides in a position to strike first with impunity. Correct or no, these apprehensions have not made tractable the ideological differences between East and West. Rather have the ideologies provided conflicting doctrinal frameworks for interpretation of the supposedly common nuclear threat. Furthermore, ideological differences must have quickened the nuclear arms race more than would mere diversity of interests and national ambitions. But what produces irritation with Russell's book is less the issue of fact, about which he may be right, than his belief, suggested above and in other passages, and characteristic also of the "expert" or scientific point of view, that the political dilemmas of the nuclear age arise from nothing but ignorance, folly, and stupidity.

This impatience with politics, and not the alleged idealism and inconsistency from which, in two appendices, he thoroughly exculpates himself, tends to vitiate his analysis. His opinion (pp. 86-87)—a matter of "ideal wisdom" but "certain" not to be implemented in practice—that "it would be better to yield than to indulge in nuclear war" is quite consistent with his recommendation of ten years ago, when he thought that ". . . at that time . . . it would be worthwhile to bring pressure to bear upon Russia, and even, if necessary, to go so far as to threaten war on the sole issue of the internationalization of atomic weapons. My aim, then as now, was to prevent a war in which both sides possessed the power of producing world-wide disaster" (pp. 89-90). It is evident that Russell—like the deterrent theorists in this respect—holds the problem of arms control to be among the many which require complete restatement because of the advent of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

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Noel-Baker is not of that persuasion. He maintains that the between-wars negotiations for disarmament produced schemes and methods suitable, though after much modification and addition, for application in the nuclear era. He also argues, not implausibly, that the schemes would have been effective in preventing war, and lacked only ". . . a political decision by the leading governments, and most of all by Britain, that on terms that were fair and equitable to all, they would disarm. It was the failure to make that decision in time that brought Hitler to power . . ." (p. 8). He presents the case circumstantially, and with the authority of experience. Indeed, his is one of those occasional works, having the air of a long pamphlet, which nevertheless the students of this subject will wish to keep by them because of its store of information, analysis, and constructive ideas.

Whether he finally convinces will depend upon whether one agrees that ". . . the problems of *conventional* disarmament are identical with the problems faced by Ministers and experts between the Wars . . ." (p. xii; italics added). This is a proposition that might well be true if nuclear weapons were to be truly eliminated. Otherwise, the questions of conventional disarmament, as of the use of conventional military force, are likely to be changed by the mere compresence of nuclear forces. Consider, for example, the prospects of conventional sea-borne invasion (or reinforcement) when the defender has three or four atom bombs.

Noel-Baker's proposals for conventional disarmament therefore imply nuclear disarmament to zero or near-zero levels, and should be taken as a whole. To make possible an all-round agreement on total nuclear disarmament, he advocates, as supplements to the inspection-system commonly proposed by Westerners, a machinery for sanctions; a standing commission of the International Atomic Energy Agency to study inspection and control; internationalization of scientific and technological research; rewards for information, and protection of informers; abolition of military means of delivering nuclear weapons, and tight controls on alternative means; "robust" conventional and biological disarmament; and an "international stock of nuclear weapons" (pp. 298-318).

The rationale of this last recommendation for an international nuclear stockpile resides in the possibility that ". . . an intending aggressor *might* be able to retain some stock of 20 per cent to 30 per cent—say a quarter—of the nuclear weapons he possessed when the disarmament treaty came into force" (p. 305). Noel-Baker therefore recommends an

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international stock of 40 per cent of the strongest nuclear power's nuclear armaments. (Tom Slick makes a similarly argued proposal.) Some such arrangement does appear necessary so long as evasion of nuclear disarmament remains a possibility.

IV

Professor Melman and his collaborators do not dispute the likelihood of evasion: "It is altogether possible that, as indicated by Evasion Team B, clandestine arms systems can be fully emplaced during a period of phasing-in of disarmament agreements" (p. 54). (Clandestine arms production after introduction of inspection is agreed to be much more difficult.) But Evasion Team B, instead of coming out in favor of an international force, asks: "Why not accept the fact that the inventory of existing stocks cannot be checked, and that mutual destruction capabilities—sometimes called mutual deterrence capabilities—will continue to exist in the United States and the USSR, no matter what agreement is signed? Why make it necessary for either country to evade the agreement to keep such a retaliatory power (as cannot be prevented in any case)? Instead, sanction its existence" (p. 280).

Sanctioning of a bipolar deterrent system would no doubt avoid many of the difficulties involved in establishing an international nuclear force—obvious difficulties of location and strategy hardly touched on by any of the writers under review, and currently inviting a major technical study. It is also assumed by advocates of bipolar deterrence that the nth-country problem would be solved and that the balance of terror would be most stable under a tight bipolar arrangement.[4] Advocacy of the latter, however, frequently takes too much for granted the continuing compliance of other nations with the bloc-leaders' disposing of world affairs. The non-leaders may be more willing to accept general disarmament given a third and international force than given the present kind of dichotomy.

The principal reason for accepting bipolar deterrence is a desire to prevent "further weapons development, production, and accumulation anywhere in the world" (Melman, ed., p. 280). Evasion Team B, that is, has its eye on the *qualitative* arms race, the all-too-successful search after new types of weapons. Deterrent theory of course suggests that changes of weapon-system are likely to be for the worse—i.e.,

[4] These assumptions seem generally to be held in the United Kingdom, the United States, and the USSR. They are questioned in the present writer's *Power Politics and the Growing Nuclear Club*, Policy Memorandum No. 20, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, June 8, 1959.

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likely to upset the balance of terror established by nuclear weapons.[5] Certainly there can be no guarantee that military innovations will be symmetrical, or will not strongly favor the first strike—e.g., Project Argus, which might easily have done so.

Evidently, no scheme of control over existing weapons can be anything but ephemeral unless the nations' military research and development are also stopped. Slick, Russell, Noel-Baker, and some of the contributors to *Inspection for Disarmament* make this point strongly, but none of them is explicit enough as to how further research and development might be prevented. It is no longer easy—if it ever was—to distinguish between military and non-military research. Suppose existing nuclear forces are frozen in the bipolar deterrent posture recommended by Evasion Team B: if some breakthrough, made in an apparently non-military field of research, is thought by someone close to government to have revolutionary military application, then a national government would surely be tempted at least to investigate it in case other nations should do so first—cf. the development of the atom and hydrogen bombs themselves.[6] Though it appears very difficult to manufacture nuclear weapons in the face of an inspection-system, it may not be impossible to make newer types of weapon—objects that need not carry the word "weapon" stamped on them, and that might be disguised in a form that would not interest inspectors. The two conditions necessary for the qualitative arms race thus continuing would seem to be the advance of science and the continued existence of autonomous nation-states. Yet only an autonomous and sovereign government or governments can support an inspectorate and enforce its findings. World government could not wholly solve this problem without gross interferences with personal liberty, since a subversive or particularist conspiracy might try at any time to develop new weapons.

V

The books under review do not come satisfactorily to grips with the problem of the qualitative arms race. (However, in their proposals for an international force they may have the concept of an institution that could be of service. If an international force also had researchers and developers at its service, national governments would have stronger

[5] For the contrary view—that the qualitative arms race is essentially non-explosive—see Samuel P. Huntington, "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results," in *Public Policy: Year Book of the Graduate School of Public Administration of Harvard University, 1958*, Cambridge, Mass., pp. 41-86.

[6] Noel-Baker, *The Arms Race*, pp. 34-37.

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motives for seeking the international group's collaboration in the development of possible new weapon-systems.) Other and more obvious problems also receive less attention than they may deserve.

One of the latter consists in the difference between the military doctrine of the Soviet Union and of the West. A scheme of arms control based upon deterrent theory may well fail to appeal to the Russians because their own strategic thinking has been developed along other lines. In illustration: Noel-Baker has several remarkable passages in which he calls attention to "the Moment of Hope: May 10th, 1955"—the day on which the Russian delegates to the UN Sub-Committee on Disarmament suddenly offered a paper incorporating and accepting proposals for a graduated but eventually complete nuclear disarmament, tied to drastic conventional disarmament, such as had been urged upon them by the Western delegates at least since the Anglo-French Memorandum of June 1954. He points out that before May 1955 the USSR had appeared resistant to appeals for the combination of conventional with nuclear disarmament; but he is puzzled that in September 1955, after the Geneva meeting of July, the West and in particular the United States reversed its position and drew back from the proposals incorporated in the Russian declaration of May, insisting instead upon President Eisenhower's "open skies" proposal to guard against surprise attack. A section of *The Arms Race* (pp. 28-31) is given over to the question, "Why did the Western governments change?" Noel-Baker suggests that the "thinking that inspired the United States policy of 1952-55" had been "eroded by the arms race." In a sense the suggestion is correct; but the speeches of Messrs. Stassen and Dulles from which he quotes hint at a more specific answer.

In 1955, what later became known as mutual deterrence was already considered in the West to be capable of producing a viable international system. It was recognized that mutual deterrence required a lower as well as, or even more than, an upper limitation of nuclear armaments. The possibility, long recognized by both East and West, that some small part of a nuclear stockpile might be concealed despite the most rigorous inspection and controls would seem to imply that, after a disarmament treaty, the nice determination of safe ratios of nuclear forces (i.e., points of stable equilibrium and non-explosiveness), whether at zero or some other very low level, would not be easy, and that in any case confidence in the equilibrium would be shaken by knowledge of the possibility of hiding stockpiles. It is thus an hypothesis that the United States government, along with others in the West, had, in mid-1955, come to a point of view much like that of Evasion Team B.

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Now, there is no evidence that the USSR, during its recent reformulation of military doctrine, has adopted the concept of mutual deterrence as understood in the West. Deterrence rationalizes the *status quo*. An intellectual climate favorable to utilitarianism and probabilistic calculations—and alien to Marxism-Leninism—produced it. Even if Soviet thinkers have come to many particular conclusions shared by Westerners, they are not likely to have espoused a view like Mr. Stassen's: ". . . if armaments, armed forces and military expenditure are brought down to too low a level, then . . . instead of the prospects of peace being improved, the danger of war is increased."[7] Above all, either side's view of its own preferences—as among disarmament, rearmament, or *status quo*—is likely to change with its perception of changes of fortunes in the arms race; but an agreement to disarm can be reached only when both parties much prefer, to the *status quo*, one single, distinct prospect of disarmament. We should not expect occasions when that is the case to be very frequent.

To complain of omissions from four such gallant works on disarmament is perhaps ungracious, and never more so than in the case of Noel-Baker's. Because practical efforts toward arms control, unlike most other movements of reform, are never cumulative, perseverance in them is like the perseverance of the saints—an affair of ever new beginnings. A critic may also be considered obliged to stand ready with his own alternative proposal or analysis. This article, therefore, will conclude with some notes and suggestions about deterrence and arms control.

VI

Supposing the unlikely—that *all* nuclear weapons should be destroyed, and should be known to have been destroyed, as the result of a disarmament agreement—one could still argue that an effective deterrent of even conventional warfare might be produced by the realization that if the conditions of agreement were to be grossly violated, it would be very much a gamble how many nuclear weapons could be fabricated by each of the contestants, and how quickly. In this extended sense, zero levels of the nuclear arms and of the means of their delivery may be compatible with the operation of mutual deterrence of a sort.

Zero, or practically zero, levels of offensive armament considered in the context of such fiduciary deterrence, formally speaking, should provide the least explosive, the inert, military relationship. When

[7] Quoted in *The Arms Race*, p. 29.

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continents confront each other, a distinction between offensive and defensive weapons may still be meaningful. But when sub-continental Powers share common frontiers, the distinction blurs, and systems of inspection would need to be much more stringent, or political conditions peculiarly favorable to mutual security.

If there can be no guarantee against the clandestine retention of some small proportion of an existing nuclear stockpile, it may be worth considering the stratagem of greatly increasing, for every potential nuclear Power, the ranges and the numbers of targets which an aggressor would need to destroy with certainty in a first strike, at the same time reducing greatly the proportion of those targets which contained weapons with nuclear warheads. The most favorable illustration would require an era of cheap and mobile or extremely hardened long-range rockets. These would have been loaded, under inspection but randomly and by some double-blind technique, a few with nuclear warheads but most with dummies. An inspector or team could then be stationed at each launching-site. Elimination of all of a victim's weapons would then be practically impossible, provided the manufacture of quantities of new warheads were preventable by inspection, and there would be no temptation to retaliate immediately since it would pay the victim of an attack to have the attacker shoot off all his rockets. This latter feature might go some way to meet the moral objections of the nuclear abnegators mentioned above. The whole stratagem would also be compatible with the devices of an international force and weapons-development group previously discussed. But it would also require radical conventional disarmament, since an international conventional force seems less possible than a nuclear one.

That and several other possible adaptations of military technology may differ in one respect from most previous proposals for arms control: something might be done about them unilaterally, without waiting upon an agreement of all parties. (Sole reliance upon a retaliatory force of nuclear submarines and Polaris missiles would be another example of a unilateral "disarming" stratagem.) At this point, advocates of disarmament may join hands with deterrent theorists, whose theme has always been "peace through military technology."

Here it should be evident that the subject matter of strategic studies and of studies in arms control are identical. The talents required in the two fields are the same. But general strategy and the development of weapons are perennial concerns of the nation-state and of its officers, while disarmament is only occasionally so, and in any case is usually pursued by governments with some admixture of power-political mo-

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tives. Civilian and non-official agitators for disarmament are thus often as handicapped as civilian advocates of changes in military strategy. Only a few, like Noel-Baker, have the advantage of belonging to an institution such as Her Majesty's Opposition, whose business is to criticize; or, like Professor Melman, can benefit from the peculiarly American *entente* among government, the military, and the academics. Even the idealists of disarmament need a point to stand on, which perhaps explains why a majority of them are churchmen or scientists—members, that is, of professedly international communities.

That there should be a continuing non-governmental discussion and study of arms control, at the high standard maintained by most of the works reviewed in this article, is desirable both for its own sake and as a means of providing background for the formation of government policy. Some international forum, perhaps a journal, not annexed to any one line or policy, might help to ensure continuity. The conflicts of presupposition and doctrines between Eastern and Western proposals for arms control as mentioned above might be disentangled by neutral and technical study from the matters of substance under negotiation, and the perils of the coming decade's qualitative arms race be kept before the world.

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CHINA, COMMUNISM, AND THE UNITED STATES

By MICHAEL LINDSAY

Conrad Brandt, *Stalin's Failure in China, 1924-1927*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1958, 226 pp. $4.75.
John King Fairbank, *The United States and China*, revised ed., Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1958, 365 pp. $5.50.

I

STALIN'S Failure in China deals with the period of Communist-Kuomintang relations in the 1920's about which a good deal has already been published. Isaac's *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* appeared over twenty years ago and, though written from a Trotskyist point of view, was well documented. Since 1945 there have been Schwartz's *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*, North's *Moscow and the Chinese Communists*, and other still more recent works. The new material in Mr. Brandt's book comes mainly from the Trotsky archives at Harvard and from evidence supplied by Chang Kuo-t'ao.

It becomes clear that in the matter of China, as on other questions, Trotsky was quite an effective critic of Stalin but had little to offer in the way of a constructive alternative. In this case, the evidence strongly suggests that Trotsky did not start to take any serious interest in China until March 1927, by which time it was almost certainly too late for any change in Communist policy to have prevented Chiang Kai-shek's seizure of power. It is possible that the policies advocated by Trotsky might have made the Communist defeat less complete, but it is highly unlikely that they could have prevented it.

Ch'en Tu-hsiu is very effectively cleared by Mr. Brandt of the charges made against him in official Communist histories. Far from being an advocate of close association with the Kuomintang, he is shown to have had serious misgivings about this policy from the very beginning but to have again and again allowed his private judgment to be overruled by obedience to Comintern directives. Lominadze, who arrived in China in July 1927, was given the mission of making Ch'en Tu-hsiu the scapegoat for Stalin's mistakes and had to use Comintern authority to secure acceptance of his objectives by the Central Committee.

There is a point here on which one would like to have further explanation. We are told that at the meeting of the plenum of the Central Committee in August 1922 Ch'en Tu-hsiu and four other

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members strongly opposed the entry of Communist Party members into the Kuomintang (p. 30). But on page 157 we are told that Ch'en Tu-hsiu and two of these other members were among the four Communists who had joined the Kuomintang in 1922.

The most interesting part of the book is its analysis of the way in which Communist theory influenced Communist policy. The Second Congress of the Comintern in 1920 had approved the *Theses on the National and Colonial Question*, drafted by Lenin, which laid down that Communists should form "temporary agreements or even alliances" with national liberation movements, provided that they preserved "the independent character of the proletarian movement" (p. 3). But the *Theses* did not really reconcile the conflicting views of Lenin, who was inclined to think that the Asian proletariat was too weak to seize power on its own, and of Roy, who was inclined to believe that the workers could manage without bourgeois allies. At the same Congress, Lenin argued that the British Labor Party was not a proper political party at all, but a federation led by petty-bourgeois reformers which the Communists could infiltrate and turn into a real working-class party.

There was, therefore, a body of official Communist doctrine, sanctioned by the posthumous authority of Lenin, which could be quoted in favor of widely differing policies in China. It was clear that, in Asian countries, the Communists were supposed to work with bourgeois nationalist allies, but who were the right allies? In practice the Russians backed any warlord who made the necessary protestations of revolutionary sympathies: ". . . they converted each Chinese General with whom they had struck a bargain into a 'revolutionary bourgeois,' though in fact he could not be called either. When such an ally showed his true face, he ceased to be 'revolutionary'; but the role he had played would forthwith be assigned to another, like-minded actor. . . . Stalin did, to be sure, go on record with the much quoted dictum that 'in China armed revolution is fighting against armed counterrevolution.' But in practice he could not tell the two apart until after events had made the distinction for him" (pp. 9-10). Again, ". . . Lenin had never informed his followers how they were to deal with nationalist parties as distinguished from nationalist movements" (p. 8), so what was the right attitude toward the Kuomintang, and how closely should the Communists ally themselves with it? In non-Marxist terms a plan of infiltrating the Kuomintang in the hope of eventually controlling it could have seemed the best strategy, but how could this be justified in terms of Marxist orthodoxy, for which a multi-class party was a

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monstrosity? The situation could be saved by applying the precedent stated by Lenin for the British Labor Party, in spite of the fact that Borodin had helped to give the Kuomintang a Leninist party organization. And this determination to think in Marxian categories distorted Communist thinking. "The claim of Marxism to be a science rests on its claim to yield foresight. But it was precisely the Marxist-Leninist equipment of Stalin's mind which blurred his foresight in China. . . . Not that he let himself be enslaved by the tenets of his doctrine. He was always ready to twist them around until they suited his purpose. Yet ready as he was to adjust to reality, he usually saw reality in the Marxist-Leninist mirror. . . . What divided Stalin and Trotsky on the China issue was their obsession with different Leninist stereotypes" (pp. 10-11).

An important result of this way of thinking was to make it extremely easy for the non-Communist Chinese leaders to out-maneuver the Comintern. Mr. Brandt perhaps underemphasizes the element of pure confusion. Local Soviet advisers had sometimes to work through two interpreters, Chinese-English, English-Russian, which must have lessened their understanding of the situation. But Moscow was often ready to overrule the views of the men on the spot in favor of the revolutionary protestations of some Kuomintang leader which fitted their preconceived views. It was only after his massacre of Communists in Shanghai in April 1927 that the Russians refused to believe any longer in Chiang Kai-shek as an ally.

The Soviet leaders were also inclined greatly to exaggerate the extent to which their apparatus could put over any policy in China. In 1926 the Soviet Politburo believed that it faced the threat of an Anglo-Japanese alliance in China and decided to buy off Japan by getting the Kuomintang and Chinese Communists to offer acceptance of Japanese rights in Manchuria. This particular project did not get very far, but the final break between the left-wing Kuomintang and the Communists was produced by a Comintern proposal to organize armed forces under Communist control and purge the Kuomintang army of "reactionary" officers, a proposal to which the left-wing Kuomintang was supposed to agree.

The interesting question which the book does not discuss is whether any Communist strategy could have succeeded in the 1920's. The answer is probably not, if success is defined as a Communist seizure of power at that time. It is, however, likely that other strategies would have left the Communists in a much stronger position than they actually had at the end of the 1920's. An honest acceptance of the

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Kuomintang alliance would have left them in a strong position but facing the risk that a reforming Kuomintang might destroy the basis for a Communist revolution. A refusal to accept the close alliance with the Kuomintang would have lessened their opportunities to organize the workers and peasants at the time and would, perhaps, have prolonged the warlord era, but it would probably have left the Communists a stronger party as of 1930.

The actual Communist victory of 1949 depended a good deal on luck. Mao's discovery of the effectiveness of peasant-based guerrilla warfare was, perhaps, more accidental than Mr. Brandt makes clear. The success of the Long March was by no means a foregone conclusion. Rather different timing of Japanese pressure might have enabled the Kuomintang to eliminate the new Communist base in North Shensi, and so on.

Finally, one must ask to what degree, thirty years later, Communist thinking is still blurred by seeing reality in a Marxist-Leninist mirror. Obviously, more recent Communist strategy has not made the same mistakes, or as serious mistakes, as in the 1920's, but it seems likely that the obsession with Marxist-Leninist stereotypes is still very important and may still produce serious blunders.

II

In his first chapter in *The United States and China,* Professor Fairbank contends that American policy toward China has been confused by a failure to understand the nature of Chinese society and the traditions of Chinese history. And this same point is stressed by Professor McKay and Mr. Sumner Welles in their introductions. Accordingly, the main emphasis of the book is on an attempt to remedy this lack of understanding. Out of 320 pages of text, 147 are devoted to Chinese society and Chinese history up to the 1920's, 84 to the period from the 1920's to 1945, and 29 to China under Communist rule. United States-Chinese relations are considered directly only in the first and last chapters and in two chapters on "Our Traditional China Policy" and "United States Policy and the Nationalist Collapse"—a total of 61 pages.

This feat of historical compression has been done with very great skill. In dealing with such a vast subject in so short a space, the author has inevitably had to make broad generalizations and to select the points which seemed to him the most important or interesting. To say that one would like to argue with Professor Fairbank on some points of interpretation or emphasis is not really a relevant criticism. If one were asked to recommend a single book from which a reader

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with little previous knowledge of China could get a clearer understanding of the nature of Chinese traditional society, of the basic facts of Chinese history, and of the complicated developments of the past thirty or forty years, this book would be an obvious choice.

The real weakness appears where Professor Fairbank leaves the field of history to analyze policy or discuss the conditions of social change (which raises the interesting general question of how far the historian's approach is an adequate one for international relations). Granted that American policy has suffered from an inadequate understanding of China, the obvious questions which need to be answered are: What new policy should follow from an adequate understanding of China? Could a different American policy in the 1940's have changed the whole course of development in China?

On the first question, the 1948 edition of this book ended with some ten pages of suggestions for American policy toward China. In this 1958 edition, however, definite suggestions for American policy have almost disappeared. We are told that "Living in the same world with a nationalistic, overpopulated, poverty-stricken Communist-managed China may be a challenge that will make or break us. The new phase of our relations will demand hard study, emotional maturity, skilled personnel. These call for effort by American citizens, not merely the United States Government" (p. 320). There are only the vaguest hints as to the sort of policy which might result from such effort.

On the second question, Professor Fairbank's conclusion seems to be that no practicable American policy could have made much difference to the course of events. He writes: "My view of this controversial question [United States policy and the Nationalist collapse] is that the American capacity to influence the Chinese scene in the 1940's has been exaggerated" and, "My answer to the imponderable question, Could we have saved China from Communism? is: Not without an utterly different approach prior to 1944; not at all thereafter." And he offers the consolation that "Considering the suffering that rapid modernization of any sort was bound to bring upon the Chinese people, we need not entirely regret our inability to be China's model for the brutal task of remaking and industrializing her ancient society in the shortest possible time" (pp. 261 and 262).

After all that has been claimed for the importance of understanding China, one cannot help feeling that these conclusions are somewhat of an anticlimax. Moreover, it would be possible to draw considerably different conclusions from the same historical data.

To work out correct conclusions about the results of policy or the

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possibilities of social change one needs not only correct initial data but also correct theories about society. The historian, as historian, can provide the correct initial data, but when he goes on to analysis and working out conclusions he must bring in theory from economics, political science, social anthropology, and so on. If he does not admit this explicitly, it only means that he is introducing his theories as implicit assumptions. And theories introduced as implicit assumptions are seldom clearly thought out.

In principle, Professor Fairbank fully recognizes the importance of satisfactory theory. Indeed, he argues that America failed in China through failure to provide a system of ideas in terms of which China's problems could be solved. But when he himself draws conclusions from the data he provides so competently as a historian, he brings in very doubtful theoretical assumptions from the fields of economics, political theory, and so forth.

A continually recurring assumption is that civil liberty and economic progress are mutually exclusive objectives, that people in economically backward countries will always prefer economic progress, and that, therefore, liberty is a luxury which can only be enjoyed in countries with a high material standard of living. For example: "We may well argue that our evaluation of the individual and the institutions by which we protect him are preferable. But we cannot show how our view can be realized within the crowded circumstances of Chinese life" (p. 2). Or, "Like it or not, the Chinese populace will have to put up with some kind of centralized and dictatorial (whether or not Communist) planning and controls for the foreseeable future simply because there is no alternative in prospect by which to feed them, employ the youth, and satisfy national pride" (p. 316).

Here Professor Fairbank has accepted far too uncritically a theory which is fashionable but which cannot really be defended except in a very qualified form. Rapid economic progress in an underdeveloped country does require a government willing and able to overrule powerful vested interests and to secure a higher rate of investment than would be produced by voluntary saving. These requirements may rule out American-style democratic institutions and free enterprise economy, but they do not necessarily imply totalitarianism. As Professor Fairbank himself admits (p. 303), the objective of the Chinese Communist regime is not popular welfare but national power, and this choice of objective accounts for a large part of the sacrifices imposed on the Chinese people. And, while centralized dictatorial planning can get remarkable results in top-priority projects, it has very serious

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defects for over-all economic efficiency. Much of the extreme dictatorial centralization and control in present-day China would not make sense in an economy directed to popular welfare and can only be explained as a means to increase the power of the Communist Party, or as a result of doctrinaire theories. Again, it is likely that a considerable degree of civil liberty would be a help rather than a hindrance to economic progress under a regime which was really trying to serve the people. Free discussion and criticism would help the government to find the best policies and the rule of law would be a very effective way to prevent officials from abusing their powers.

If, as is possible, Mao Tse-tung really believed that the Chinese regime was serving the interests of the people, his experiment in 1957 of allowing free criticism to resolve "contradictions among the people" was quite logical. And the results of this experiment cast serious doubts on the argument that the Chinese people voluntarily sacrificed their liberty to secure the economic progress which a totalitarian system could offer them. The students from worker or peasant families at the People's University, the group which had probably gained most from the revolution, were much more critical of Communist control than the more middle-class student body at Peking University. Professor Fairbank's account of this period (p. 297) might give the rather misleading impression that serious criticism of the regime came only from the older, Western-educated intellectuals.

This raises another important theoretical issue, the stability of totalitarian regimes. Professor Fairbank says: "What we see in mainland China today is a new all-powerful bureaucracy, coercing the populace but drawn from it for the purpose; a new elite urging on their labors, organizing their lives. This new totalitarian system has profound evils built into it but it has remained viable in Russia. A less thorough and more superficial autocracy proved viable under one Chinese dynasty after another. We cannot conclude that Chinese Communism's obvious evils are likely to be sufficient to destroy it" (pp. 319-20). It is certainly true that extremely oppressive regimes have survived for centuries in many parts of the world but this does not really answer a question about their degree of stability: How far has their survival depended on the exclusion and repression of new ideas? The old Chinese empire was probably an extreme example of successful indoctrination in an orthodox ideology, official Confucianism. When it became no longer able to prevent the introduction of new ideas, the new ideas took some time to spread but, in a few generations, wrecked the old system.

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Professor Fairbank is certainly right in stressing the continued importance of elements of the old Chinese cultural tradition, but at times he seems inclined to exaggerate this into the theory that people's thinking is entirely limited by their cultural inheritance. The most quotable illustration comes in the 1948 edition (p. 191) where, after describing the emancipation of women, he goes on to say, "This new freedom of women must be a response to elements long latent in the Chinese system of values. . . ." The issue has considerable practical importance. If Chinese political thinking cannot escape from a long tradition of centralized bureaucratic rule, the Communist regime is likely to be stable. If the Chinese people can think in terms of some better alternative system, the regime will only be meta-stable—its survival will depend on its ability to exclude or repress knowledge of a better alternative.

It follows from all this that an analysis of Professor Fairbank's historical data in terms of different theoretical assumptions could yield conclusions widely different from his. By changing his assumption about the conditions for economic progress, one could reach the conclusion that China might have developed in a very different way if American power in the 1940's had been used by people who understood Chinese society, who opposed both neo-Confucianism and Stalinist communism, and who worked for developments which were possible under Chinese conditions—supporting and protecting the liberal intelligentsia, backing projects for rural reconstruction and mass education, and so on.

Proper understanding of Chinese society, for which Professor Fairbank pleads, is certainly an essential condition for an effective future policy. But different analyses of totalitarian society would imply radically different policies. If the analysis suggests that totalitarianism is likely to be a stable system in China and not necessarily expansionist, then a search for coexistence is the only sensible objective. If the analysis suggests that totalitarianism has only limited stability and is likely to be aggressive, then the sensible long-term objective of policy would be to seek means of producing some change in the system. To produce a satisfactory analysis of totalitarianism, and perhaps of possible developments from totalitarianism, may be the most important task.

To sum up, Professor Fairbank has given us a very good summary of Chinese history but apparently has not realized how much any satisfactory analysis of the data he presents as a historian must depend on a critical choice of theories from other branches of social science.

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

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